People v. Ramirez
Decision Date | 05 December 2022 |
Docket Number | S262010 |
Citation | 14 Cal.5th 176,520 P.3d 617,301 Cal.Rptr.3d 530 |
Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Marcos Antonio RAMIREZ, Defendant and Appellant. |
Court | California Supreme Court |
Jacquelyn Larson, Auburn, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Jennifer Mouzis, Sacramento, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters and Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Michael A. Canzoneri, Louis M. Vasquez, Amanda D. Cary, F. Matt Chen and Rachelle A. Newcomb, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be present at trial. Yet, once trial has commenced in the defendant's presence in a noncapital felony case, the trial court may continue the trial in the defendant's absence under Penal Code section 1043, subdivision (b)(2) (hereafter section 1043(b)(2) ), provided that the absence is voluntary.
1 We granted review in this matter to decide whether the Court of Appeal erred when it upheld the trial court's finding that defendant Marcos Antonio Ramirez was voluntarily absent under section 1043(b)(2).
Defendant failed to appear in court on the second day of trial. Earlier that morning, emergency medical personnel and police officers had been dispatched to defendant's home after a possible drug overdose was reported. According to a police officer who responded to the home, defendant had initially declined medical care, but ultimately decided to be taken by his mother to a hospital rather than to court. The trial court ruled that defendant was voluntarily absent under the circumstances, and it continued trial without him in accordance with section 1043(b)(2).
On appeal, defendant claimed the trial court violated his constitutional rights by finding him to be voluntarily absent without conducting an evidentiary hearing regarding the circumstances of his absence. A divided Court of Appeal ruled that substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that defendant voluntarily absented himself from trial. It further ruled that the court's decision to proceed with trial, rather than grant defense counsel's motion for a one-day continuance, constituted harmless error. ( People v. Ramirez (Mar. 5, 2020, F076126) 2020 WL 1061294 [nonpub. opn.].)
A trial court must assess the totality of facts when determining whether a defendant is voluntarily absent under section 1043(b)(2). A defendant's absence from trial due to drug use is not per se voluntary for purposes of section 1043(b)(2). Rather, it is among the relevant circumstances that a trial court must consider when it decides whether a defendant has voluntarily absented himself or herself from trial. To the extent the trial court's ruling or the Court of Appeal's decision suggests that a defendant who ingests illicit drugs and subsequently seeks medical attention is voluntarily absent as a matter of law, we disagree with this proposition.
Nevertheless, we hold that substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding of voluntary absence under the circumstances. In Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995–996, 266 Cal.Rptr.3d 329, 470 P.3d 41, we explained that when an appellate court reviews a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, an intermediate standard of proof, the reviewing court evaluates "whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true." Assuming without deciding that we employ this heightened review to the trial court's determination that defendant's voluntary absence was clearly established, we conclude that the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that defendant was voluntarily absent. Because the Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's determination that defendant had voluntarily absented himself from trial under section 1043(b)(2), we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Defendant was charged with first degree residential burglary. ( § 459.) He pleaded not guilty to the charge and a jury trial was set for April 12, 2017, but he failed to appear on that date. Defense counsel informed the court that defendant's mother had called his office and notified him that defendant was ill. The trial court vacated the jury trial and ordered defendant to appear for trial setting the next day. It also issued a bench warrant but stayed execution of the warrant until the following day. On April 13, after the trial court received a doctor's note regarding defendant's prior illness, it rescheduled trial for July 5, 2017.
Defendant was present with counsel at the start of trial on July 5, at which time the jury was selected and sworn in. Following preliminary instructions to the jury, the trial court released the jurors for the day and ordered them to return the next day at 8:30 a.m. Defendant was released on his previously sworn promise to appear.
On the morning of July 6, defendant failed to appear in court. At 9:30 a.m., outside the presence of the jury, the court called the matter with the prosecutor, defense counsel, and Sonora Police Officer John Bowly present to recap an earlier in camera discussion regarding defendant's absence. The court summarized:
Defense counsel then received a call from defendant's mother, and reported that she stated she was with defendant at the emergency room waiting to see a physician. The following colloquy occurred:
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