People v. Ramos
| Docket Number | 549 KA 20-00081 |
| Decision Date | 06 July 2023 |
| Citation | 2023 NY Slip Op 03755 |
| Parties | The People of the State of New York, RESPONDENT, v. Gregory Ramos, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (SUSAN HUTCHISON OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
GREGORY RAMOS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PRO SE.
JOHN J. FLYNN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BUFFALO (MICHAEL J. HILLERY OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, OGDEN, AND GREENWOOD, JJ.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Christopher J. Burns, J.), rendered July 17, 2018. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the facts, the indictment is dismissed, and the matter is remitted to Supreme Court, Erie County, for proceedings pursuant to CPL 470.45.
Memorandum Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon a jury verdict, of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [1]) and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (§ 265.03 [3]). Defendant's conviction is based on a theory of accessorial liability and arises from his alleged involvement in a fatal shooting at a bar. We previously affirmed the conviction of the codefendant, who was the actual shooter, on the appeal following his separate trial (People v Suarez, 175 A.D.3d 1036, 1037 [4th Dept 2019], lv denied 34 N.Y.3d 1082 [2019]). On this appeal, defendant contends in his main brief, among other things, that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction and that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. We agree with defendant that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence and therefore reverse the judgment and dismiss the indictment.
A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when "[w]ith intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person" (Penal Law § 125.25 [1]). Further, a person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, as relevant here, when (§ 265.03 [3]). A person is criminally liable for the conduct of another that constitutes an offense "when, acting with the mental culpability required for the commission thereof, [they] solicit[], request[] command[], importune[], or intentionally aid[] such person to engage in such conduct" (§ 20.00 [emphasis added]; see People v Spencer, 181 A.D.3d 1257, 1258 [4th Dept 2020], lv denied 35 N.Y.3d 1029 [2020]).
The People presented evidence at trial that defendant was best friends with the codefendant and that defendant owned a white sedan in which he and the codefendant were seen shortly before the shooting. The crux of the People's case consisted of video evidence collected from surveillance cameras in the bar and the surrounding area. Footage from one camera showed a white sedan arriving at a corner one block north and west of the bar and then parking outside of the camera's view. Additional video footage followed the path of the shooter, identified by a witness as the codefendant, as he walked from a location near where the white sedan had parked, and then proceeded to walk a block south toward the bar and then enter the bar. Video footage from after the shooting followed the codefendant as he proceeded approximately one block west and north toward the location where the white sedan had parked. The white car is then almost immediately seen on footage from the first camera leaving the side street where it had been parked. The gun used by the codefendant, which video surveillance from inside the bar reveals to be relatively small, was never recovered. There is no video surveillance of the codefendant entering or exiting the white sedan, which was parked, either by plan or happenstance, on a part of the side street with no video surveillance, and the video of the white sedan itself is pixelated to an extent that precludes a conclusive identification of the vehicle as belonging to defendant. The People also offered evidence that, several days after the shooting, defendant fled from police officers, resulting in a high speed car chase and defendant's arrest.
As we previously held in People v McDonald, a case involving very similar facts, a" 'defendant's presence at the scene of the crime, alone, is insufficient for a finding of criminal liability'" (172 A.D.3d 1900, 1902 [4th Dept 2019], quoting People v Cabey, 85 N.Y.2d 417, 421 [1995]). "Indeed, evidence that a defendant was at the crime scene and even assisted the perpetrator in removing evidence of that crime is insufficient to support a defendant's conviction where the People fail to offer evidence from which the jury could rationally exclude the possibility that the defendant was without knowledge of the perpetrator's intent" (id.; see People v La Belle, 18 N.Y.2d 405, 411-412 [1966]). The above evidence, without more, establishes only that "defendant may have dropped off the codefendant [near] the bar prior to the shooting," which is "plainly insufficient to establish that defendant was aware of and shared the codefendant's intent to kill the victim" (McDonald, 172 A.D.3d at 1903).
The present case nonetheless materially differs from McDonald in that, here, the People also presented the testimony of a jailhouse informant who testified that defendant confessed to him that he planned and participated in the shooting with the codefendant for the purpose of seeking retribution for the victim's purported cooperation with law enforcement. Thus, "viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the People, 'there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found the elements of the crime[s] proved beyond a reasonable doubt'" (People v Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349 [2007]), including defendant's shared intent to cause the death of another person (see Penal Law § 125.25 [1]; Spencer, 181 A.D.3d at 1258) and his knowledge that the codefendant was armed at the time defendant transported him to a location near the bar (see § 265.03 [3]; People v Hawkins, 192 A.D.3d 1637, 1640 [4th Dept 2021]).
Our conclusion that there is legally sufficient evidence to support the conviction, however, does not end our inquiry. We have both the power to review the factual findings of the jury and the obligation to do so where, as here, the defendant so requests (see Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d at 348; see also CPL 470.15 [5]). Our "unique factual review power...
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