People v. A.R. (In re A.R.)
| Decision Date | 31 October 2016 |
| Docket Number | B267556 |
| Parties | In re A.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. A.R., Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. FJ52209)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Robert J. Totten, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Tonja R. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Analee J. Brodie, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Plea agreements are negotiated by the People and the defendant (or minor) and require judicial approval prior to becoming effective. (People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 929-930.) In this case, minor A.R. initially pled guilty to attempted robbery. His admission, however, was inconsistent with the parties' negotiated agreement requiring A.R. plead to an offense qualifying as a strike under the "Three Strikes" law. The trial court accepted the plea, but later granted the prosecutor's motion to vacate it because it was inconsistent with the parties' agreement.
On appeal, A.R. argues that the trial court erred in vacating his plea. We find no error because it was undisputed that the vacated plea did not conform to the parties' agreement. We modify the dispositional order to accurately reflect A.R.'s presentence credits and affirm the dispositional order as modified.
In a seven-count petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, A.R. was charged with three counts of second degree robbery, one count of attempted second degree robbery (count 3), two counts of assault with a deadly weapon, and one count of dissuading a witness from prosecuting a crime. A gang enhancement was alleged with each offense.
In pretrial plea negotiations, the parties agreed that A.R. would plead guilty to one count involving a strike offense and to the gang enhancement. Further, the parties agreed A.R. would be sentenced to a long-term camp placement. The remaining counts would then be dismissed. Yoobin Kang represented the prosecution in these negotiations.
Kang could not attend the plea hearing and asked fellow prosecutor James Evans to take a plea to "count 3," the attempted robbery. Kang did "not realiz[e] that it was not a strike" offense.
At a hearing, A.R. pled guilty to count 3—attempted robbery—and to the gang enhancement. In pleading to the attempted robbery, A.R. acknowledged that he was admitting to a strike offense (even though attempted robbery is not a strike offense). On August 12, 2015, the trial court entered a dispositional order finding A.R. admitted count 3. The August 12 dispositional order dismissed the remaining counts.
Subsequently, prosecutor Kang moved to vacate the dispositional order because A.R. did not plead guilty to a strike offense. A.R.'s counsel acknowledged that the parties agreed A.R. would admit to "a strike." According to the trial court, A.R.'s counsel must have believed count 3 was a strike because she did not advise the court that the plea was inconsistent with the parties' agreement.
On September 21, 2015, the trial court vacated its August 12 dispositional order. Immediately afterwards, A.R. pled guilty to one count of robbery and admitted the gang allegation. The remaining counts were dismissed. The trial court entered a new dispositional order, finding A.R. admitted count 1 (robbery) and admitted the gang allegation.
This appeal followed. On appeal, it is undisputed that A.R. agreed to plead to a strike and that attempted robbery (count 3) did not qualify as a strike under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (d)(3).
The principal issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly vacated A.R.'s admission and the August 12 dispositional order.1 A.R. also argues that the court failed to properly calculate his predisposition credits, and that contention is undisputed.
Relying on People v. Superior Court (Sanchez) (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 567 (Sanchez), respondent argues that the trial court properly vacated A.R.'s admission to attempted robbery and the court's August dispositional order. Relying on Amin v. Superior Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1392 (Amin), A.R. argues that the August dispositional order must be reinstated.
Both parties cite to general contract principles in support of their arguments. Our Supreme Court repeatedly has held that contract principles are applicable to interpret plea agreements.(Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64, 69; People v. Martin (2010) 51 Cal.4th 75, 79; People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 930-931; People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 767.) Our Supreme Court further has concluded that " '[t]he fundamental goal of contractual interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties.' " (Shelton, supra, at p. 767.) " 'The mutual intention to which the courts give effect is determined by objective manifestations of the parties' intent, including the words used in the agreement, as well as extrinsic evidence of such objective matters as the surrounding circumstances under which the parties negotiated or entered into the contract; the object, nature and subject matter of the contract; and the subsequent conduct of the parties." (Ibid.) "If contractual language is clear and explicit, it governs." (Ibid.) In addition to contract principles, due process must be considered when analyzing a plea. (People v. Crandell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1301, 1307.)
Sanchez involved a plea agreement based on a mutual mistake of law. Specifically, the plea required the trial court to impose an unauthorized sentence. (Sanchez, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 569.) Because the parties' agreement resulted in an unauthorized sentence, the trial court unilaterally modified the plea by reducing the penalty to conform with the term authorized by law. (Ibid.) The appellate court held that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by reforming the negotiated plea. (Id. at p. 570.) The trial court's reformation denied the prosecution the benefit of its bargain. (Ibid.) The Sanchez court explained: "A trial court exceeds its jurisdiction when it alters the terms of a negotiated plea without the People's consent to make the bargain more favorable to the defendant." (Id. atp. 572.) The People were permitted to rescind the agreement because it was based on a mutual mistake of law, and the agreement could not become effective as drafted. (Id. at p. 573.)
In contrast to Sanchez, the Amin court rejected the People's efforts to rescind a plea agreement based on the prosecutor's failure to carefully read police reports prior to agreeing that the defendant would not be prosecuted for crimes mentioned in the police reports. (Amin, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1395, 1400.) The Amin court held that the prosecutor bore the risk of the mistake that "resulted from her failure to read the report more carefully." (Id. at pp. 1404, 1407.) The court emphasized that the prosecutor could have learned the accurate facts prior to entering the agreement and concluded that the prosecutor's "purported ignorance of or mistake about that fact will not suffice to void the agreement." (Id. at p. 1405.) The prosecutor's failure to take care prior to entering the agreement was "not grounds for excusing compliance with its stated terms." (Id. at p. 1406.) The Amin court further explained that " " (Id. at p. 1409.)
Amin cited to the Ninth Circuit's U.S. v. Partida-Parra (9th Cir. 1988) 859 F.2d 629 (Partida-Parra), which like this case involved two prosecutors and a botched plea. In Partida-Parra, the first prosecutor made clear that he would accept only a felony plea from the defendant. (Id. at p. 630.) The second prosecutor, who stood in for the first, reached a misdemeanor pleaagreement, which was entered and accepted by the court. (Id. at p. 631.) The first prosecutor then moved to set aside the misdemeanor guilty plea. (Ibid.) The district court set aside the defendant's guilty plea, and the defendant appealed. (Id. at p. 630.)
The appellate court failed to reach a unanimous decision. The majority concluded that the district court lacked discretion to vacate a guilty plea accepted by the court. The majority explained: "We do not believe that the plea-agreement/contract analogy extends so far as to allow the district court to revisit an accepted plea to reconsider whether the 'contract' was formed . . . ." (Partida-Parra, supra, 859 F.2d at p. 634.) The government was not entitled to relief resulting from a miscommunication between the two prosecutors. (Ibid.) The majority made clear that it was not considering a cause involving fraud or misrepresentation. (Id. at p. 634, fn. 6.) In contrast, the Partida-Parra dissent concluded that any contractual defense should be available to both the prosecution and defense and based on the government's mistake —having defendant plead to a misdemeanor instead of a felony charge—the agreement should have been rescinded. (Id. at p. 636.)
Citing Partida-Parra, the Ninth...
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