People v. Pitts

• Decision Date: 19 August 1971
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 54629
• Citation: 1 Ill.App.3d 120,273 N.E.2d 664
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eddie PITTS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 664

273 N.E.2d 664

1 Ill.App.3d 120

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eddie PITTS, Defendant-Appellant.

Gen. No. 54629.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

Aug. 19, 1971.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 16, 1971.

Gerald W. Getty, Public Defender, Suzanne M. Kohut, James J. Doherty, Asst. Public Defenders, Chicago, for defendant-appellant.

Edward V. Hanrahan, State's Atty., Robert A. Novelle, Henry A. Hauser, Asst. State's Attys., Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee.

McGLOON, Justice.

The defendant, Eddie Pitts, was convicted by a jury of the unlawful sale of the narcotic drug, heroin, in violation of Ill.Rev.Stat. (1969) Ch. 38, § 22--3, and sentenced to from ten to twelve years in the penitentiary. He appeals to this court from that conviction.

We reverse and remand for a new trial.

The defendant, on appeal, raises many issues. However, we will discuss only that issue upon which we base our decision. Further, since the facts are not in dispute, we will recite only those facts necessary for purposes of clarity.

The defendant raises the issue of his rights to a fair trial and due process of law. He argues that he was denied these basic rights because, among other things, the prosecution introduced incompetent evidence that the defendant had committed other crimes. This argument rests on the fact that although the defendant did not testify, the prosecution introduced testimony to the effect that the defendant was on parole at the time he was arrested for the crime in the case at bar.

The facts surrounding the introduction of the testimony in question are as follows: The defendant was arrested by a Chicago police undercover narcotics agent. The officer was working as part of a three-man team. The other two officers would follow the undercover officer to provide surveillance and presumably protection in the event of an emergency. At the time of his arrest, the defendant made several statements in the presence of the three officers which later became the basis of a pre-trial motion to suppress made by the defense counsel. At the hearing on this motion, one of the officers testified on cross-examination by defense counsel that at the time of his arrest the defendant told the officer, 'You know, I am goind to be in a lot more trouble because I am on parole for selling drugs.'

After hearing all of the testimony, the motion to suppress was denied. However, prior to concluding the hearing the prosecutor, in colloquy with the court, requested a ruling on the propriety of placing certain admissions, including the testimony in question, before the jury. The court responded, 'However, any reference to any kind of record by these police officers, if any, that this defendant had, would be highly inappropriate, and I think prejudicial to this defendant.' The prosecution expressed their acquiescence, and the case proceeded to trial.

At trial, although the defendant did not testify, the following testimony was elicited by the prosecution from one of the arresting officers:

Q. Do you recall what Mr. Pitts stated in relation to my last comment, Detective (naming officer)?

A. Yes, sir, I do.

Q. What would that be?

A. He said that he was in a lot of trouble and that he was on parole.

At this point, the court denied defense counsel's motion for a mistrial, struck the answer and instructed the jury to disregard it. At the close of the evidence, the trial judge denied the defendant's motion for new trial and motion for arrest of judgment, and the defendant was sentenced as previously described.

On appeal the State argues that any denial of due process that might be caused by the statements in question was prevented by the fact that the trial judge had the testimony struck from the record and instructed the jury to disregard it.

We note that the defendant brings this argument of incompetent evidence on the constitutional grounds of denial of fair trial and due process. While the general rules for the admission of such evidence have been couched in terms of relevancy and materiality within the framework of the adjective law of evidence and not upon the substantive law of constitutional rights, we are not precluded from considering the merits of the defendant's argument.

The general rule on the admission of 'other crimes' evidence is that, upon a prosecution for a particular crime, evidence which shows or tends to show that the accused has committed another crime, independent of that for which he is on trial, is irrelevant and inadmissible. People v. Peto, 38 Ill.2d 45, 230 N.E.2d 236 (1967). The rationale is that such evidence ordinarily does not tend to establish the commission by the accused of the offense charged, that the evidence must be confined to the point in issue and that the substance of one crime cannot be proved by the substance of the other. People v. Donaldson, 8 Ill.2d 510, 134 N.E.2d 776 (1956), People v. Meisner, 311 Ill. 40, 142 N.E. 482 (1924), People v. Rivas, 5 Ill.2d 556, 126 N.E.2d 638 (1955).

This rationale was summed up in People v. Gregory, 22 Ill.2d 601, at page 603, 177 N.E.2d 120, at page 122 (1961) when our Supreme Court commented:

Under our concepts of a fair and impartial criminal trial, it is elementary that a defendant, no matter how reprehensible his crime or how black his history of past misdeeds, is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely with reference to the crime with which he is charged. Accordingly, it is well settled that evidence of other offenses unrelated to the crime for which a defendant is on trial is incompetent.

While there are several well-defined exceptions to the general rule, the applicability of any such exception is not claimed here.

It is also well established that where the defendant chooses to testify, evidence of his prior convictions for 'infamous crimes' which are defined by statute may be introduced in the manner prescribed by the statute for the purpose of determining his credibility. Ill.Rev.Stat. (1967) Ch. 38, § 155--1. People v. Flynn, 8 Ill.2d 116, 133 N.E.2d 257 (1956).

In the case at bar, the defendant did not testify, and we are faced with the question of whether the testimony evidencing his conviction for previous crimes was sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal. The defendant's brief has cited several cases which we deem controlling. In People v. Williams, 72 Ill.App.2d 96, 218 N.E.2d 771 (1966), the defendant was on trial for burglary and theft involving money taken from a priest in a Roman Catholic Church. One of the investigating officers testified concerning a report from which he had originally obtained the defendant's description: 'This is on another church burglary, in the same reference where the priest was attacked and accosted by George Williams.'

Later the detective testified on redirect examination that he had previously seen the defendant 'in...