People v. Purdy
| Docket Number | 359143 |
| Decision Date | 30 November 2023 |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RYAN CHRISTOPHER PURDY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Tuscola Circuit Court LC No. 21-015349-FC
Before: O'BRIEN, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and M. J. KELLY JJ.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury-trial convictions of six counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I), MCL 750.520b(1)(f) (); and three counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-III), MCL 750.520d(1)(b) (). He was sentenced to 15 to 30 years' imprisonment for each of his CSC-I convictions and 10 to 15 years' imprisonment for each of his CSC-III convictions. We affirm.
When the victim was 11 years old, defendant moved into a home next door to the victim's family. Defendant, who was about 37 years old at the time, quickly became an authority figure in the victim's life. Eventually, the victim's mother, SL, began a relationship with defendant, which ultimately resulted in defendant, the victim, SL, and the victim's younger brother, NL, living together. Shortly after the victim turned 16 years old, defendant began sexually assaulting her. During each instance of sexual assault, which occurred about one or two times per week, defendant would penetrate the victim's vagina orally, digitally, and with his penis.
To accomplish this abuse, defendant employed a system of manipulation and control over the victim. Defendant relied on his position as an authority and father-figure in the victim's life. If the victim refused to participate in the sexual activities, defendant would aggressively and abrasively scream at her, including the use of derogatory words. Although they did not fully understand the context of the arguments, two witnesses overheard defendant use derogatory language toward the victim during an argument. In addition to verbally berating the victim, defendant also threatened to take away the victim's personal belongings if she did not continue the relationship. Defendant told the victim that he would take away the saddle he bought that she used to ride horses as well as her cell phone and automobile, both of which were in defendant's name. Defendant also had access to the victim's cell phone, which he used to track all of her text messages. Lastly, defendant threatened to leave the household if the victim did not allow him to sexually penetrate her. This included leaving SL and NL, who the victim believed were financially reliant on defendant. In effect, the victim thought defendant would cause SL, NL, and the victim to become homeless if the sexual activities did not continue.
The sexual assaults continued regularly until shortly before the victim turned 21 years old. Eventually, after going to an equestrian college in West Virginia, the victim told her boyfriend, Joshua Little, about the sexual assaults. Little spoke with defendant on the telephone and claimed that defendant admitted his sexual relations with the victim began when she was 15 years old. The victim made a report to police, also claiming she was 15 years old at the time of the assaults. The victim tied her age to an event where she got in trouble for spending time in a car with a boy, presumably engaging in sexual acts. On the basis of that information, defendant initially was charged and bound over on 58 counts of CSC, 29 each for CSC-I and CSC-III. Of those, 40 counts were related to the victim's age being under 16 years old at the time of the assaults. The remaining 18 charges pertained to defendant using force or coercion to accomplish the sexual assaults, and for CSC-I, the victim suffering a personal injury.
At trial, the victim's father, JL, testified that he believed the victim was 16 years old at the time she got in trouble for the incident involving her in a car with a boy. JL stated that he made a police report. After obtaining the report in the middle of trial, the prosecution discovered that the event at issue took place shortly after the victim's 16th birthday. The victim was recalled as a witness, she clarified she made a mistake, cited her trauma as a reason for the error, and agreed she must have been 16 years old when the sexual assaults began. The prosecution dropped the 40 CSC charges that relied on the victim's age, but proceeded on the remaining counts, which were charged in the alternative. Defendant's strategy at trial relied heavily on undermining the prosecution's case by implying that the error about the victim's age should cause the jury to doubt all of the evidence. Defendant did not dispute that there was a sexual relationship between himself and the victim. Instead, the defense's argument was that the relationship was consensual. Defendant was convicted and sentenced as previously stated.
This appeal followed. While the appeal was pending, defendant moved the trial court for a new trial. Defendant argued that the prosecutor committed misconduct, the trial court erroneously instructed the jury, and his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to those errors. The prosecution argued to the contrary, and the trial court agreed and entered an order denying the motion.
Defendant argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct warranting a new trial because the prosecutor failed to correct Little's false testimony. We disagree.
In cases alleging prosecutorial misconduct, issues are "preserved by contemporaneous objections and requests for curative instructions ...." People v. Mullins, 322 Mich.App. 151, 172; 911 N.W.2d 201 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Defendant did not object to the alleged prosecutorial misconduct or request a curative instruction. Therefore, this issue is not preserved for our review. Id.
When preserved, "[c]laims of prosecutorial misconduct are generally reviewed de novo to determine whether the defendant was denied a fair trial." People v. Dunigan, 299 Mich.App. 579, 588; 831 N.W.2d 243 (2013). "However, we review unpreserved constitutional issues for plain error affecting substantial rights." People v. Burkett, 337 Mich.App. 631, 635; 976 N.W.2d 864 (2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must be met: 1) error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights." People v. Carines, 460 Mich. 750, 763; 597 N.W.2d 130 (1999). To show that a defendant's substantial rights were affected, there must be "a showing of prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings." Id. "Reversal is warranted only when the plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when an error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant's innocence." People v. Randolph, 502 Mich. 1, 10; 917 N.W.2d 249 (2018) (citation omitted).
The prosecutor did not commit misconduct because she had no duty to correct Little's testimony under the circumstances.
"Issues of prosecutorial misconduct are decided case by case, and this Court must examine the entire record and evaluate a prosecutor's remarks in context." People v Anderson, 331 Mich.App. 552, 565; 953 N.W.2d 451 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Generally, '[p]rosecutors are accorded great latitude regarding their arguments and conduct,'" but there are limits. People v. Bahoda, 448 Mich. 261, 282; 531 N.W.2d 659 (1995) (citation omitted).
This Court has explained:
It is well settled that a conviction obtained through the knowing use of perjured testimony offends a defendant's due process protections guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment. If a conviction is obtained through the knowing use of perjured testimony, it must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. Stated differently, a conviction will be reversed and a new trial will be ordered, but only if the tainted evidence is material to the defendant's guilt or punishment. Thus, it is the misconduct's effect on the trial, not the blameworthiness of the prosecutor, which is the crucial inquiry for due process purposes. The entire focus of our analysis must be on the fairness of the trial, not on the prosecutor's or the court's culpability. [People v. Bass, 317 Mich.App. 241, 272-273; 893 N.W.2d 140 (2016) (citation omitted).]
In addition to the prohibition against using false testimony "a prosecutor has an affirmative duty to correct patently false testimony, especially when that testimony conveys to the jury an asserted confession from the defendant." People v. Brown, 506 Mich. 440, 446; 958 N.W.2d 60 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "The responsibility 'does not cease to apply merely because the false testimony goes only to the credibility of the witness.'" People v. Smith, 498 Mich. 466, 476; 870 N.W.2d 299 (2015), quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269; 79 S.Ct. 1173; 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959). "A new trial is required if the uncorrected false testimony could . . . in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury." Brown, 506 Mich. at 447 (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original). "As the appellant . . . defendant bore the burden of furnishing the reviewing court with a record to verify the factual basis of any argument upon which...
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