People v. Quaye
| Decision Date | 23 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | Indictment No. 6492/2011 |
| Citation | 2014 NY Slip Op 34000 (U) |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK v. HUMPHRIES QUAYE, Defendant. |
William M. Harrington, A.J.S.C.:
Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of Robbery in the First Degree (P.L. § 160.15[2]).1 On January 9, 2014, the defendant filed a Criminal Procedure Law section 330.30(1) motion, pro se, requesting this court to set aside the jury's verdict, substitute a verdict of guilty to a lesser charge, or acquit the defendant of all charges. On February 1, 2014, the defendant requested permission to amend his initial filing to include an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The defendant's request was granted.
The People responded to the defendant's initial motion and motion to amend. The People opposed the defendant's request for relief and argued, among other things, that the motion must be denied, in large part, as the defendant's arguments are unpreserved for review. Moreover, the People argued that this court cannot consider the defendant's arguments that require an analysis of the weight of the evidence. Lastly, the People contend that the defendant's counsel was effective.
The court has considered the defendant's motions, the People's responses opposing the requested relief, as well as the trial record. For the reasons set forth below, the defendant's motion to set aside the jury's verdict is denied.
On June 10, 2013, this court presided over an evidentiary hearing on the defendants' motions to suppress identification evidence and physical evidence. In a written decision dated July 29, 2013, this court denied the defendants' motions to suppress evidence, finding that the officers were justified in seizing the property from the vehicle in which the defendants were seated and that the identification procedure was proper.
On September 18, 2013, a jury trial commenced before this court. The People called twelve witnesses to testify: the complainant, Erik Lavenburg, Police Officer Jason Santana, Communication Technician Beverly McBride, Firearms Analysis Detective Colleen Schutt, Evidence Collection Team Police Officer Brendan Sheehan, Police Officer Ryan Stiano, Sergeant Jason Vasquez, Criminalist Natalya Yanoff, Detective Richard Colangelo, Rikers Representative Amy Lowe, Police Officer Elvis Merizalde, and Detective Gerard Amato from the Kings County District Attorney's Office.
At the end of the People's case the defendant's counsel made a motion for a trial order of dismissal. The court considered the defendant's motion and denied the request in its entirety. The defendant, Humphries Quaye, opted to testify on his own behalf.
The court charged the jury on October 10, 2013 and, after receiving a note from the jury the next day, recharged the jury as to the elements of first, second and third degree robbery and fourth degree grand larceny. On October 11, 2013, the jury reached a verdict and convicted the defendant of Robbery in the First Degree.
After receiving an extension from the court to file his motion, the defendant, Humphries Quaye, filed a pro se motion dated January 7, 2014. The defendant requested an extension because he was filing the motion on his own behalf and he did not receive the court transcript for some time.
On January 21, 2014, the People filed an answer to the defendant's motion. The defendant was permitted an opportunity to respond and he filed a motion in response to the People's answer; his motion is dated February 1, 2014. By his motion, the defendant advanced an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. On February 14, 2014, the People replied to the defendant's response. Lastly, on March 4, 2014, the defendant replied to the People's response.2
At any time after the rendition of a guilty verdict and before sentence is imposed a trial court is empowered to C.P.L. § 330.30(1). And "a defendant who does not rest after the court fails to grant a motion to dismiss at the close of the People's case, proceeds with the risk that he will inadvertently supply a deficiency in the People's case." People v. Kirkpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 17, 21 (1973). Therefore, "a defendant who presents evidence after a trial court has declined to grant a trial motion to dismiss made at the close of the People's case waives subsequent review of that determination." People v. Hines, 97 N.Y.2d 56, 61 (2001). Based on the defendant's waiver, the court may only consider all of the evidence that the jury considered in reaching its verdict, which in this case includes the defendant's testimony. Thus, this court may only address the legal sufficiency of all of the evidence and, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the court must determine whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621 (1983) citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in the original). Moreover, a trial court's ability to review is limited and "a trial court is powerless to set aside a verdict on the ground that it is against the weight of the evidence." People v. Pirozzi, 237 A.D.2d 628 (2d Dep't 1997); People v. Hampton, 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 03936, *16-17 (June 4, 2013); People v. Carter, 63 N.Y.2d 530, 536 (1984); People v. Lleshi, 100 A.D.3d 780, 780 (2d Dep't 2012); People v. Brown, 141 A.D.2d 657 (2d Dep't 1988).
By his motion the defendant takes issues with the testimony of one witness, the complainant, Erik Lavenburg. His claims center around the believability of the witness. He does not claim that any element of the People's case was lacking, he merely takes exception to the weight of it. Notably, his motion highlights the fact that his point of contention rests with the believability of the witness (...
According to the defendant, Mr. Lavenburg's trial testimony was inconsistent with prior testimony that the complainant gave at a Parole Hearing for co-defendant, Jerrod Drumgoole. The inconsistencies that the defendant complains of include that the complainant initially described the hallway where he was robbed as dimly lit, he did not notice what the assailants were wearing, he did not get a good look at the second assailant, and he identified the perpetrators only once. The defendant also argues that the complainant's testimony at the parole hearing demonstrates that it was difficult to identify his assailants because it was raining very hard, had gotten dark outside and visibility was limited. It is clear to this court that the defendant wishes that this court consider the passage of time regarding the complainant's ability to recall the event. However, again, the defendant's argument is about the weight of the evidence proffered by the People, not its sufficiency.
The defendant's argument regarding his testimony also addresses the weight of the evidence that the jury should have assigned to the evidence. The defendant believes that the innocent reason to be present in the vehicle advanced during his testimony should have outweighed the complainant's testimony.
To the extent that the defendant argues that the evidence at trial was legally insufficient, that argument is also unavailing. Specifically he contends that the admitted Riker's Island phone calls that he made were mere conjecture; the calls' speculatory nature coupled with conflicting testimony from the complainant and the lack of supporting evidence are "insufficient" to support his conviction.3 The only question the court may consider is whether any rational jury could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Viewing all of the evidence, in the light most favorable to the People, the court is satisfied that a rational jury could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d at 621.
A person is guilty of Robbery in the First Degree when he forcibly steals property, and when, in the course of the commission of the crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime is armed with a deadly weapon. See P.L. § 160.15(2). Moreover, a person forcibly steals property and commits robbery when, in the course of committing a larceny, he uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force upon another person for a particular purpose. See P.L. § 160.00. Larceny requires an intent to deprive another person of property .To "deprive another person of property" means:
"(a) to withhold it or cause it to be withheld from him permanently or for so extended a period or under such circumstances that the major portion of its economic value or benefit is lost to him, or (b) to dispose of the property in such manner or under such circumstances as to render it unlikely that an owner will recover such property." P.L. § 155.00(3).
The complainant testified that he observed the defendant and co-defendant near the elevator of his in-laws' apartment located at 415 Albemarle Road in Brooklyn. He had an opportunity to observe the defendants at close range and while the defendant was standing withing a few feet of him. Co-defendant Drumgoole was so close that he had his hand resting on the complainant's shoulder. There was nothing blocking the...
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