People v. Pubrat

• Decision Date: 01 August 1994
• Docket Number: Docket No. 162555
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Walter PUBRAT, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 724

520 N.W.2d 724

206 Mich.App. 340

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Walter PUBRAT, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 162555.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted July 8, 1994, at Detroit.

Decided Aug. 1, 1994, at 9:05 a.m.

Released for Publication Sept. 8, 1994.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Thomas L. Casey, Sol. Gen., John D. O'Hair, Pros. Atty., Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, and Robert A. Radnick, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the People.

Peggy K. Madden, Detroit, for defendant on appeal.

Before SAWYER, P.J., and WEAVER and TURNER, ^* JJ.

SAWYER, Presiding Judge.

Defendant pleaded nolo contendere to attempted larceny in a building, M.C.L. § 750.92; M.S.A. § 28.287 and M.C.L. § 750.360; M.S.A. § 28.592, and carrying a concealed weapon, M.C.L. § 750.227; M.S.A. § 28.424. Defendant was placed on five years' probation. He now appeals and we reverse.

Defendant's only argument on appeal is that he should be permitted to withdraw his plea because he was not represented by an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Michigan. We agree.

Defendant was represented in the trial court by James Cohen. Cohen was apparently licensed to practice law at the time he entered his initial appearance in this matter, but by the time of the taking of the plea and sentencing, Cohen had been suspended from the practice of law. ¹ The question then is whether the validity of defendant's plea is vitiated by the fact that the individual serving as his attorney at those proceedings was not licensed to practice law. For the reasons to be discussed below, we believe that it does render the plea invalid.

The only other Michigan case of which we are aware that addressed a similar issue is People v. Brewer, 88 Mich.App. 756, 279 N.W.2d 307 (1979). In Brewer, this Court addressed a case in which the defendant was represented by an attorney who had been suspended from the practice of law because of a failure to pay bar dues. The Court declined to adopt a rule requiring reversal, but did remand the matter to the trial court to determine whether, in light of the suspension, the defendant had been deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 762, 279 N.W.2d 307.

We need not determine whether Brewer was correctly decided because, in our view, there exists an important distinction between suspension for failure to pay dues and suspension for disciplinary reasons. In the situation where an attorney is suspended for the failure to pay dues, that failure does not necessarily reflect upon his ability. That is, as the Brewer Court noted, id. at 762, 279 N.W.2d 307, it could, but does not necessarily, reflect a lack of interest by the attorney in continuing to practice law. On the other hand, it could also reflect financial difficulties by the attorney or simple neglect in the failure to pay the bar dues. Indeed, the suspension from practice for the failure to pay dues reflects as much an enforcement mechanism for the collection of mandatory dues as it is a method of ensuring competent and ethical representation. On the other hand, suspension for disciplinary reasons reflects a lack of either competency or ethics by the attorney being disciplined.

Other states that have considered the question of the effect of representation by an individual not licensed to practice law have reached varying results. For example, in People v. Felder, 61 A.D.2d 309, 402 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1978), a divided New York court affirmed the conviction of three defendants who had been represented by an individual who had not, and apparently had never, been licensed to practice law. On the other hand, in People v. Perez, 82 Cal.App.3d 89, 147 Cal.Rptr. 34 (1978), the California Court of Appeals reversed the conviction of a defendant who was represented at trial by a law student participating in a program that allowed law students to appear in court under the supervision of a licensed attorney. The court even went so far as to say that the evidence of the defendant's guilt was overwhelming and that, if they were free to do so, they would hold that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, but that they could not so hold because "the denial of the right to counsel at any critical stage is reversible per se." Id. at 43, citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963).

The question, then, is whether such an error may be deemed harmless. In this respect, the majority and dissenting opinions in Felder, supra, set forth the opposing views. The majority in Felder, supra at 311-312, 402 N.Y.S.2d 411, opined as follows:

Concededly, the fact that each of the defendants was represented in the County Court by a layman masquerading as a lawyer raises an issue of constitutional dimension. However, not all errors which violate the Constitution of the United States call for reversal (cf. Harrington v California, 395 US 250, 253-254 [89 S.Ct. 1726, 1728-1729, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969) ]. Constitutional errors insignificant in the setting of a particular case may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring an automatic reversal of the conviction (cf. Chapman v California, 386 US 18, 22 [87 S.Ct. 824, 827, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) ]. Even constitutional error may be harmless where it is clear, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to defendant's conviction (People v Almestica, 42 NY2d 222, 224 [397 N.Y.S.2d 709, 366 N.E.2d 799 (1977) ].

... The test of due process in such an instance is not whether the defendant had an attorney, licensed or unlicensed, but whether under all of the circumstances his conviction was obtained in such a manner as to be offensive to the common and fundamental idea of what is fair and right (see People v Cornwall, 3 Ill App 3d 943 [277 N.E.2d 766 (1971) ].

The dissent in Felder, supra at 318, 402 N.Y.S.2d 411, replied as follows:

I do not believe it is at all germane that this layman may have acted more or less capably than the most skilled lawyer. Surely, one need not expound upon the State's concern in licensing the profession of law. Whether he did so expertly or inexpertly is totally irrelevant. In licensing, the admitting court of State assures and certifies that the licensee has met minimal standards of education and character promulgated and adhered to by his peers over the centuries. I suggest that if we condone what here occurred, we are rendering a grievous disservice to the public and, also, denigrating our honorable and learned pursuit.

We believe that the dissent in Felder has the better view of the matter. The conclusion that denial of the right to counsel can...