People v. Quinones

Decision Date10 November 2005
Docket NumberNo. 1-04-1405.,1-04-1405.
Citation839 N.E.2d 583
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Juan QUINONES, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago (Jessica A. Hunter, Assistant Appellate Defender), for Appellant.

Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Cook County, Chicago (James Fitzgerald, John E. Nowak, Sally L. Dilgart, Paul A. Ruscheinski, of counsel), for Appellee.

Justice GREIMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a bench trial, defendant Juan Quinones was found guilty of two counts of defacing firearm identification marks and two counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (UUW). Defendant was sentenced to four years in prison for each count of defacing a firearm and to three years in prison for each count of aggravated UUW, to be served concurrently, and was ordered to submit a blood specimen for genetic testing. On appeal, defendant contends (1) that section 24-5(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/24-5(b) (West 2002)) contained an unconstitutional mandatory presumption that relieved the State of its burden of proving that a defendant knowingly or intentionally defaced the identifying marks on a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) that his multiple convictions of defacing a firearm and multiple convictions of aggravated UUW violate the one-act, one-crime doctrine; (3) that the trial court's mistaken belief that aggravated UUW was a Class 3, rather than a Class 4, felony influenced its sentencing decision; (4) that he was prejudiced when the trial court failed to completely admonish him of his appellate rights; and (5) that the compulsory extraction of his DNA was a violation of his constitutional rights.

At trial, Federal Bureau of Investigations Special Agent Ralph Anthony Renno testified that on April 11, 2003, he received a phone call from Maria Garza. Garza told Renno that earlier that morning she had received a note on her door that read "we have David [Villarreal]" and instructed Garza to call a certain phone number. Garza had also received calls concerning the kidnaping from a different phone number. Renno sought and was granted permission to tap and trace both phone numbers. At 7 p.m., Garza met Renno at the FBI office. From 7 p.m. until 2 a.m., Garza engaged in six discussions with a person at the number written on the note. At 2 a.m., Garza and the party on the phone agreed to talk again in the morning. From 9 a.m. on April 12, 2003, until the afternoon, Garza engaged in several more conversations with the party at the number written on the note. The parties agreed to meet at Garza's sister-in-law's house at 1944 South 55th Court in Cicero, Illinois, where Garza would give the other party a certain amount of money in exchange for Villarreal's release.

Several FBI agents, a Chicago police officer and Garza proceeded to 1944 South 55th Court. Several agents and Garza entered the house while Renno, Special Agent Brian Murphy, Special Agent Dennis Timothy and FBI employee Susana Herrera, who would act as an interpreter, remained in a van across the street from the residence to conduct surveillance. While Garza and the agents were in the residence, several calls were placed between Garza and a man named Antonio, further negotiating the exchange. At trial, Renno testified that the voice of the man on the recordings of these conversations was defendant's. He further testified that, when apprehended, defendant identified himself as Antonio.

At 6:06 p.m., a Chevrolet Astro van pulled up to the house at 1944 South 55th Court. The driver got out of the van and approached the house while the passenger, who Renno identified as defendant, remained in the van. The driver knocked on the front door of the house but Garza and the agents inside did not answer. The driver walked back to the car, got in and exchanged words with defendant. Defendant then picked up a cellular phone and held it to his ear. Thereafter, the driver again went to the front door of the house and knocked. The agents stationed in the house opened the door and arrested the driver. Defendant then got out of the van, put his head down and began briskly walking away. Renno and the officers in the surveillance van apprehended defendant. Through Herrera, Renno asked defendant where Villarreal was being kept. Defendant offered to lead the officers to the location. On the way, in response to questions posed by Renno, defendant indicated that there were two people guarding Villarreal and that they had a gun.

The agents arrived at a basement apartment at 207 West Quincy in Riverside, Illinois, the location where defendant had indicated Villarreal was being held, at 6:45 p.m. The agents attempted to call the men inside the apartment but received no answer. The agents went to the door of the apartment, knocked, received no answer and pried the door open. When he entered the apartment and turned on the lights, Renno observed two men lying on the living room floor with a third man, who was bound with duct tape, lying between them. In the kitchen, the agents recovered a Ruger handgun. The serial number on the handgun had been filed off.

Defendant was transported to a nearby police station. Defendant had keys which he indicated were to the apartment at 207 West Quincy and a cellular phone in his possession. The number of the cellular phone matched the number from which Garza had received calls on April 11 and 12. When Renno interviewed defendant at the police station, defendant stated that he had also been a victim of the kidnaping. According to defendant, earlier that week an acquaintance named Arqui had invited defendant and Villarreal to lunch. The next morning, when they went to Arqui's apartment, they were abducted. Arqui told defendant that he had given Roglio Aguirre $80,000 to hold but that Aguirre had stolen the money. Because defendant had known Aguirre for a long time, Arqui believed abducting defendant would help him find Aguirre. Arqui had threatened to hurt defendant's family in Mexico if he did not assist him. Defendant admitted that he had placed the phone calls to Garza.

Herrera's testimony was consistent with Renno's. She testified that she had spoken Spanish all of her life and that she had translated the conversation between defendant and Renno after defendant was apprehended to the best of her ability. In Herrera's opinion, the voice on the recorded phone calls was defendant's.

FBI Special Agent Sean Burke was assigned to the kidnaping on April 11, 2003. His testimony regarding the events leading up to the agents' arrival at 1944 South 55th Court was also consistent with Renno's. Burke, other agents and Garza entered the residence at 1944 South 55th Court through the back door so that they would not be seen if the house were being watched. At about 6 p.m., Burke received a radio transmission from Renno indicating that a van containing two men had stopped in front of the house. When the driver knocked on the door of the residence, Burke instructed the other agents and Garza not to answer. Immediately thereafter, Garza received a phone call. The caller indicated that someone had been sent to the door of the location where they were to meet but that no one had answered. The driver again approached the door and knocked at which point he was arrested. After securing the driver, Burke saw that Renno and the other agents had defendant in custody down the street. Burke also proceeded to 207 West Quincy and entered the apartment with Renno. His account of what was found in the apartment was consistent with Renno's.

Brian Wilson, an Illinois State Police forensic scientist specializing in firearm and tool marks, identified a Ruger P 89 DC semiautomatic handgun as that recovered from the apartment at 207 West Quincy. Wilson testified that the gun was in operating condition and that it fired as intended. Wilson testified that the serial number on the gun had been obliterated but conceded that he could not say when the obliteration occurred or who had caused the number to be obliterated.

The parties stipulated that a proper chain of custody of all physical evidence had been maintained, that defendant's fingerprints were not found on the gun but that those of one of the men found in the apartment were, and that defendant did not have a firearm owner's identification (FOID) card.

At the close of the State's case-in-chief, defendant's motion for a directed finding was denied. Defendant rested and the trial court found defendant guilty of two counts of defacing a firearm and two counts of aggravated UUW, noting that defendant had constructive possession of the gun. Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied and the trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of four years for each defacing a firearm count and three years for each aggravated UUW count.

On appeal, defendant first contends that section 24-5(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (the Code) (720 ILCS 5/24-5(b) (West 2002))1 was unconstitutional because it contained a mandatory presumption that relieved the State of its burden of proving that a defendant knowingly or intentionally defaced the identifying marks on a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 24-5 of the Code provided:

"(a) Any person who shall knowingly or intentionally change, alter, remove or obliterate the name of the maker, model, manufacturer's number or other mark of identification of any firearm commits a Class 2 felony,

(b) Possession of any firearm upon which any such mark shall have been changed, altered, removed or obliterated shall be prima facie evidence that the possessor has changed, altered, removed or obliterated the same." 720 ILCS 5/24-5 (West 2002).

We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. People v. Malchow, 193 Ill.2d 413, 418, 250 Ill.Dec. 670, 739 N.E.2d...

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    ... ... 230, 784 N.E.2d 784 ...         Since Pomykala was decided, our appellate court has reviewed the constitutionality of other statutes that incorporated the phrase " prima facie evidence." See People v. Quinones, 362 Ill.App.3d 385, 298 Ill.Dec. 260, 839 N.E.2d 583 (2005) (reviewing section 24-5(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/24-5(b) (West 2002))); People v. Miles, 344 Ill.App.3d 315, 279 Ill.Dec. 280, 800 N.E.2d 122 (2003) (reviewing section 16 of the Illinois Credit Card and Debit Card ... ...
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    ... ... 47 Since I decide this issue based solely on statutory construction, I do not reach any possible constitutional questions, such as whether the statute violates the one-act, one-crime rule. People v. Quinones, 362 Ill.App.3d 385, 397, 298 Ill.Dec. 260, 839 N.E.2d 583 (2005) (multiple convictions based on the same act, specifically, defendant's possession of the firearm cannot stand under the one-act, one-crime doctrine). One-act, one-crime principles apply only if the statute is construed as permitting ... ...
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    ... ... Since I decide this issue based solely on statutory construction, I do not reach any possible constitutional questions, such as whether the statute violates the one-act, one-crime rule. People v. Quinones, 362 Ill.App.3d 385, 397, 298 Ill.Dec. 260, 839 N.E.2d 583 (2005) (multiple convictions based on the same act, specifically, defendant's possession of the firearm * * * cannot stand under the one-act, one-crime doctrine). One-act, one-crime principles apply only if the statute is construed as ... ...
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    ... ... 47 Further, defendant asserts, the State concedes, and we agree that defendant's two convictions for AUUW stem from the same physical act of carrying an uncased, loaded and accessible firearm in public and, thus, violate the one-act, one-crime rule. People v. Quinones, 362 Ill.App.3d 385, 39697, 298 Ill.Dec. 260, 839 N.E.2d 583 (2005). Therefore, we vacate one of his AUUW convictions and the corresponding three-year concurrent sentence. 48 We do not agree, however, with defendant's claim that his one remaining AUUW conviction also violates the one-act, one ... ...
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