People v. Pratt

• Decision Date: 20 February 2003
• Docket Number: Docket No. 228081.
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eddie Junior PRATT, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

656 N.W.2d 866

254 Mich. App. 425

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eddie Junior PRATT, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 228081.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted November 6, 2002, at Grand Rapids.

Decided December 17, 2002, at 9:00 a.m.

Released for Publication February 20, 2003.

Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Ronald J. Frantz, Prosecuting Attorney, and Gregory J. Babbitt, Chief of Appeals, for the people.

Peter J. Ellenson, Southfield, for the defendant on appeal.

Before: MURPHY, P.J., and SAWYER and R.J. DANHOF¹, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals as of right from his conviction of receiving and concealing stolen property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $20,000, M.C.L. § 750.535(3)(a). Defendant was sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender, M.C.L. § 769.12, to three to fifteen years' imprisonment. We affirm both defendant's conviction and sentence.

This case involved defendant's taking of his former girlfriend's 1990 Buick Regal. Defendant maintained that he borrowed the car from her, while his former girlfriend testified that defendant took her car without permission. On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence used to support his conviction. Evidence is sufficient to convict a defendant when a rational factfinder could determine that the prosecutor proved every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Cain, 238 Mich.App. 95, 116-117, 605 N.W.2d 28 (1999). To establish that defendant was guilty of the offense, the prosecution is required to prove: (1) the property was stolen; (2) the value of the property met the statutory requirement; (3) defendant received, possessed, or concealed the property with knowledge that the property was stolen; (4) the identity of the property as being that previously stolen; and (5) the guilty actual or constructive knowledge of the defendant that the property received or concealed was stolen. People v. Quinn, 219 Mich.App. 571, 574, 557 N.W.2d 151 (1996). Defendant takes issue with only two of the elements: first, defendant contends that there was no evidence presented that the car was stolen; and second, that there was insufficient evidence presented with respect to the value of the Buick.

With regard to whether the car was stolen, defendant asserts that there was no evidence presented that he intended to permanently deprive the owner of her car. Defendant's argument hinges on his assertion that for the property to be "stolen," it must have been taken by larceny and, thus, taken with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession. Defendant is correct that a larceny requires that the property must be taken with such an intent. See, e.g., Cain, supra at 119, 605 N.W.2d 28, citing People v. Goodchild, 68 Mich.App. 226, 232, 242 N.W.2d 465 (1976) ("The felonious intent required for larceny, animus furandi, is an intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property."). However, we find that the statute concerns any property taken without permission, not only property taken by larceny.

MCL 750.535(3)(a) requires that a defendant must have possessed stolen goods. However, the statute does not define "stolen." In the absence of statutory definition of a term, this Court may consult dictionary definitions to determine the common meaning of a term. People v. Morey, 461 Mich. 325, 330, 603 N.W.2d 250 (1999). Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2000), defines "steal" as "to take (the property of another or others) without permission or right, esp. secretly or by force," and "to appropriate ... without right or acknowledgement." For goods to be considered stolen under this definition, they need only be taken without permission or right; thus, "stolen" goods encompass a broader category than just goods taken by larceny. Defendant conceded that sufficient evidence was offered to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that he took the car without permission. Accordingly, the jury could have concluded that the car was "stolen" as that term is used in the statute.

Defendant also challenges whether sufficient evidence was admitted regarding the value of the Buick, contending that the prosecution should have been required to have the car appraised. Again, we disagree. With regard to a general valuation rule, at least in the context of the larceny statute, this Court, in People v. Johnson, 133 Mich.App. 150, 153, 348 N.W.2d 716 (1984), stated:

While the larceny statute itself does not provide a guide for determining the value of property which is the subject of a theft, case law supports the use of fair market value as the relevant standard when such a value exists. Generally, proof of value is determined by reference to the time and place of the offense. Value has been interpreted to mean the price that the item will bring on an open market between a willing buyer and seller. [Citations omitted.]

An owner of a car is qualified to testify about the value of his property unless his valuation is based on personal or sentimental value. People v. Watts, 133 Mich.App. 80, 84, 348 N.W.2d 39 (1984). The phrase "personal value" means subjective value to the owner, or a value that cannot be objectively substantiated. People v. Dyer, 157 Mich.App. 606, 611, 403 N.W.2d 84 (1986). Here, the former girlfriend's father, who had purchased the car, testified about its value. There was no evidence...