People v. Poplis
| Citation | 281 N.E.2d 167,30 N.Y.2d 85,330 N.Y.S.2d 365 |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals |
| Decision Date | 17 February 1972 |
| Parties | , 281 N.E.2d 167 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. George POPLIS, Appellant. |
Gerald Zuckerman, New York City, for appellant.
Frank S. Hogan, Dist. Atty. (Bennett L. Gershman and Michael R. Juviler, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.
Defendant has been convicted of murder under new Penal Law, Consol.Laws, c. 40, section 125.25 (subd. 2). In relevant text this provides: 'A person is guilty of murder' when '(u)nder circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of another person'.
The proof abundantly establishes that the death of Roxanne Felumero, the three-and-a-half-year-old child of defendant's wife, was caused by repeated physical beatings by defendant between March 16 and March 21, 1969 when the child died.
The beatings were brutal, callous and inhuman. The medical proof is that the resulting injuries produced death. The beating of the child by defendant was established by several witnesses and especially by Marie Poplis, defendant's wife and the mother of the child, who described the repeated physical violence of defendant to the child and ultimately her death.
The argument of appellant is not that the proof would not sustain a finding of physical brutality by him resulting in death, but rather that the acts as alleged 'do not fall within the murder statute'. It is suggested there is no substantial difference in the definitions of murder under section 125.25 (subd. 2) and manslaughter second degree under section 125.15 (subd. 1). The latter provision states a person is guilty of manslaughter when '(h)e recklessly * * * causes the death of another person'.
A person who, with a 'depraved indifference to human life', recklessly engages in conduct which 'creates a grave risk of death to another person' resulting in death, also by included definition 'recklessly causes' the death. But the murder prescription requires more than recklessly causing death which could happen, for example, from gross carelessness in motor vehicle operation.
The murder definition requires conduct with 'depraved indifference' to 'human life', plus recklessness. This is conduct of graver culpability, and it is the kind which has been rather well understood at common law to involve something more serious than mere recklessness alone which has had an incidental tragic result. The continued brutality toward a child, found by the jury in this case, fits within the accepted understanding of the kind of recklessness involving 'a depraved indifference to human life'.
The predecessor to section 125.25 was former Penal Law section 1044 subd. 2). This was very similar in effect, but somewhat different in text. It prescribed an act 'imminently dangerous to others, and evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life'. This is just about another way of saying 'depraved indifference to human life' but the new text eliminates the psychiatrically complicating term 'evincing a depraved mind' and is a distinct improvement.
The court had the former definition for consideration in People v. Jernatowski, 238 N.Y. 188, 144 N.E. 497 (1924) where the act charged was recklessly shooting a gun into a house, killing one of the occupants. Chief Judge Hiscock, on analysis of the problem raised by 'depraved mind, regardless of human life', reached this conclusion (p. 192, 144 N.E. p. 498): 'So in this case, when the defendant fired two or more shots into the house where he knew there were human beings, he committed an act which the jury certainly could say was imminently dangerous, and which evinced a wicked and depraved mind, regardless of human life, and which amply supplied the evidence of malice and felonious intent which...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Petronio v. Walsh
...the defendant beat a three-and-a-half year old child over the course of five days, thereby causing his death. 30 N.Y.2d 85, 87, 330 N.Y.S.2d 365, 281 N.E.2d 167 (1972). In People v. Best, the defendant beat her nine and a half year old son so frequently and severely that his open wounds bec......
-
Howard v. McGinnis, 03-CV-6059 (VEB).
...conviction. People v. Roe, 74 N.Y.2d at 25, 544 N.Y.S.2d 297, 542 N.E.2d 610 (citations omitted).; People v. Poplis, 30 N.Y.2d 85, 88, 330 N.Y.S.2d 365, 281 N.E.2d 167 (N.Y. 1972) (finding that the defendant committed depraved indifference murder when, albeit without any intent to kill, he ......
-
U.S. v. Heldt
...on the part of the prosecution, on appeal a defendant has cause to complain only if he was prejudiced. See People v. Poplis, 30 N.Y.2d 85, 281 N.E.2d 167, 330 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1972). To the extent he might receive relief from a prosecution solely on a showing of potential prejudice, he would b......
-
Rustici v. Philips
...depraved indifference statute under which Rustici was convicted was not unconstitutionally vague. See People v. Poplis, 30 N.Y.2d 85, 88, 281 N.E.2d 167, 168, 330 N.Y.S.2d 365, 366 (1972) ("The murder definition requires conduct with `depraved indifference' to `human life,' plus recklessnes......
-
On equality, bias crimes, and just deserts.
...approach, not a "mixed" approach that includes both retributive and consequentialist components. (21) On Hate and Equality, at 522. (22) 30 N.Y. 2d 85, 281 N.E. 2d 167 (23) Id. at 88. A reckless killing that did not demonstrate "depraved indifference" would be classified as manslaughter, no......