People v. Popescue
Decision Date | 09 October 1931 |
Docket Number | No. 20711.,20711. |
Citation | 345 Ill. 142,177 N.E. 739 |
Parties | PEOPLE v. POPESCUE et al. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; Phillip J. Finnegan, Judge.
John Popescue and another, having been indicted for murder, pleaded guilty, and were sentenced to death, and they bring error.
Affirmed.Benjamin C. Bachrach, of Chicago (Wilbert F. Crowley and Wendell E. Green, both of Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiffs in error.
Oscar E. Carlstrom, Atty. Gen., and John A. Swanson, State's Atty., of Chicago (Edward E. Wilson and Grenville Beardsley, both of Chicago, and J. J. Neiger, of Rock Island, of counsel), for the People.
John Popescue and Charles Rocco (herein called defendants) were indicted in the criminal court of Cook county for the murder of Courtney Merrill. When arraigned, both defendants, in the presence of their counsel, entered pleas of guilty. They were each advised by the court of the legal consequences of their pleas, and, after thus being admonished, they each persisted in their pleas of guilty, and such pleas were received and recorded. The trial judge then proceeded to examine witnesses as to the aggravation and mitigation of the offense as required by law (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1929, c. 38, § 732), and thereafter sentenced each of the defendants to death by electrocution. Motions for a new trial, in arrest of judgment, to vacate the sentences and for leave to withdraw the pleas of guilty, were all argued and denied, and the record was brought here for review by writ of error.
The error principally argued and relied upon by defendants for reversal is that the trial judge, after the pleas of guilty and before pronouncing sentence, heard the defendants themselves admit that they had committed another murder three hours before the crime charged in the indictment. It is urged that the hearing of this testimony was prejudicial to the defendants and beyond the scope of the court's authority under the statute.
The evidence heard by the trial judge after the pleas of guilty were entered consisted in part of the voluntary written confessions of the defendants, made and signed October[345 Ill. 144]31, 1930. These confessions were admitted in evidence by stipulation and read to the court without objection.
John Popescue in his confession, among other things, stated:
Charles Rocco's confession in part is as follows: ‘I live at 2911 East Ninety-First, where I was arrested with John Popescue and Rose. John and Rose rented the room. I paid for it. The three of us occupied it. On October 28, 1930, after supper, about a quarter after five, I left the room and took with me my 45 Army Colt and three pieces of rope. I used my own rope last night in tying a cab driver on the highway in Indiana. * * * After leaving the room we walked around, talking. I says, ‘It is about time you got down to business and get a car pretty short and shooting into Gary.’ * * * Another man pulled into the alley at the garage next to the bank. I asked John if he wanted to make it, and he said and he run down to it and I covered the right side while he was covering the left, and John and the owner of the car were in a tangle. When John first approached he said to the man,
Rose Mankowski, otherwise known as Rose Miller, testified, without objection, for the people, in part as follows: She was asked, ‘What did he say, if anything, at that time?’ and answered, At this point objection was made for the first time and witness was taken from the courtroom and an argument ensued. Upon conclusion of the argument, counsel for defendants suggested to the court that it was bad practice to permit such evidence ‘even on a plea of guilty; however, after your honor hears it you can order it stricken, if you see fit.’ No further examination of the witness on this point was attempted.
John Popescue, in addition to his confession, testified in his own behalf. He was interrogated in chief by his counsel, Crowley. In his oral testimony he repeated substantially all that he had stated in his written confession. After he had again detailed the facts relating to this murder, he testified, while he was still on the stand in his own behalf, as follows: On cross-examination he testified among other things: ...
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U.S. ex rel. Healey v. Cannon
...waiver of any infirmity which was not jurisdictional or relevant to the voluntariness of the plea. See, e.g., People v. Popescue, 345 Ill. 142, 177 N.E. 739 (1931); People v. Baxton, 10 Ill.2d 295, 139 N.E.2d 754, cert. denied, 353 U.S. 976, 77 S.Ct. 1062, 1 L.Ed.2d 1138 (1957); People v. T......
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State v. Houston
...his natural inclination or aversion to commit crime, the stimuli which motivate his conduct, and, as was said in People v. Popescue, 345 Ill. 142, 177 N.E. 739, 77 A.L.R. 1199, the judge should know something of the life, family, occupation and record of the person about to be sentenced.' T......
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State v. Folkes
...not true in every particular. These confessions alone were amply sufficient to sustain the death penalty." People v. Popescue, 345 Ill. 142, 177 N.E. 739, 77 A.L.R. 1199 at p. 1210. 12. The third and last assignment of error is that the court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested ......
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People v. La Pointe
...age, his natural inclination or aversion to commit crime, the stimuli which motivate his conduct, and, as was said in People v. Popescue, (345 Ill. 142, 177 N.E. 739), the judge should know something of the life, family, occupation and record of the person about to be sentenced.' People v. ......