People v. Prince

• Decision Date: 25 March 1996
• Docket Number: No. A067920,A067920
• Citation: 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 138,43 Cal.App.4th 1174
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2018, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 3382 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. William Lawrence PRINCE, Defendant and Respondent.

Page 138

51 Cal.Rptr.2d 138

43 Cal.App.4th 1174, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2018,

96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 3382

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. William Lawrence PRINCE, Defendant and Respondent.

No. A067920.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

March 25, 1996.

Review Denied June 19, 1996.

Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Ronald A. Bass, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Martin S. Kaye, Deputy Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Deputy Attorney General, San Francisco, for appellant.

Colleen M. Rohan, San Francisco, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for respondent.

STEIN, Associate Justice.

The People appeal an order dismissing the information charging William Lawrence Prince with several offenses, including the manufacture, and possession for sale of methamphetamine. (Health & Saf.Code, §§ 11379.6, 11378.) The court found that criminal prosecution was barred, under the Double Jeopardy Clause, because in separate civil forfeiture proceedings the court had granted the government's motion for entry of default after Prince failed to answer. Prince filed a motion to set aside the defaults, and all further proceedings in the civil forfeiture cases were stayed until the conclusion of the criminal case.

FACTS

On April 19, 1993, the district attorney filed four forfeiture complaints in Mendocino County Superior Court pursuant to former Health and Safety Code section 11488.4, subdivision (a), ¹ each of which named Prince as the real party in interest. The first complaint, CV 66860, sought forfeiture of $2,250 and various weapons and equipment; the second, CV66861, of itemized stereo components; the third, CV66862, of assorted computer equipment; and the fourth, CV66863, of video equipment. Each of the complaints alleged that the property was seized during a March 8, 1993 search of Prince's residence, and that the items to be forfeited were "proceeds or purchased with proceeds from violations of sections 182 of the California Penal Code [and] 11379.6, 11378, & 11379 of the Health and Safety Code." The first forfeiture complaint also alleged, in the alternative, that certain security equipment and a generator were forfeitable pursuant to section 11470, subdivision (b) because they were used to facilitate the manufacture of methamphetamine (§ 11379.6), and that the firearms were also forfeitable pursuant to section 11470, subdivision (d)(2) because they were possessed during multiple violations, including sections 11377, 11378, and 11379.6. ²

Each complaint alleged that all of Prince's personal property had been sold by a landlord in January 1991 to satisfy back rent obligations. Cash receipts found at Prince's residence showed that at approximately that same time Prince began purchasing chemicals and labware from a known supplier to methamphetamine manufacturers. Prince had no apparent source of legitimate income, yet cash receipts were found in his residence reflecting expenditures of approximately $250,000 over the preceding three years.

On July 1, 1993, the court granted motions for entry of default on each of the forfeiture complaints. Prince subsequently moved to set aside the default judgments, alleging that he had filed a claim listing his home address, but did not receive notice of the forfeiture because he since had moved to county jail. ³ On August 24, 1993, the court, pursuant to a stipulation, continued Prince's motion to vacate default in the forfeiture actions until the conclusion of his criminal case which had been filed the previous day.

The information charged Prince with manufacturing methamphetamine while armed with a firearm (§ 11379.6, subd. (a); Pen.Code, § 12022, subd. (c)), possession of ephedrine with intent to manufacture methamphetamine (§ 11383, subd. (c)), possession of methamphetamine for sale while armed with a firearm (§ 11378; Pen.Code, § 12022, subd. (c)), and possession of codeine. (§ 11350, subd. (a).) Prince pleaded not guilty.

On November 16, 1994, after allowing Prince to amend his plea to add a plea of once in jeopardy, the court presiding over the criminal case granted his motion to dismiss the information on the ground that the civil forfeiture proceedings imposed punishment for his criminal conduct, and therefore further criminal prosecution was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The People filed a notice of appeal that same day.

ANALYSIS

The Double Jeopardy Clause is one of the "least understood and, in recent years, one of the most frequently litigated provisions of the Bill of Rights." Whalen v. United States (1980) 445 U.S. 684, 699, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 1442, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).) The United States Supreme Court has stated that "the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three distinct abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction [hereinafter "successive prosecution"] and multiple punishments for the same offense [hereinafter "multiple punishments"]." (United States v. Halper (1989) 490 U.S. 435, 440, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1897, 104 L.Ed.2d 487.) ⁴

"A decade ago, the law was clear that civil forfeitures did not constitute 'punishment' for double jeopardy purposes. In United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 104 S.Ct. 1099, 79 L.Ed.2d 361 (1984), the Supreme Court held that the claimant's prior acquittal on criminal charges did not bar a subsequent action for forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 924(d). Applying the test set forth in United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 2641, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980), the Court concluded that Congress intended forfeiture to be 'a remedial civil sanction.' 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at p. 363, 104 S.Ct. at p. 1105. Accordingly, it held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not apply." (U.S. v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency (9th Cir.1994) 33 F.3d 1210, 1218, opn. mod. on den. rehg. (9th Cir.1995) 56 F.3d 41, cert.

granted sub. nom. U.S. v. Ursery (1996) --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 762, 133 L.Ed.2d 707.)

The decisions of the Supreme Court in United States v. Halper, supra, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487, and Austin v. United States (1993) 509 U.S. 602, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 have, however, raised questions concerning the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause when the government first obtains a criminal conviction and later seeks forfeiture of proceeds of illegal transactions that also gave rise to the criminal convictions, or conversely, attempts to criminally prosecute a defendant, after obtaining a judgment of civil forfeiture. The issue is now pending before the United States Supreme Court in U.S. v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, supra, 33 F.3d 1210, [holding that civil forfeiture proceeding violated Double Jeopardy Clause because defendants had already been convicted of same offenses], and U.S. v. Ursery (6th Cir.1995) 59 F.3d 568, cert. granted (1996), --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 762, 133 L.Ed.2d 707 [vacating criminal conviction and sentence following entry of consent judgment in civil forfeiture of property used to facilitate offenses].

The trial court, in this case, applied the reasoning of U.S. v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, supra, 33 F.3d 1210, in precisely the manner forewarned of by Judge Rymer, in her dissent from the Ninth Circuit's decision to deny a rehearing en banc. Judge Rymer observed that, "[t]he flip side of the panel's reasoning is that a drug dealer whose illegally obtained proceeds have previously been seized may not thereafter be prosecuted because he will already have been 'punished.' This cannot be right." (U.S. v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency (9th Cir.1995) 56 F.3d 41, 42 [denial of rehearing en banc].) Yet, that is precisely what has occurred in this case.

We, of course, are bound only by the precedent of the United States Supreme Court on issues of federal constitutional law, and construe the decisions in Halper and Austin more narrowly than did the court in U.S. v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, supra, 33 F.3d at page 1210, ⁵ and those cases following the Ninth Circuit's reasoning. For reasons we shall explain, assuming arguendo that Halper applies at all, ⁶ it was error to dismiss the information based on Prince's Double Jeopardy plea because Prince has not yet been subjected to any punishment in the civil forfeiture proceeding in light of the stay, and the pending motions to set aside the defaults.

A. Halper and Austin

In United States v. Halper, supra, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487, the court considered the question whether a nominally civil penalty might nevertheless constitute a second "punishment" under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Its analysis was predicated on the fact that the defendant had already been punished once because he had been convicted of 65 counts under a criminal false claims statute. The district court refused to impose the full $2,000 per violation penalty under the civil False Claims The United States Supreme Court held that the fact the penalty is imposed in a civil proceeding, does not preclude a finding that the civil sanction, as applied in a particular case, constitutes "punishment" for purposes of application of the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibition against multiple punishments in a separate proceeding. "[A] civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment as we have come to understand the term." (United States v. Halper, supra, 490 U.S. at p. 448, 109 S.Ct. at p. 1902.)

Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731, finding that the "statutorily authorized penalty of $130,000" was 220 times greater than the approximately $585 Halper had fraudulently obtained from the government. The government appealed.

In light of Halper's showing that the penalty was "grossly disproportionate" to the government's loss, the...