People v. Poggi

• Decision Date: 26 June 1980
• Docket Number: Cr. 34250
• Citation: 165 Cal.Rptr. 758,107 Cal.App.3d 581
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Joseph Carlos POGGI, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 758

165 Cal.Rptr. 758

107 Cal.App.3d 581

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Joseph Carlos POGGI, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 34250.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

June 26, 1980.

Hearing Denied Aug. 28, 1980.

Quin Denvir, State Public Defender, Edward H. Schulman and Michael Tanaka, Deputy State Public Defenders, for defendant and appellant.

George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Crim. Div., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., William R. Weisman, Robert R. Anderson and Elizabeth A. Baron, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

ASHBY, Associate Justice.

Appellant Joseph Poggi appeals from an order pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 6316.2 extending for one year appellant's commitment to the Department of Mental Health as a mentally disordered sex offender.

Following appellant's conviction of forcible rape in 1972, ¹ criminal proceedings were adjourned and appellant was adjudged a mentally disordered sex offender and committed to the Department of Mental Hygiene ² to be confined in the Atascadero State Hospital pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 6316. In 1973 he was returned to court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 6325 as not recovered but still dangerous but the court recommitted appellant to the department for placement and treatment at Patton State Hospital, requesting semiannual reports on his progress toward recovery. Upon receipt of periodic reports during 1974 and 1975, the court ordered no change in appellant's status. On August 20, 1976, the court approved appellant's transfer to Atascadero State Hospital, which apparently arose from appellant's involvement in drugs at Patton.

The Board of Prison Terms pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 6316.1, subdivision (b), determined the maximum term of commitment to expire November 14, 1977. On October 21, 1977, the District Attorney of Los Angeles County filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6316.2 to extend appellant's commitment for one year, because appellant suffers from a mental disorder and as a result of such mental disorder is disposed to the commission of sexual offenses to such a degree that he presents a serious threat of substantial harm to the health and safety of others. Proceedings were delayed for an appellate ruling, rendered April 26, 1978, that the petition had been timely filed. (People v. Superior Court (Rigg (, Armstrong, Brandes and Poggi)), 80 Cal.App.3d 407, 145 Cal.Rptr. 711.)

Following a jury trial, the jury found that appellant suffers from a mental disorder and as a result of such mental disorder is predisposed to the commission of sexual offenses to such a degree that he presents a serious threat of substantial harm to the health and safety of others. The court ordered appellant committed to the State Department of Mental Health for confinement at Patton State Hospital for a period of one year, commencing on the date of the commitment order, December 8, 1978.

Three psychiatrists and four hospital staff employees testified for the People at appellant's extended commitment hearing. ³ Based upon appellant's history, hospital records, and his interview with appellant on October 12, 1978, Dr. Blake Skrdla diagnosed appellant's mental disorder as (1) psychosis chronic, with history of repeated drug intoxication and (2) antisocial personality and sexual deviation, aggressive sexuality. In his opinion, appellant is predisposed to commission of sexual offenses to such a degree that he represents a serious threat of substantial harm to the health and safety of others. That appellant is psychotic was indicated by (1) hallucinations which appellant suffered as recently as June 1978 and (2) appellant's medication, 800 milligrams of mellaril a day, which would put a normal person to sleep and which exceeded the usual dose of 100 to 300 milligrams for the average psychotic patient. Appellant is preoccupied with feelings of sexual inadequacy and fantasies of rape.

Dr. George Y. Abe who interviewed appellant in November 1978 was of the opinion appellant is a mentally disordered sex offender predisposed to the commission of sexual offenses. Appellant was suffering a form of psychosis and schizophrenic symptoms. He needed a high dosage of medication to prevent psychotic symptoms.

Based upon a review of appellant's records, Dr. Ronald Markman was of the opinion appellant is predisposed to the commission of sexual offenses and is a serious threat of substantial harm to others. Appellant is a borderline psychotic as indicated by the amount of his medication. He would be unlikely to take medication on the outside, which would likely lead to dangerous behavior. Appellant has an antisocial character, and inadequate self-control and conscience.

Three psychiatric technicians from the hospital staff related appellant's conversations to them about an incident in October of 1977 in which he attempted to lure a female employee onto his ward, while a picnic was going on outside, for purposes of raping her. He told them it was definitely his plan to rape her and that he had no doubt he would have raped her. In these and other conversations, appellant stated he got a great deal of excitement physically assaulting women, that he felt women were to be boxed around and assaulted, and that rape is a way of life. Appellant felt fear, distrust, anger, and hatred toward women.

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends (1) that the extended commitment must be reversed in the absence of a finding that appellant was "amenable to treatment"; (2) that the testimony of the hospital staff as to statements made to them by appellant violated appellant's privilege against self-incrimination; and (3) that the court erred in commencing the one-year period of extended commitment from the date of the extended commitment order, rather than the date of expiration of the previously determined maximum term of commitment. None of these contentions has merit.

Appellant's second and third contentions require little discussion. The statements to hospital staff did not incriminate appellant by tending to show his guilt of a crime. They were used to show his mental condition to determine whether his commitment should be extended because as a result of mental disorder he is dangerous to the health and safety of others. The statements were not privileged. (People v. Lakey, 102 Cal.App.3d 962, 976-977, 162 Cal.Rptr. 653; see Cramer v. Tyars, 23 Cal.3d 131, 137, 151 Cal.Rptr. 653, 588 P.2d 793; In re Duckett, 76 Cal.App.3d 692, 698-699, 143 Cal.Rptr. 100.)

The commitment extension proceedings were timely initiated (People v. Superior Court (Rigg), supra, 80 Cal.App.3d 407, 145 Cal.Rptr. 711), and continued for good cause. It was proper to commence the one-year extension from the date of the extended commitment order. (People v. Lakey, supra, 102 Cal.App.3d 962, 977-980, 151 Cal.Rptr. 653, 588 P.2d 793.)

Appellant's main contention is that the extension of commitment pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 6316.2 is invalid in the absence of a finding that appellant was "amenable to treatment." ⁴ Appellant was convicted of forcible rape in 1972, which then carried a punishment of imprisonment in the state prison for from three years to life. Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6316.1, added in 1977, the Board of Prison Terms is required, in the case of mentally disordered sex offenders who committed a felony prior to July 1, 1977, to determine the maximum term of commitment based upon the longest term of imprisonment which could have been imposed for the offense had the crime been committed after July 1, 1977. Section 6316.1 provides that the person "may not be kept in actual custody longer than the maximum term of commitment, except as provided in Section 6316.2." (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 6316.1, subd. (b); emphasis added.)

Welfare and Institutions Code section 6316.2 provides that a person may be committed beyond the term prescribed by section 6316.1 under the procedures and criteria set forth. We note that sections 6316.1 and 6316.2 were added by chapter 164 of the statutes of 1977 in order "to provide additional safeguards against the premature release of dangerous persons." (Stats.1977, ch. 164, § 6, p. 638.)

As it read when the instant petition was filed, section 6316.2 specified that a person may be committed beyond the maximum term, for a period of one year, if such person "meets all of the following: (P) (1) The 'sex offense' as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 6302 of which the person has been convicted is a felony, whether committed before or after July 1, 1977, or is a misdemeanor which was committed before July 1, 1977. (P) (2) Suffers from a mental disorder, and as a result of such mental disorder, is predisposed to the commission of sexual offenses to such a degree that he presents a serious threat of substantial harm to the health and safety of others." (Stats.1977, ch. 164, § 3, pp. 634-635.)

Appellant met all of these criteria, and the jury so found.

Appellant attempts to read into the statute a requirement for an additional finding, that he be amenable to treatment. ⁵ The statute contains no such requirement by its express terms. As a matter of fact, in 1979 the Legislature added subdivision (j) to section 6316.2, to state expressly that a finding of amenability to treatment is not required. Subdivision (j) reads: "Amenability to treatment is not required for a finding that any person is a person as described in subdivision (a), nor is it required for treatment of such person. Treatment programs need only be made available to such person. Treatment does not mean that the treatment be successful or potentially successful, nor dies it mean that the person must recognize his or her problem and willingly participate in the treatment program." (Stats.1979, ch. 992, § 2, p....