People v. Pratt

Decision Date04 May 2009
Docket NumberNo. 1-06-3524.,1-06-3524.
Citation908 N.E.2d 137
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alonzo PRATT, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Rebecca Levy, Patricia Unsinn, Deputy Defender Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellant.

James E. Fitzgerald, Marie Q. Czech, Kathleen Warnick, Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Justice GARCIA delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder for the beating death of Charles Swanagan and sentenced to 40 years in prison. On appeal, the defendant contends he was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel by the trial court's denial of his request, on the day of trial, to revoke his pro se status and have counsel appointed. The defendant further claims the trial court's denial of his request for standby counsel was an abuse of discretion. Finally, the defendant contends, and the State concedes, that his mittimus must be amended to reflect the correct credit for the time he served in presentencing custody. We affirm the defendant's conviction and amend his mittimus.

BACKGROUND

The defendant was initially represented by private counsel. On June 7, 2004, the third in a succession of private counsel was granted leave to withdraw and the court appointed the public defender to represent the defendant. On September 9, 2004, the defendant informed the court he did not want the public defender to represent him and tendered a motion for counsel other than the public defender. The court reminded the defendant his case was from 2001 and that he had been represented by three private attorneys, all of whom had resigned. The court denied the defendant's motion.

In November 2004, the assistant public defender assigned to the defendant's case filed a motion to suppress the identification and statements which the court denied after a hearing on March 16, 2005. At the hearing, the court resolved the credibility of the witnesses in favor of the police officer, but found the defendant "intelligent, coherent and quite articulate." The public defender continued to represent the defendant.

On September 6, 2005, the defendant tendered two motions that the court found to be "contradictory": the defendant filed anew his motion for appointment of counsel other than the public defender and a motion to proceed pro se on his capital murder case. The trial judge did not rule on the motion to proceed pro se. At the status hearing on December 9, 2005, the defendant inquired about his pending request to proceed pro se. The court informed the defendant that a decision had not been made and reminded him that he was still being represented by counsel. The defendant's case was continued to January 6, 2006.

On January 6, 2006, the trial court informed the defendant it was close to making a decision on whether the defendant would be allowed to proceed pro se, stating, "I am leaning toward letting you represent yourself." The State was instructed to redact discovery of all personal information in preparation for tendering to the defendant. On January 24, 2006, the State filed its intention not to seek the death penalty and tendered redacted discovery to the defendant. The court informed the defendant the assistant public defender would continue representing him until after the defendant reviewed the discovery. The court would then "go through the admonishment again with regard to representing yourself because you may have a change of heart after you've done that."

On March 1, 2006, the trial court addressed the defendant's request to represent himself pro se. The court explained that it had hoped the defendant would reconsider his request after reviewing the discovery and seeing the seriousness of the charges he faced. The court questioned the defendant, asking him whether he still desired to proceed pro se. The defendant replied, "Yes, sir." The court asked about the defendant's educational and work background. The defendant stated that he graduated from high school in 1975 and worked as a union electrician for more than 25 years. The defendant stated he could read and write and that although he had no formal legal training, he did take a civics class in high school. The defendant told the court that for the past seven years, while incarcerated, he had been "doing a lot of studying" and "going to the law library at least once a week." The defendant admitted he was taking medication for depression, but assured the court it would not interfere with his ability to represent himself.

The court explained that the defendant would be expected to abide by all of the trial rules and procedures, even though he may not know them. The defendant was told that a lawyer's role is to advise a defendant on such critical matters as whether to negotiate a plea or take a bench or jury trial. At trial, a lawyer would decide what evidence to introduce, and what legal or factual arguments to make. The court instructed the defendant that by proceeding pro se, he would have no one to assist him with all of this. After each inquiry by the court, the defendant indicated he understood and still wished to proceed pro se. The defendant asked the court whether he was "entitled" to have standby counsel appointed. The court explained that the defendant was "not entitled to standby counsel." The defendant replied, "Okay. No problem." The request for standby counsel prompted the court to state, "See, now there's an indication that maybe you want a lawyer." The defendant assured the court, "I have a pretty good understanding of my defense." The court noted, "Knowing the case isn't the same thing as being a lawyer." The court then asked the defendant whether he still wanted to represent himself, "[e]ven though I'm not going to appoint standby counsel." The defendant responded, "Oh, it will work out." The trial court found the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to counsel. An order was entered granting the defendant access to the law library.

The same day, the defendant filed numerous pretrial motions, including a motion to suppress the lineup and suppress the deceased witnesses' statements, as well as a motion to wear civilian clothes at the trial. The court addressed all of the defendant's motions. By agreement, the jury trial was scheduled for August 21, 2006.

On August 21, 2006, the defendant filed certain motions and the cause was continued by agreement to August 28, 2006, for the jury trial.

On August 28, 2006, the following exchange occurred.

"DEFENDANT PRATT: I'm not able to continue. I'm on psychotropic medication. I just can't carry on. It's just too much for me. I can't handle this.

THE COURT: You're on psychotropic medication?

DEFENDANT PRATT: Yes. Yes. I can't handle this. I can't handle this.

THE COURT: Can't handle what?

DEFENDANT PRATT: This. This trial. This procedure. I'm an electrician. I'm not a lawyer. I can't handle this.

THE COURT: How many times did I admonish you, Mr. Pratt? How many times? You fired five —

DEFENDANT PRATT: 2,000, 3,000 times. I don't know.

THE COURT: You fired — you fired five lawyers. Mr. Boyke, Mr. Fahy, Mr. Sorenson.

DEFENDANT PRATT: They walked off. Okay. I'm not going to argue with you, Your Honor. THE COURT: I was here when you told them; that — that you didn't want them to represent you. Robert LaJohnson, with years of experience — where did you get the psychotropic drugs? Have you been over to the Psychiatric Institute?

DEFENDANT PRATT: Yes."

The State objected to the defendant's request for a continuance, arguing the defendant was only trying to delay the start of his trial. The State answered it was ready to proceed. The State informed the court that through "great efforts" and "great expense," it had brought witnesses from Alabama, including one at the request of the defendant, based on the defendant's assertion that he was ready for trial. The State summarized the history of the defendant's case, including the trial court's numerous efforts to dissuade the defendant from proceeding pro se by admonishing him of the perils involved in self-representation.

The court noted that the defendant claimed to having been prescribed psychotropic drugs and felt "duty-bound to have [the defendant's claim] verified." The court ordered a psychiatric evaluation of the defendant and continued the case to the following day. The court reminded the defendant to be ready for trial the following day. The defendant responded, "[I]s there any way that I can — can have any kind of assistance? I'm an electrician." The court reminded the defendant, "I've asked you repeatedly not to go pro se." The defendant replied,

"I understand. I need assistance, Your Honor. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. Your Honor. I'm a[n] electrician. I can't — I cannot understand the legal terminology.

* * *

It's just too much for me."

The court told the defendant it would not delay the trial.

The next day, the defendant filed a written motion seeking to withdraw as a pro se defendant. In his motion, the defendant claimed he was entitled to counsel and reiterated his contention that he could not understand the legal proceedings because of his lack of legal training. At the court's request, the psychiatric evaluator was examined concerning the defendant's fitness for trial. The doctor stated that although the defendant did not cooperate with him, he saw no evidence of cognitive impairment or psychosis. The doctor noted that the defendant had been taking the medications Trazadone and Zoloft. The trial court found no bar to proceeding to trial. The trial court informed the defendant that his case was the oldest case on the call. The court reviewed the list of attorneys the defendant had dismissed and reminded the defendant that he had been admonished multiple times...

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  • People v. Phillips
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • June 15, 2009
    ...878 N.E.2d 1222. The result here must be the same. In addition, this case is readily distinguishable from People v. Pratt, 391 Ill. App.3d 45, 330 Ill.Dec. 285, 908 N.E.2d 137 (2009), where Justice Hall in a dissent found that standby counsel should have been appointed. Pratt, at 59, 330 Il......
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    ...and this absence of reversals appears consistent with nationwide experience." (Emphases in original)); People v. Pratt , 391 Ill. App. 3d 45, 57, 330 Ill.Dec. 285, 908 N.E.2d 137 (2009) (reiterating same proposition); People v. Ellison , 2013 IL App (1st) 101261, ¶ 42, 370 Ill.Dec. 71, 987 ......
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    ...that appears to be routine practice in the trial court when a defendant represents him or herself. See People v. Pratt , 391 Ill. App. 3d 45, 47, 330 Ill.Dec. 285, 908 N.E.2d 137 (2009) (trial court ordered State to redact "all personal information" from discovery when defendant indicated i......
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