People v. Phillips
| Decision Date | 23 March 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 48726,48726 |
| Parties | , 6 Ill.Dec. 215 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Michael PHILLIPS, Appellee. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Scott Wilzbach, State's Atty., Salem , for the People.
Michael J. Rosborough, Deputy State Appellate Defender, and Daniel M. Kirwan, Asst. State Appellate Defender, Mount Vernon, for appellee.
Defendant, Michael Phillips, was indicted in the circuit court of Marion County for unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Criminal complaints also were filed against him in Effingham County charging him with two burglaries. The charges were consolidated for a hearing before the circuit court of Marion County as provided by section 5--4--2(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 38, par. 1005--4--2(b)). The defendant then filed a petition informing the court that he believed himself to be an addict within the meaning of section 3.03 of the Dangerous Drug Abuse Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 91 1/2, par. 120.3--3), and that pursuant to section 8 of that act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 91 1/2, par. 120.8) he elected to undergo treatment under the supervision of the Department of Mental Health instead of prosecution. The court found the defendant to be ineligible because he was on probation for a prior offense and his probation officer would not consent to such treatment. The defendant then pleaded guilty to the charges against him and was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment for 3 to 9 years on each charge. The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, reversed and remanded the cause for another determination of defendant's eligibility under the Act. (39 Ill.App.3d 387, 350 N.E.2d 363.) We granted the State leave to appeal. The issue before this court is the constitutionality of section 8(e) of the Act, which requires the consent of the appropriate probation authority before a probationer can be eligible for treatment under the Act.
Section 8 of the Act provides:
'An addict charged with or convicted of a crime is eligible to elect treatment under the supervision of the Department instead of prosecution of probation, as the case may be, unless * * * (e) the addict is on probation or parole and the appropriate parole or probation authority does not consent to that election * * *.'
At the time of the defendant's petition for treatment under the Act he was on probation for a previous offense and was under the supervision of the probation office of Marion County. In denying defendant's petition the court stated:
'Let the record show that this case is set for trial before a jury on November 13, which is tomorrow; that there has been a motion filed for consolidation of felonies in Effingham for the purpose of a negotiated plea; that There has been no consent by the State's attorney or by the probation officer of Marion County to consent to this section of the statute to refer the defendant for treatment, and for that purpose and reason the motion will be denied.' (Emphasis added.)
The appellate court, in reversing, held that the lack of consent by defendant's probation officer was irrelevant. The majority opinion of the appellate court reasoned that the probation authority whose consent is contemplated by section 8(e) is the circuit court which admitted defendant to probation, not the probation officer. The State appealed, contending that section 8(e) requires the consent of defendant's probation officer.
In briefs and argument before this court, defendant concedes that the interpretation of section 8(e) advanced by the State is correct. Defendant argues, however, that this section of the Act, by requiring the consent of a probation officer before a defendant can be eligible for treatment, delegates to the probation officer sentencing authority which should reside with the court. In so doing, defendant argues, section 8(e) contravenes article VI, section 1 of the 1970 Constitution of the State of Illi nois: 'The judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court, an Appellate Court and Circuit Courts.'
It is, of course, indisputable that the power to impose sentence is exclusively a function of the judiciary. (See Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, par. 1005--4--1(b).) In People v. Montana, 380 Ill. 596, 44 N.E.2d 569, we declared unconstitutional certain amendments to the sentence and parole act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1941, ch. 38, par. 801 Et seq.) These amendments limited the sentencing power of a court to making only advisory recommendations as to maximum and minimum duration of imprisonment. The Division of Correction, an administrative body, was given authority to reject such recommendations and impose a different sentence. We held this to be an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power, and said that '(t)he power to impose sentence as a punishment for crime is purely judicial.' (380 Ill. 596, 608, 44 N.E.2d 569, 575.) We are here concerned only with a situation where the defendant who has been charged with a crime, but not convicted, elects treatment under the Act instead of prosecution. We hold that in such a case the authority granted to the probation officer to deny treatment under the Act to persons charged with, but not convicted of, a criminal offense does not infringe upon the court's constitutional right to impose sentence.
The Unified Code of Corrections defines 'sentence' as 'the disposition imposed by the court on a convicted defendant.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, par. 1005--1--19.) This court, prior to the Unified Code, repeatedly characterized 'sentence' as the judicially declared consequence of the defendant's guilt, either confessed or ascertained by a verdict. People ex rel. Barrett v. Bardens, 394 Ill. 511, 68 N.E.2d 710; People ex rel. Fullenwider v. Jenkins, 322 Ill. 33, 152 N.E. 549; People v. Murphy, 257 Ill. 564, 100 N.E. 980; Featherstone v. People, 194 Ill. 325, 62 N.E. 684.
The Act provides an alternative to the usual criminal justice procedures; it allows a criminal defendant with a drug abuse problem to Avoid the criminal justice machinery and the ultimate result of either acquittal or sentence. A defendant who is eligible under the Act may elect to submit to treatment by the Department of Mental Health instead of prosecution. In such a case, treatment, unlike a sentence, is not a consequence of defendant's guilt. It is instead 'an...
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