People v. Phila. Reinsurance Corp.

• Decision Date: 29 July 2021
• Docket Number: Appellate Division No.: 37-2020- 00200183-CL-EN -CTL
• Citation: 286 Cal.Rptr.3d 236,70 Cal.App.5th Supp. 10
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff(s) and Respondent(s), v. PHILADELPHIA REINSURANCE CORPORATION, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Superior Court

70 Cal.App.5th Supp. 10

286 Cal.Rptr.3d 236

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff(s) and Respondent(s),

v.PHILADELPHIA REINSURANCE CORPORATION, Defendant and Appellant.

Appellate Division No.: 37-2020- 00200183-CL-EN -CTL

Appellate Division, Superior Court, California. SAN DIEGO COUNTY.

Filed July 29, 2021

Crystal Rorabaugh, Newport Beach, for Defendant and Appellant.

Walter de Lorrell III, Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

DECISION/STATEMENT OF REASONS (CCP § 77(d)) BY THE COURT

JULIA C. KELETY, Presiding Judge, Appellate Division On August 31, 2020, the trial court denied Philadelphia Reinsurance Corporation's motion to set aside the summary judgment entered by the trial court resulting in the bail bond forfeiture. The trial court's minute order states in part:

Here, defendant Maria Campos failed to appear in court on March 28, 2019 and the bail bond was forfeited. The clerk mailed the notice of forfeiture on April 2, 2019, and thus, Defendant [Philadelphia Reinsurance Corporation] had 185 days from April 2, 2019, to secure the criminal defendant's appearance in court. On October 18, 2019, the court granted an extension of the appearance period through April 17, 2020. The court shut down due to the Covid-19 pandemic from March 17, 2020 through May 22, 2020. Monday, May 25, 2020, was a holiday (Memorial Day). This period of the Court's closure was deemed to be holiday time for purposes of computing time (see Code Civ. Proc. Section 12 ), but it did not "toll" Defendant's time to file a motion to vacate the forfeiture. Thus, as would be true for any response to a motion that was due by a date occurring during the closure, Defendant's time for filing any request to vacate the forfeiture – if it was going to file one at all – was extended [to] May 26, 2020, the first court business day after the closure. Code Civ. Proc. Section 12a. Defendant did not make a motion at that time, nor at any time up to the entry of summary judgment on June 11, 2020. The court's entry of summary judgment on that date was well within the 90-day period specified in Penal Code section 1306. Therefore, the summary judgment order is timely and valid.

This appeal followed.

The Appellate Division grants the People's Motion for Judicial Notice of the Judicial Council's Circulating Order Memorandum ( Evid. Code, § 459 ), and following de novo review, we conclude that Emergency Rule 9 does not apply to bail bond forfeiture motions and affirm the trial court's order denying the surety's motion to set aside the summary judgment.

Emergency Rule 9 is Unambiguous

As recently explained by Division One of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in All of US or None – Riverside Chapter v. Hamrick (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 751, 279 Cal.Rptr.3d 422 :

" ‘The rules applicable to interpretation of the rules of court are similar to those governing statutory construction. [Citation.] Under those rules of construction, our primary objective is to determine the drafters' intent. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘If the rule's language is clear and unambiguous, it governs. [Citation.] Experience teaches, however, that unforeseen ambiguities can and do come to light despite the drafters' considered efforts to avoid them. In such cases, courts may consult appropriate extrinsic sources to clarify the drafters' intent. [Citation.]’ " ( Rossa v. D.L. Falk Construction, Inc. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 387, 391–392, 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 329, 266 P.3d 1022 ( Rossa ).)

Emergency Rule 9 was adopted by the Judicial Council on April 6, 2020 following Governor Newsom's March 27, 2020 order giving the Judicial Council the authority to take the necessary action to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. Emergency Rule 9 ("Tolling statutes of limitations for civil causes of actions"), as amended on May 29, 2021, states:

(a) Tolling statutes of limitations over 180 days Notwithstanding any other law, the statutes of limitations and repose for civil causes of action that exceed 180 days are tolled from April 6, 2020, until October 1, 2020.

(b) Tolling statutes of limitations of 180 days or less Notwithstanding any other law, the statutes of limitations and repose for civil causes of action that are 180 days or less are tolled from April 6, 2020, until August 3, 2020.

Appendix I amended effective May 29, 2020; adopted effective April 6, 2020.

The language is clear and unambiguous; Emergency Rule 9 tolls "statutes of limitations and repose for civil causes of action." Statutes of limitations and statutes of repose are specific statutes that serve to bar the initiation of legal proceedings after the expiration of a defined timeline.¹

Rule 9 does not toll the various statutory timelines set forth in the relevant Penal Code sections governing the procedure for the forfeiture and exoneration of bail bonds, including the 180-day timeline for defendant's appearance, the timeline for the filing of a motion by the surety to extend the 180-day timeline, and the timeline trial court's timeline for entering summary judgment as those timelines are not "statutes of limitations or repose for civil causes of action." (See Pen. Code, §§ 1305, 1305.4, and 1306.² ) These statutory and procedural timelines within the Penal Code were created to ensure a defendant's appearance in a criminal case. With the significant amendments to Penal Code section 1305 et seq. in 1927, "... the Legislature purposely changed the character of proceedings for forfeiture of bail. .... The effect was to remove bail forfeiture proceedings from the category of judicial forfeitures and place them within the classification of legislative or statutory forfeitures." ( People v. Burton (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d Supp. 878, 883, 305 P.2d 302 ( Burton ), disapproved on other grounds in People v. United Bonding Ins. Co . (1971) 5 Cal.3d 898, 905, 98 Cal.Rptr. 57, 489 P.2d 1385.) "Prior to 1927 the method provided for enforcing a forfeiture of bail under Penal Code Sections 1305 and 1306 was by civil action upon the bond, brought by the District Attorney , which action could only be commenced after a declaration of forfeiture by the court in which the principal had failed to appear, and the lapse of twenty days more during which the non-appearance remained unexcused." ( Burton, supra , at p. 881, 305 P.2d 302 ; italics added.) "Since 1927 the Penal Code Sections 1305, 1306 has required the court in which a bail bond has been filed to perform specified acts as a means of fixing liability of bail after the unexcused non-appearance of the defendant. There is no civil action on the bond by the district attorney, as formerly." ( Burton, supra , at p. 881, 305 P.2d 302 ; italics added.) Bail forfeiture pursuant to Penal Code section 1305 et seq. is now a "a pure legislative type of forfeiture in which the statute itself not only transfers title of the forfeited property but within itself prescribes the notice to be given the former owner and the procedural steps essential to constitute compliance with the due process clause of the Constitution." ( People v. Grant (1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 794, 797, 127 P.2d 19.)

The timelines set forth in Penal Code section 1305 et seq. stand in stark contrast to the one-year statute of limitations for "[a] [civil] action upon a statute for a forfeiture or penalty to the people of this state" set forth in subdivision (b) of section 340 contained in the Code of Civil procedure, Part 2 (entitled "Of Civil Actions"), Title 2 (entitled "Of the Time of Commencing Civil Actions"), Chapter 3 (entitled "The Time of Commencing Actions Other than for the Recovery of Real Property"). Unlike the various statutory and procedural timelines set forth in the Penal Code that were properly applied by the trial court in this matter, the statute of limitations set forth in Code of Civil Procedure, section 340 (b) would be an example of a "statute[ ] of limitations ... for [a] civil cause[ ] of action that exceed[s] 180 days" that was expressly and unequivocally intended to be tolled by Emergency Rule 9. "Where no action for a forfeiture is required to be brought, or where the statute itself prescribes the periods within which the procedural steps must be taken, certainly said section 340 of the Code of Civil Procedure would have no application...." ( People v. Grant, supra, 52 Cal.App.2d at p. 799, 127 P.2d 19, original italics.)

Emergency Rule 9 does not extend timelines for motions in pending actions

To the extent that Rule 9 may be ambiguous, the Advisory Committee Comment to the rule and the Judicial Council's Circulating Order Memorandum support the conclusion that Rule 9 does not extend the timelines set forth in the Penal Code sections governing bail bond forfeiture procedures.

The Advisory Committee Comment states:

Emergency rule 9 is intended to apply broadly to toll any statute of limitations on the filing of a pleading in court asserting a civil cause of action . The term "civil causes of action" includes special proceedings. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 312, 363 ["action," as used in title 2 of the code (Of the Time of Commencing Civil Actions), is construed "as including a special proceeding of a civil nature"; special proceedings of a civil nature include all proceedings in title 3 of the code, including mandamus actions under §§ 1085, 1088.5, and 1094.5-all the types of petitions for writ made for California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and land use challenges]; see also Pub. Resources Code, § 21167(a) - (e) [setting limitations periods for civil "action[s]" under CEQA].)

The rule also applies to statutes of limitations on filing of causes of action in court found in codes other than the Code of Civil Procedure, including the limitations on causes of action found in, for example, the Family Code and Probate Code.

(Italics added.) Although the Advisory Committee Comment explains that Rule 9 is to be applied "broadly," any such "broad" application is expressly limited to toll "statutes of limitations on the filing of a pleading in court asserting a...