People v. Prieto
| Decision Date | 05 December 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 02CA2093.,02CA2093. |
| Citation | 124 P.3d 842 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Victor PRIETO, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Anthony J. Navarro, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
David S. Kaplan, Colorado State Public Defender, Jason C. Middleton, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.
Opinion by: Judge ROY.
Defendant, Victor Prieto, appeals the judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of felony first degree murder, under the influence vehicular homicide, reckless vehicular homicide, second degree burglary, criminal mischief, and theft. We affirm.
On the night of the crime, defendant was in a vehicle that rammed the side of a store. Certain merchandise from the store was removed. Shortly thereafter, and while fleeing the burglary, the vehicle ran a stop sign in a nearby residential area and, going an estimated speed of fifty to sixty miles per hour, collided with a vehicle driven by the victim, killing her almost instantly.
Defendant, who suffered a broken leg, was taken by ambulance to the hospital and was treated for his injuries. The police investigator who accompanied defendant to the hospital observed slurred speech and a smell of alcohol on defendant. Blood alcohol tests revealed that defendant had a blood alcohol level of .134.
Defendant's primary defense was insufficient evidence that he was the driver. Defendant was convicted and sentenced to life in prison without parole for felony first degree murder. This appeal followed.
Defendant initially asserts, as he did below, that his constitutional right to equal protection was violated because felony first degree murder carries a greater punishment than aggravated vehicular homicide even though they proscribe identical conduct. We disagree.
Equal protection of the law is guaranteed by the United States Constitution and by the Due Process Clause of the Colorado Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 25. The United States Supreme Court has held that statutes proscribing identical conduct but authorizing different penalties are not violative of federal equal protection guarantees. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979). Because Colorado has taken a more expansive view, we analyze defendant's claim under the Colorado Constitution. See People v. Stewart, 55 P.3d 107 (Colo.2002).
Equal protection assures like treatment to those who are similarly situated. People v. Mozee, 723 P.2d 117 (Colo.1986). "When two criminal statutes prescribe different penalties for identical conduct, a defendant convicted and sentenced under the harsher statute is denied equal protection of the laws." People v. Mozee, supra, 723 P.2d at 126; see People v. Haymaker, 716 P.2d 110, 115 (Colo.1986).
If, however, the statutory classifications of crimes are based upon differences that are both real in fact and reasonably related to the purposes of the legislation, equal protection principles are not offended. The General Assembly may establish harsher penalties for more egregious conduct even if the differences are only a matter of degree. People v. Mozee, supra. Furthermore, statutes that prescribe different sanctions for what ostensibly might be different acts, but offer no rational standard for distinguishing the disparate punishment, run counter to equal protection guarantees. People v. Wilhelm, 676 P.2d 702 (Colo.1984). However, it is equally well established that a single act may violate more than one criminal statute. People v. Owens, 670 P.2d 1233 (Colo.1983).
Colorado employs the elemental analysis in determining whether there is an equal protection violation. Under the elemental analysis, the issue is not whether there may be several offenses with differing penalties that might apply to the defendant's conduct and from which the prosecuting attorney may choose in making a charging decision, but whether there are distinctions between the elements of the offenses as defined by the statutes. People v. Stewart, supra.
The statute for first degree murder, which includes the felony first degree murder provision, states:
A person commits the crime of murder in the first degree if. . . [a]cting either alone or with one or more persons, he or she commits or attempts to commit arson, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, sexual assault . . . or the crime of escape as provided in section 18-8-208, and, in the course of or in furtherance of the crime that he or she is committing or attempting to commit, or of immediate flight therefrom, the death of a person, other than one of the participants, is caused by anyone.
Section 18-3-102(1)(b), C.R.S.2004. First degree murder is a class 1 felony, § 18-3-102(3), C.R.S.2004, and carries a minimum sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and a maximum sentence of death. Section 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A), (4), C.R.S.2004.
The relevant portion of the vehicular homicide statute provides:
(1)(a) If a person operates or drives a motor vehicle in a reckless manner, and such conduct is the proximate cause of the death of another, such person commits vehicular homicide.
(b)(I) If a person operates or drives a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or one or more drugs, or a combination of both alcohol and one or more drugs, and such conduct is the proximate cause of the death of another, such person commits vehicular homicide. This is a strict liability crime.
Reckless vehicular homicide is a class 4 felony punishable by imprisonment for a minimum of two and a maximum of six years with three years of mandatory parole. Under the influence vehicular homicide is a class 3 felony punishable by imprisonment for a minimum of four years and a maximum of twelve years with five years of mandatory parole. Sections 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A), 18-3-106(1)(c), C.R.S.2004.
In 1998, the legislature enacted an enhanced sentencing provision applicable to vehicular homicide under § 18-3-106(1)(a) or (1)(b):
If the defendant is convicted of class 4 or class 3 felony vehicular homicide under section 18-3-106(1)(a) or (1)(b), and while committing vehicular homicide the defendant was in immediate flight from the commission of another felony, the court shall be required to sentence the defendant to the department of corrections for a term of at least the midpoint in the presumptive range but not more than twice the maximum term authorized in the presumptive range for the punishment of the class of felony vehicular homicide of which the defendant is convicted.
Section 18-1.3-401(8)(g), C.R.S.2004.
Thus, upon merger of the vehicular homicide convictions, defendant was subject to a sentence of a minimum of eight years and a maximum of twenty-four years with five years of mandatory parole. However, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court merged both the vehicular homicide convictions and the burglary conviction into the felony first degree murder conviction and sentenced defendant to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
Defendant first contends that the statutes offend equal protection principles because they proscribe identical conduct with widely disparate sentences. We do not agree.
In determining whether two statutes proscribe identical conduct, we begin by analyzing the elements of each. When construing a statute, we must give effect to legislative intent. To determine that intent, we first look to the language of the statute, giving words and phrases their ordinary and commonly understood meaning. Our analysis starts with the presumption that the statutes are constitutional. A party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has the burden of proving that claim beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Stewart, supra.
People v. Stewart, supra, is particularly instructive. In Stewart, as pertinent here, the defendant seriously injured the victim with his motor vehicle. He was convicted of reckless second degree assault, which requires that the offender recklessly cause serious bodily injury with a deadly weapon there a motor vehicle. See § 18-3-203(1)(d), C.R.S.2004. Reckless second degree assault is a class 4 felony. However, a sentence to imprisonment in the aggravated range is required. Sections 18-1.3-406, 18-3-203(2)(c), C.R.S.2004. By contrast, reckless vehicular assault requires that the offender drive or operate a motor vehicle in a reckless manner, proximately causing serious bodily injury to another. It is a class 5 felony, which does not mandate incarceration. Section 18-3-205, C.R.S.2004.
In Stewart, the supreme court rejected the defendant's equal protection argument for three reasons: (1) reckless vehicular assault requires the operation of a motor vehicle, and reckless second degree assault does not; (2) reckless vehicular assault requires proximate cause, and reckless second degree assault requires only cause; and (3) reckless vehicular assault requires a motor vehicle, and reckless second degree assault requires a deadly weapon, which may, but need not, be a motor vehicle.
Here, the felony first degree murder statute requires a predicate offense of arson, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, sexual assault, or escape. And, though no mens rea is required with respect to the death, felony first degree murder requires that the actor act knowingly in perpetrating one of the predicate offenses. People v. Jones, 990 P.2d 1098 (Colo.App.1999). By contrast, the intent required for vehicular homicide can be either reckless or strict liability (when driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs), requiring only voluntary conduct. Frazier v. People, 90 P.3d 807 (Colo.2004).
An actus reus of greater specificity will distinguish prohibited conduct. See People v....
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...court's gatekeeping function [to assure] that specialized testimony is reliable, relevant, and helpful to the jury." People v. Prieto, 124 P.3d 842, 849 (Colo.App.2005). Only reliable expert testimony can be helpful to the jury. Masters v. People, 58 P.3d 979, 994 (Colo.2002). While experie......
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