People v. Podsiad, 119.

• Decision Date: 10 December 1940
• Docket Number: No. 119.,119.
• Citation: 295 Mich. 541,295 N.W. 257
• Parties: PEOPLE v. PODSIAD.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

295 Mich. 541

295 N.W. 257

PEOPLE

v.PODSIAD.

No. 119.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 10, 1940.

Blanche Podsiad was convicted of accepting money from the earnings of a prostitute and deriving support from such earnings, and she appeals.

Affirmed.

Appeal from Circuit, Wayne County; Homer Ferguson, Judge.

Argued before the Entire Bench.

Asher L. Cornelius, of Detroit, for appellant.

Thomas Read, Atty. Gen., and Paul W. Voorhies, Pros. Atty., and William L. Brunner and Joseph L. Bannigan, Asst. Pros. Attys., all of Detroit, for appellee.

McALLISTER, Justice.

Defendant was convicted of the offense of accepting money from the earnings of a prostitute and deriving support from such earnings in violation of Act No. 328, § 457, Pub.Acts 1931 (Comp.Laws Supp.1940, § 17115-457, Stat.Ann. § 28.712) and appeals, claiming that the proof was not sufficient to sustain the conviction; that defendant was prejudiced by being tried on various counts which were afterwards withdrawn from the jury; that prejudicial error resulted from a certain irresponsive answer to a question by one of the witnesses for the people; and that the trial court, in sentencing the defendant on two counts based on the same act, was in error.

Defendant was a married woman, 47 years old, and resided with her husband and children in the city of Wyandotte. It was claimed by the prosecution that she accepted money from the earnings of Thelma Coburn, who engaged in prostitution on the premises of defendant. The witness Coburn testified that she resided in a basement apartment of defendant's home and had agreed with defendant to work for her selling beer and whiskey on the premises in return for her board and room and to engage in prostitution and pay defendant all of the money she therebyreceived. She further testified that she not only paid defendant moneys received for acts of prostitution, but that the defendant had threatened to beat her unless she turned over to defendant all of the money she received therefor. It appears that the witness Coburn engaged in sexual intercourse with various men on numerous occasions while residing in defendant's home. It is defendant's claim that Thelma Coburn paid money to her for board and room, and that she had no knowledge of her prostitution. But under the evidence, it was a question of fact for the jury to determine whether the Coburn woman paid to defendant money received from prostitution, and whether defendant had knowingly received the proceeds of such prostitution.

With regard to the claim that defendant was prejudiced by the answer of one of the State's witnesses during his examination, it appears that witness Martin, called in rebuttal by the prosecution after defendant had introduced in evidence testimony of good character, testified:

‘Q. How long have you known her (meaning Blanche Podsiad, the defendant)? A. My meeting with Mrs. Podsiad was, I believe, five years ago, when she was first arrested for pandering-with her attorney.’

Immediately after the above answer had been made by the witness, defendant's counsel moved for a mistrial. The court refused to grant the motion and instructed the jury to disregard the answer of the witness and ordered it stricken from the record. The fact that a witness, by an irresponsive answer, is likely to do much mischief does not necessarily result in reversible error, if the court applies the proper corrective. See People v. Mead, 50 Mich. 228, 15 N.W. 95;People v. Rozewicz, 228 Mich. 231, 199 N.W. 632.

‘When a witness for any reason gives an irresponsive answer and which is not competent evidence, and the answer is suppressed at once, the case must be a very peculiar and very strong one which would justify a feversal for such fault or mistake of the witness.’ Hill v. Robinson, 23 Mich. 24, 29.

In this case, neither the court nor the examining counsel were at fault. The answer of the witness was immediately stricken and the jury were promptly directed to disregard the testimony. There was no attempt to deprive defendant of her rights to avoid incriminating herself, directly or indirectly. In fact, she was a witness in her own defense, and it would have been easy for her to show that there was no truth in the answer of the witness if such were the fact and...