People v. R.D., s. 72268
| Decision Date | 15 April 1993 |
| Docket Number | 72269,Nos. 72268,s. 72268 |
| Citation | 613 N.E.2d 706,184 Ill.Dec. 389,155 Ill.2d 122 |
| Parties | , 184 Ill.Dec. 389 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. R.D., A Minor, Appellee. The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Alex BLANKENSHIP, Appellee. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Roland W. Burris, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Jack O'Malley, State's Atty., Chicago (Terence M. Madsen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb, Gael O'Brien, Veronica Ximena Calderon and Theodore Fotios Burtzos, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for the People in Nos. 72268 and 72269.
Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, Chicago (Robert D. Glick, Asst. Public Defender, of counsel), for appellee in No. 72268.
Law Offices of Terry Sullivan, Ltd., Rolling Meadows (Nancy J. Nicol, of counsel), for appellee in No. 72269. Terry Sullivan, Rolling Meadows, for Alex Blankenship.
The State, in these consolidated appeals, asks this court to redefine and to limit the scope of the material witness rule (People v. Armstrong (1972), 51 Ill.2d 471, 475-76, 282 N.E.2d 712; People v. Rogers (1922), 303 Ill. 578, 136 N.E. 470; Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 114-11(d)). That rule requires the State to produce or explain the absence of all material witnesses connected with the taking of a confession whenever the voluntary nature of a confession is brought into question in a motion to suppress. The State also asks this court to overturn the appellate court decisions which reversed the defendants' convictions on the ground that the State failed to produce all material witnesses at the hearings on the defendants' motions to suppress.
These consolidated appeals involve two defendants. Because the appeals require us to evaluate the trial courts' rulings on the defendants' motions to suppress, we set forth the evidence adduced at each defendant's suppression hearing separately.
In No. 72268, defendant R.D. was charged in a juvenile petition with burglary. The defendant filed a motion to suppress statements he made to the police. The motion alleged that the defendant's statements were involuntary. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. After a bench trial, the defendant was found guilty of the charge and was sentenced to 30 days in the Illinois Department of Corrections, time considered served. The appellate court reversed the defendant's conviction and remanded for a new suppression hearing, finding that the State had violated the material witness rule by failing to present the testimony of two material witnesses at the suppression hearing. No. 1-90-2417 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
The relevant facts relating to the motion to suppress are as follows. The defendant moved to suppress his statements to the police on two grounds: (1) that he requested counsel in response to Miranda warnings, but counsel was not afforded to him; and (2) that his statements were the result of improper psychological coercion, because he overheard a codefendant in another room implicating him prior to his confession.
The defendant testified at the suppression hearing that he was brought to the police station and placed in an interview room. The defendant testified that, as he was escorted into an interview room, he saw a codefendant sitting in another interview room. As he waited to be questioned by the police, the defendant overheard that codefendant implicating him in other burglaries. He testified that he was frightened when he overheard these statements. He testified that a female police officer later came into the room where he was waiting and said, "You are through." Detective Michael Rogers then came into the interview room to question him. The defendant asked Detective Rogers to call his father, but the Detective told him that they had attempted to reach his father, but no one was home. The minor claimed that he then asked to speak with a public defender, but Detective Rogers told him that he would have to go to the Audy home to speak to a public defender. The defendant then made inculpatory statements to Rogers. The defendant's motion to suppress claimed that these statements were the result of psychological pressure exerted upon him at the police station and that the statements were taken in violation of his right to counsel established in Miranda.
Detective Rogers testified for the State at the suppression hearing. Rogers testified that he interviewed the defendant in the hallway outside of the interview room where he was being held. Rogers advised the defendant of the nature of the charge against him and of his Miranda rights. Rogers asked the defendant if he wanted his parents notified of his arrest and wanted them present during the interview. When the defendant asked that his family be contacted, there was an unsuccessful attempt to notify them. Rogers then told the defendant that he could wait until his parents came to the station before he spoke to the detective. Rogers testified that the defendant responded that he would speak to the detective without his parents or an attorney present. The defendant then made inculpatory statements to Rogers. Detective Rogers testified that Officers Cooper and Jozefowicz were present when the defendant made inculpatory statements, but that they were merely observing and did not ask any questions. Rogers denied that the defendant requested an attorney and also denied that he told the defendant that he would have to go to a juvenile facility to speak to a public defender.
At the end of the suppression hearing, the defendant objected to the State's failure to produce all material witnesses at the suppression hearing. The trial court overruled this objection, finding that the two police officers who were present while Detective Rogers interviewed the defendant were not material witnesses. The trial court also found that the defendant was given and knowingly waived Miranda warnings, that the defendant's statements were not the product of mental or psychological coercion, and that there was no evidence to suggest that his statements were involuntary. Accordingly, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress his inculpatory statements.
In his statement to the police, the defendant admitted that he and some friends entered the laundry room of an apartment building located at 1046 Sheridan Road and took money from coin boxes in the laundry machines. While they were in the laundry room, the police arrived and arrested the defendant and the others in the group. The defendant was subsequently adjudicated a delinquent and ordered to serve 30 days in jail, time considered served.
As stated, the appellate court reversed the defendant's conviction and remanded for a new suppression hearing, finding that the State failed to produce all material witnesses at the hearing on the motion to suppress. We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal (134 Ill.2d R. 315(a)).
In No. 72269, defendant Alex Blankenship was charged by information with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Prior to trial, the defendant filed motions to quash his arrest, to suppress evidence and to suppress statements he made to the police. The defendant's motion to suppress statements he made to the police was predicated upon the claims that the police failed to give him Miranda warnings and ignored his repeated requests for counsel. At the hearing on the defendant's motions, the following evidence was introduced. Detective Patrick Darcy of the Chicago police department testified that, on Sunday, February 16, 1986, he received information from an informant that the defendant had a large quantity of cocaine at his used furniture store. Darcy and four other officers drove to the defendant's store, located at 1400 South Cicero. At 12:25 p.m., Darcy entered the front door, which was unlocked, followed by Detective Graham and Sergeant DeAntonio. Officers Rosiak and Papalito went to the rear entrance. Darcy walked into the store, displayed his badge and identified himself. As Darcy walked toward the back of the store, the office door on the right-hand side of the store opened and the defendant stepped out. Darcy saw, just inside the door, on top of a television set, a small amount of white powder next to an open piece of white paper. Based on his experience as a narcotics officer, Darcy believed that the white powder was cocaine. Darcy also observed an open gym bag containing a scale and a large clear plastic bag full of a white chunky substance, which Darcy also believed was cocaine.
Darcy entered the office and placed the two men inside under arrest. Detective Graham placed the defendant and a fourth man under arrest. Darcy advised all four men of their Miranda rights. Officers Rosiak and Papalito then entered the store and escorted three of the men to a couch in the rear storage area. As Detectives Darcy and Graham walked with the defendant toward the rear of the store, the defendant told them that all of the cocaine was his and that the other men were just visiting. Darcy and Graham then turned around and walked the defendant back to a desk at the front of the store. Darcy asked the defendant if he had any more cocaine in the store and defendant responded that he had more in the safe. Darcy then asked the defendant if he would sign a waiver of rights form and a consent to search form. The defendant agreed to sign such forms.
After signing the forms, the defendant showed Detectives Darcy and Graham the safe and opened it. Two additional large clear plastic bags of a white chunky substance were recovered from the defendant's safe. Darcy then asked the defendant to sign a form admitting ownership of all the items that were recovered. The defendant read the form, which Darcy wrote out by hand, and signed it.
Darcy denied that he told the defendant that the other men in the store would be...
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