People v. Pitts
| Decision Date | 01 December 1975 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Herbert PITTS and Maurice White, Defendants. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
Robert Morgenthau, Dist. Atty., New York County by Lothar Genge, New York City, for the People.
John L. Edmonds, New York City, for defendant Pitts.
Charles T. McKinney, Brooklyn, for defendant White.
Charged with Criminal Possession of Stolen Property in the First Degree, consisting of several thousand dollars worth of stolen typewriters, the defendants move to suppress those machines as evidence in the case on the ground that they were obtained by means of an unlawful search and seizure. After a hearing upon the motion at which testimony was given by two police officers and the defendant White, I find the pertinent facts to be as follows.
At about 11:15 a.m. on Sunday, August 8, 1975, two New York City police officers, Albert Horz and Gary Stryker, were on routine motor patrol in the vicinity of Houston and Chrystie Streets in lower Manhattan. Horz was driving south on Chrystie Street when they passed a Hertz rental truck parked at the curb, facing south. In passing, they saw, in the cargo area of the truck, a man, the defendant White, and a number of cartons bearing markings of 'S.C.M.' and 'I.B.M.', which White was rearranging.
The officers proceeded one block down Chrystie Street until halted by a red light. As they were waiting there, another man, the defendant Pitts, walked over to their car from the vicinity of the rental truck and, explaining that he had cut his finger on the cartons in the truck, asked them for a bandaid. Having none, the officers gave him a paper towel. In response to Horz's inquiries concerning the ownership and destination of the truck, Pitts stated that it was his and that he was bound for some place on Cherry Street; and he asked for directions to that street, which Horz supplied.
Proceeding another block south on Chrystie Street, the officers, their interest aroused, drove back to the truck to investigate, and parked behind it. Their curiosity stemmed from the facts that, in their long experience in the precinct, they had never seen or heard of business machines being delivered anywhere in this area on a Sunday; that the defendants were dressed in ordinary business suits rather than laboring clothes; and that the truck was a rented one.
Getting out of the patrol car, the officers conversed with Pitts on the street at the rear of the truck. White, who continued to work inside the cargo area, was perspiring profusely--a fact which indicated to the officers that the cartons were not empty.
Pitts, again asked whether he was the owner of the truck, replied that he was not but that he had all the appropriate papers. A rental agreement bearing the defendant White's name was produced, and White, emerging from the truck, produced his driver's license, both documents being in order.
Further asked where in particular on Cherry Street he was bound, Pitts declared that he had no address but would recognize the place by its landmarks. At about this point, Officer Horz, noticing that a shipping label on one of the cartons in the truck bore the name 'Cornell University,' asked Pitts from what point he had driven. Pitts designated Cornell University, of which he was a graduate, as his point of departure and asserted that he had been sent by a Cornell newspaper to deliver the cartons to Cherry Street. Asked if he had a bill of lading, he produced a handwritten 'inventory' listing various numbers of different styles of typewriters and their value, the total amount being more than $13,000. When Horz remarked that this was not a proper bill of lading, Pitts said that it was all that he had received but that he had the telephone number of people who could straighten the whole thing out. Upon Horz' assertion that they would have to go to the station house briefly for the purpose of having the ownership of the property verified, Pitts assured that this would be 'no problem.'
Officer Stryker then said that he would drive the truck to the police station, and he was given the keys. He opened the driver's door of the cab and, as he was entering, he moved an object, wrapped in canvas, that was in his way on the floor. Feeling a gun stock through the covering, he unwrapped the object and found a loaded rifle and a bandolier of ammunition. Stryker then left the cab and informed Officer Horz of his discovery. Horz immediately ordered the defendants to put their hands on the patrol car, patted them down and arrested them for possession of a loaded rifle inside the city limits, a violation of the New York City Administrative Code. The defendant Pitts explained that they were delivering the rifle to someone on First Street. Horz replied that the rifle was not a major problem and that they need not worry so long as the ownership of the property was verified.
With the defendants riding with Horz and Stryker in the patrol car, and the truck being driven by another police officer summoned to the scene, everyone and everything soon arrived at the 5th Precinct station house. There, Officer Horz telephoned Ithaca, New York, and spoke to the head of security for Cornell University. The latter informed him that 78 typewriters had been stolen from Cornell the previous night and gave Horz the serial numbers of a few of them. A check of the cartons and merchandise in the truck by Officer Stryker, who then entered the cargo area for the first time, quickly confirmed that this was the property stolen from Cornell. The defendants were then placed under arrest for criminal possession of stolen property, and, presumably, the truck and its cargo were thereafter driven off and impounded.
Seemingly urging an unreasonable stopping and seizure on Chrystie Street of the truck and its cargo, and improper detention or restraint of the defendants themselves during that incident, the latter contend that the ultimate arrests and search of the truck were thereby tainted with illegality, thus precluding reception of the acquired contraband as evidence in this prosecution.
These contentions appear to proceed upon the premises that most police halting and interrogation concerning possible criminal conduct amounts to 'seizure' of the person interrogated; that virtually every escorting or taking of a motor vehicle to a station house constitutes a 'seizure' of the vehicle and its contents; and that activity of the foregoing nature is almost invariably violative of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution unless the police have 'reasonable' or 'probable' cause to believe that criminal conduct has recently occurred or is afoot. It is well settled, however, that even in the absence of circumstances justifying an arrest or a seizure of property, the police frequently are authorized and, indeed, obligated to engage in reasonable investigatory activity, such as stopping persons and vehicles, street interrogation, directing people to exit automobiles, and the like. In short, such authority arises not only upon reasonable belief that criminal behavior has occurred or is imminent but also where the circumstances merely raise a reasonable Suspicion of criminality or are of such nature as to impel a person fairly sophisticated in law enforcement work to explore for possible criminal activity. (People v. Rosemond, 26 N.Y.2d 101, 104--105, 308 N.Y.S.2d 836, 838--839, 257 N.E.2d 23, 25--26; People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 444--445, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461--462, 201 N.E.2d 32, 33--34, cert. den., 379 U.S. 978, 85 S.Ct. 679, 13 L.Ed.2d 568; People v. Morales, 22 N.Y.2d 55, 290 N.Y.S.2d 898, 238 N.E.2d 307; People v. Entrialgo, 19 A.D.2d 509, 245 N.Y.S.2d 850, aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 733, 250 N.Y.S.2d 293, 199 N.E.2d 384; People v. Dread, 49 A.D.2d 401, 375 N.Y.S.2d 338 New York Law Journal p. 1, Nov. 26, 1975; Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 80 S.Ct. 1431, 4 L.Ed.2d 1688; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889; United States v. Bonanno, D.C., 180 F.Supp. 71, rev. on other grds., United States v. Bufalino, 2 Cir., 285 F.2d 408, 410; United States v. Thomas, D.C., 250 F.Supp. 771, aff'd, 2 Cir., 396 F.2d 310.) One manifestation of this general principle is, of course, the so-called stop-and-frisk doctrine--inherent in the common law and codified in New York (C.P.L. § 140.50; Terry v. Ohio, supra)--authorizing police stopping and interrogation upon reasonable 'suspicion', as distinguished from 'belief,' of the occurrence or imminence of criminal behavior.
Whether the requisite mental state required for the indicated kind of police action be labeled 'reasonable Suspicion' or some other term importing a thought process weaker than 'reasonable belief' is purely a matter of semantics. The key word is not the noun employed but the adjective 'reasonable.' Illustrations of the kinds of situations which form a 'reasonable' basis for investigation, though...
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People v. Martin
...States, 282 U.S. 694, 51 S.Ct. 240, 75 L.Ed. 629; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543; People v. Pitts, 84 Misc.2d 708, 377 N.Y.S.2d 407). ...