People v. Plume

• Decision Date: 23 December 2016
• Citation: 46 N.Y.S.3d 304,2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 08640,145 A.D.3d 1469
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. William J. PLUME, also known as William J. Aguirre, also known as William J. Aquire, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

145 A.D.3d 1469

46 N.Y.S.3d 304

2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 08640

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.William J. PLUME, also known as William J. Aguirre, also known as William J. Aquire, Defendant–Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Dec. 23, 2016.

The Legal Aid Bureau of Buffalo, Inc., Buffalo (Nicholas P. DiFonzo of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant.

Lori Pettit Rieman, District Attorney, Little Valley, for Respondent.

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CENTRA, PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, AND CURRAN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

Defendant appeals from an order denying his motion pursuant to CPL 440.20 seeking to set aside the sentence imposed on him with respect to a September 2000 conviction of two counts of burglary in the first degree (Penal Law § 140.30[2], [3] [counts 1 and 2, respectively] ), two counts of assault in the first degree (§ 120.10[1], [4] [counts 4 and 6, respectively] ), two counts of assault in the second degree (§ 120.05[1], [6] [counts 7 and 9, respectively] ), one count of reckless endangerment in the first degree (§ 120.25 [count 11] ), and three counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree ( [CPW 3d] § 265.02[1] [counts 12 through 14] ). We note that all references to count numbers refer to the counts as submitted to the jury. At sentencing and resentencing, County Court (Himelein, J.) imposed various terms of incarceration on the various counts and directed that the sentences run as follows: the sentences on the burglary counts would run concurrently with each other; the sentences on the first-degree assault counts would run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the burglary sentences; the sentences on the second-degree assault counts would run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the sentences imposed on the burglary counts and the first-degree assault counts; the sentence on the reckless endangerment count would run consecutively to the sentences on the burglary and all assault counts; and the CPW 3d sentences would run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the sentences imposed on all other counts. Defendant now contends that the court (Ploetz, J.) erred in denying his CPL 440.20 motion challenging the imposition of consecutive sentences, and we agree.

We note at the outset that the court erred in denying the motion on the ground that this Court had affirmed the legality of the sentence on direct appeal (People v. Plume, 306 A.D.2d 916, 762 N.Y.S.2d 313, lv. denied 100 N.Y.2d 644, 769 N.Y.S.2d 210, 801 N.E.2d 431 ), as well as when considering and denying defendant's petition for a writ of error coram nobis (see People v. Plume, 12 A.D.3d 1206, 784 N.Y.S.2d 917, lv. denied 4 N.Y.3d 856, 797 N.Y.S.2d 430, 830 N.E.2d 329 ). "Mandatory denial of a motion pursuant to CPL 440.20 is required only when the issue ‘was previously determined on the merits upon an appeal from the judgment or sentence’ " (People v. Povoski, 111 A.D.3d 1350, 1351, 974 N.Y.S.2d 210, quoting CPL 440.20[2] ). As the People correctly conceded in opposition to defendant's CPL article 440 motion, defendant never challenged the legality of his sentence on direct appeal, and our decision did not explicitly find the sentence to be legal (Plume, 306 A.D.2d at 916–918, 762 N.Y.S.2d 313 ). Contrary to the People's contention, defendant did not challenge the legality of the sentence when he previously sought a writ of error coram nobis, and this Court did not render any determination on the legality of the sentence when we denied the writ ( Plume, 12 A.D.3d at 1206, 784 N.Y.S.2d 917 ). In his coram nobis application, defendant contended only that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the legality of the sentence, and the Court of Appeals has established that such a contention is categorically distinct from a challenge to the legality of the sentence itself (see People v. Borrell, 12 N.Y.3d 365, 367–370, 881 N.Y.S.2d 637, 909 N.E.2d 559 ). In any event, as noted above, even if defendant had challenged the legality of the sentence on a prior collateral challenge to the judgment of conviction, denial of defendant's motion on that ground is not mandatory (see Povoski, 111 A.D.3d at 1351, 974 N.Y.S.2d 210 ).

With respect to the merits, "[t]he Penal Law provides that concurrent sentences must be imposed ‘for two or more offenses committed through a single act or omission, or through an act or omission which in itself constituted one of the offenses and also was a material element of the other’ " (People v. Laureano, 87 N.Y.2d 640, 643, 642 N.Y.S.2d 150, 664 N.E.2d 1212, quoting Penal Law § 70.25[2] ). In other words, concurrent sentencing is required if "the actus reus element is, by definition, the same for both offenses (under the first prong of the statute), or if the actus reus for one offense is, by definition, a material element of the second offense (under the second prong)" (id. ). "The defendant benefits if either prong is present, and the prosecution's burden is to countermand both prongs" (People v. Day, 73 N.Y.2d 208, 211, 538 N.Y.S.2d 785, 535 N.E.2d 1325 ).

Applying those rules, we agree with defendant that the sentence imposed on count 4, for first-degree assault under Penal Law § 120.10(1), which requires serious physical injury to any other by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, must run concurrently with the sentence imposed on count 1, for burglary under section 140.30(2), which requires that the perpetrator cause physical injury to a nonparticipant in the crime. We further conclude that the sentence imposed on count 4 must run concurrently with the sentence imposed on count 2, for burglary under section 140.30(3), which requires that the perpetrator use or threaten the immediate use of a dangerous instrument. In instructing the jury, the trial court did not designate any particular victim or any particular weapon as the subject of either burglary count and, therefore, "[t]he same conduct resulting in defendant's conviction [of first-degree assault] also constituted the physical injury element of one count of burglary in the first degree and the use of a dangerous instrument element of the other" (People v. Anderson, 254 A.D.2d 701, 702, 678 N.Y.S.2d 550, lv. denied 92 N.Y.2d 980, 683 N.Y.S.2d 761, 706 N.E.2d 749 ; see People v. Lemon, 38 A.D.3d 1298, 1299, 832 N.Y.S.2d 718, lv. denied 9 N.Y.3d 846, 840 N.Y.S.2d 773, 872 N.E.2d 886, reconsideration denied 9 N.Y.3d 962, 848 N.Y.S.2d 31, 878 N.E.2d 615 ; People v. Plater, 235 A.D.2d 597, 598–599, 652 N.Y.S.2d 636, lv. denied89 N.Y.2d 1039, 659 N.Y.S.2d 870, 681 N.E.2d 1317 ). Contrary to the People's contention, it is impossible to ascertain from the record whether the burglary convictions were based on defendant's conduct in relation to any particular victim, and concurrent sentences are required where, as here, "it is impossible to determine whether the act that formed the basis for the jury's guilty verdict on [one] count ... was also ... the ... act[ ] that formed the basis for its guilty verdict on [another] count" (People v. Alford, 14 N.Y.3d 846, 848, 901 N.Y.S.2d 132, 927 N.E.2d 552 ; see People v. Parks, 95 N.Y.2d 811, 815, 712 N.Y.S.2d 429, 734 N.E.2d 741 ; People v. Jeanty, 268 A.D.2d 675, 680, 702 N.Y.S.2d 194, lv. denied 94 N.Y.2d 945, 949, 710 N.Y.S.2d 1, 731 N.E.2d 618 ).

We further agree with defendant that the sentence imposed on count 6, for first-degree assault under Penal Law § 120.10(4), which requires physical injury to a nonparticipant during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, must run concurrently with the sentences imposed on counts 1 and 2, for burglary. Inasmuch as the court did not specify the underlying burglary upon which the felony assault under count 6 was predicated, and "[t]he felony upon which [the] felony assault is predicated is a material element of that crime," the sentences imposed for the burglaries must run concurrently with the sentence imposed for felony assault under count 6 (People v. Ahedo, 229 A.D.2d 588, 589, 646 N.Y.S.2d 520, lv. denied 88 N.Y.2d 964, 647 N.Y.S.2d 718, 670 N.E.2d 1350 ; see People v. Faulkner, 36 A.D.3d 951, 953, 826 N.Y.S.2d 831, lv. denied 8 N.Y.3d 922, 834 N.Y.S.2d 512, 866 N.E.2d 458 ; People v. Williams, 275 A.D.2d 967, 967, 713 N.Y.S.2d 422 ).

Defendant additionally contends that the sentences on counts 12 through 14, convicting him of CPW 3d, must run concurrently with the sentences imposed on counts 1, 2, 4, and 6, covering the charges for burglary and first-degree assault. We agree. Where, as here, a person is convicted both of criminally possessing a weapon "with intent to use the same unlawfully against another" (Penal Law § 265.01[2] ; see § 265.02[1] ), and of substantive crimes involving the unlawful use of that weapon against another, consecutive sentencing is permitted only when the People "establish that [the defendant] possessed the [weapon] with a...