People v. Quinn

• Decision Date: 01 March 1992
• Docket Number: No. 6,Docket No. 91667,6
• Citation: 440 Mich. 178,487 N.W.2d 194
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kevin QUINN, Defendant-Appellee. Calendar,
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 194

487 N.W.2d 194

440 Mich. 178

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kevin QUINN, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 91667.

Calendar No. 6, March Term, 1992.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued March 4, 1992.

Decided July 14, 1992.

Richard Thompson, Pros. Atty., Oakland County by Michael J. Modelski, Chief, Appellate Div., Pontiac, for plaintiff-appellant.

Arthur James Rubiner, Bingham Farms, for defendant-appellee.

BOYLE, Justice.

We granted leave in this case to decide whether under M.C.L. Sec. 750.227c; M.S.A. Sec. 28.424(3), knowledge that a firearm is loaded ¹ is an element of the offense of transporting or possessing a loaded firearm other than a pistol in or upon a vehicle. ² The Court of Appeals set aside the defendant's conviction and, because jeopardy precludes retrial following reversal for insufficiency of the evidence, ³ dismissed the charge. The Court held that knowledge that the firearm was loaded is a necessary element of the offense and that the state had failed to prove that the defendant knew that the firearm was loaded.

We hold that the Legislature did not intend that knowledge that a firearm is loaded is an element of the offense. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the defendant's conviction.

I

On March 3, 1987, the defendant and several other persons were firing a variety of firearms on state game land in rural Oakland County approximately twenty-five to thirty miles from the defendant's home. A neighbor, an off-duty police detective, heard the shooting and became concerned that, because there were so many shots, automatic weapons possibly were being fired. The off-duty officer drove to an area on the state-owned property where he saw several males shooting what appeared to him to be shotguns and automatic assault-type rifles. He also observed three four-wheel-drive vehicles that contained several rifles and shotguns laid out on the open tailgates. He asked one of the persons present to stop firing because the noise was scaring the livestock.

The detective returned to his home and telephoned the Michigan State Police. Before a trooper's arrival, the detective observed the vehicles leaving the area and was able to jot down the license tag numbers of two of the vehicles.

These vehicles, a Chevrolet Blazer and a four-wheel-drive Toyota, were eventually stopped by an Oakland County Sheriff's deputy at Dixie Highway and Levon, one street north of Interstate 75, approximately six to seven miles from the land where the occupants had been firing the firearms. The defendant, Kevin Quinn, was the driver of the Toyota; two other persons rode with him, one in the front passenger seat, and one in the rear. The deputy contacted the troopers assigned to the complaint.

Shortly after their arrival, the troopers looked into the rear windows of both vehicles and saw many firearms ⁴ in the back and on both back seats of each vehicle. Closer inspection disclosed that one of the firearms found in the Toyota, a Calico M-100 carbine .22 calibre assault rifle, was loaded. It contained one round of ammunition in its chamber. In addition to the firearms found, the officers located seventeen ammunition clips in the Chevrolet Blazer and a total of 883 live rounds of ammunition in both vehicles.

After being apprised of his Miranda ⁵ rights, Quinn initially admitted owning only seven of the firearms found in the vehicles. However, he later told the officers that they "should just charge him with all the weapons because in fact they were all his. They did not belong to anyone else."

Mr. Quinn was convicted by a jury of transporting or possessing a loaded firearm other than a pistol in or upon a vehicle, pursuant to M.C.L. Sec. 750.227c; M.S.A. Sec. 28.424(3), and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of forty-five days. He appealed, and the Court of Appeals, in a per curiam decision, vacated the conviction and dismissed the charge. 189 Mich.App. 225, 227, 471 N.W.2d 654 (1991).

The premise of the Court of Appeals opinion was that M.C.L. Sec. 750.227c; M.S.A. Sec. 28.424(3), "is the counterpart" of Michigan's statutory prohibition against carrying a concealed weapon, M.C.L. Sec. 750.227; M.S.A. Sec. 28.424, ⁶ being "similar in both wording and purpose." 189 Mich.App. at 227, 471 N.W.2d 654. Because a knowledge element had been read into the latter statute, People v. Lane, 102 Mich.App. 11, 300 N.W.2d 717 (1980), ⁷ the Court concluded that it was necessary to engraft a knowledge requirement as an element of a violation of M.C.L. Sec. 750.227c; M.S.A. Sec. 28.424(3). Because the state had not proved that the defendant knew the gun was loaded, the panel held that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction.

We granted the prosecution's application for leave to appeal. 439 Mich. 864, 481 N.W.2d 341 (1991).

A

While the defendant offers a passing reference to "due process" requirements, the respective parties' analyses, like that of the Court of Appeals, actually focus on whether the Legislature intended to incorporate an element of knowledge into the statute. Thus, the defendant contends that, although scienter is not expressly mentioned in the statute, knowledge that the firearm is loaded should nonetheless be required " 'to limit the statute's application to knowing, rather than innocent, violations of the statute's provisions.' " Quoting Lane, 102 Mich.App. at 15, 300 N.W.2d 717.

Stressing that the people agree that knowledge that a firearm is present in the vehicle is an element of the offense, ⁸ the people respond that there is nothing in the language or legislative history of the statute evidencing the Legislature's intent to create a "double knowledge" requirement that would require proof not only of knowledge of the presence of the firearm, but also proof that defendant knew that the firearm transported was loaded. In sum, the people contend that the interpretation of the statute advanced comports with the legislative intent to create an affirmative duty for those who knowingly possess or transport firearms in their vehicles to ensure that the firearms are unloaded.

We agree. The construction adopted today makes those who transport firearms responsible for their safe transportation, protecting those inside and outside the vehicle against the dangers of discharge, without posing the danger of conviction for those who "transport" firearms without knowledge of their presence.

II

We deal with this issue as a matter of statutory construction. We observe at the outset, however, that while the wisdom and efficiency of excluding elements of knowledge from the definition of a crime has been questioned, ⁹ the United States Supreme Court has recognized as a general matter that the constitution does not preclude the enactment of even strict liability criminal statutes. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 78 S.Ct. 240, 2 L.Ed.2d 228 (1957). Thus, where the Legislature in enacting a statute has omitted language indicating that fault is a necessary ingredient, the challenge typically focuses, as here, not on the constitutionality of the enactment, but rather on whether the intent of the Legislature was actually to require some fault as a predicate to finding guilt, irrespective of the failure to expressly so state. See LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law (2d ed), Sec. 3.8, p. 243.

In the seminal case of Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952), the United States Supreme Court concluded that where the criminal statute is a codification of the common law, and where mens rea was a necessary element of the crime at common law, the Court will not interpret the statute as dispensing with knowledge as a necessary element. The Court stated, "The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion." Id. at 250, 72 S.Ct. at 243. Distinguishing and approving United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 42 S.Ct. 301, 66 L.Ed. 604 (1922), and United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280, 42 S.Ct. 303, 66 L.Ed. 619 (1922), which declined to import a knowledge requirement into statutes creating public welfare offenses, and citing Justice Cooley's statement that the purpose of imposing criminal penalties in this class of regulation is " 'to require a degree of diligence for the protection of the public which shall render violation impossible,' " 342 U.S. at 257, 72 S.Ct. at 247, the Court refused to extend the doctrine to crimes codifying common-law offenses.

Thus, where the offense in question does not codify a common-law offense and the statute omits the element of knowledge or intent, the United States Supreme Court examines the intent of the Legislature to determine whether it intended that knowledge be proven as an element of the offense, or whether it intended to hold the offender liable regardless of what he knew or did not know. ¹⁰

We are persuaded that our interpretation of the Legislature's intent in enacting this statute falls comfortably within the parameters of federal authority holding that a state may decide under the police power that public policy requires that certain acts or omissions to act be punished regardless of the actor's intent. Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 30 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed. 930 (1910). In these instances, the actor "shall do them at his peril and will not be heard to plead in defense good faith or ignorance." Id. at 70, 30 S.Ct. at 666. The statute does not punish crimes mala in se but, rather, regulates conduct under the state's police power to promote the social good, a course the Legislature may elect without requiring mens rea. This construction also comports with the purpose of public welfare regulation to protect those who are otherwise unable to protect themselves by placing "the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger." United States...