People v. Ramos, B248512
| Citation | 5 Cal.App.5th 897,210 Cal.Rptr.3d 242 |
| Decision Date | 21 November 2016 |
| Docket Number | B248512 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Rafael RAMOS, Defendant and Appellant. |
Heather Washington, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General; Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General; Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Victoria B. Wilson, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; and Idan Ivri, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ZELON, Acting P.J.Rafael Ramos was charged with making criminal threats against Nancy Garcia, and elected to represent himself at trial. Prior to opening statements, the trial court removed Ramos from the courtroom for disruptive conduct. No standby counsel was appointed to represent him in his absence. During Ramos's period of exclusion, the prosecution presented its opening statement and conducted a direct examination of Garcia. Ramos was then permitted to return to the courtroom and participate in the remainder of trial. The jury found him guilty.
On appeal, Ramos argues that: (1) the court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when it involuntarily excluded him from the courtroom without appointing substitute counsel; and (2) the error requires automatic reversal. We agree, concluding that the denial of counsel during the testimony of a key witness is a per se Sixth Amendment violation that requires reversal without analysis for prejudice or harmless error. We therefore reverse the judgment, and remand for a new trial.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On August, 21, 2012, the County of Los Angeles District Attorney filed a two count information against Rafael Ramos alleging that he burglarized the residence of Nicole Eimer (see Pen. Code, § 459 )1 , and made criminal threats against her. (See § 422, subd. (a).) The information also alleged Ramos had suffered a prior prison term within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b).
At the preliminary hearing, Eimer testified that she had been in a relationship with Ramos that ended in June of 2012. According to Eimer, at approximately 1:00 p.m. on July 12, 2012, Ramos approached an open window on the side of her house and began screaming her name. Ramos then reached his arm inside the window, punched through a screen and grabbed her arm. While grasping her arm, Ramos told Eimer he was going to kill her, causing her to fear for her life.
Eimer's next door neighbors, Ruth and Nancy Garcia, also testified at the preliminary hearing. Ruth testified that at approximately 1:00 p.m. on July 12, 2012, she was standing in her driveway with Nancy (Ruth's sister) when she noticed Ramos sitting on a couch on Eimer's porch. Ruth stated that Ramos was drinking alcohol, and began "hitting on" Nancy. When Nancy refused to respond to him, Ramos stood up, walked toward her and threatened to "fuck her up." Ramos then walked back toward Eimer's house, stuck his hand through an open window and began swearing at a person inside the house.
Nancy Garcia provided similar testimony, explaining that she went outside her house on the afternoon of July 12th, and saw Ramos sitting on her neighbor's porch. According to Nancy, Ramos began "hitting on" her. After Nancy refused to respond, Ramos stood up, walked toward her and told her she was acting conceited. Nancy asked Ramos to stop speaking to her. Ramos then "got aggressive," telling Nancy she needed to mind her own business, that this was "his city" and that he was going to "fuck [her] up." Ramos walked back toward Eimer's house, put his hand through an open window and began arguing with someone inside the house. The police arrived shortly thereafter.
Several months after the preliminary hearing, the district attorney filed an amended information that added a third count alleging Ramos had made criminal threats against Nancy Garcia. (§ 422, subd. (a).)
Prior to trial, Ramos made three separate " Marsden motions" (see People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44 (Marsden )) requesting appointment of substitute counsel. The trial court denied each request. On the morning the trial was scheduled to begin, which was the last day of Ramos's statutory speedy trial period, the district attorney informed the court she had recently received recordings of numerous conversations between Ramos and Eimer that had occurred while the defendant was in custody awaiting trial. The district attorney explained that at least one of the recordings indicated that Ramos had instructed Eimer "how she should or should not be testifying." Ramos's appointed counsel, Barbara McDaniel, told the court that although she had been prepared to start trial that day, she would now need time to review the newly-acquired recordings. Ramos, however, informed that court that he was tired and wanted to start the trial immediately. He also stated that he wanted to "fire" McDaniel, and receive a new "public defender." The court held a fourth Marsden hearing, and denied the request. Immediately after the court made its ruling, Ramos stated that he wanted to "go pro per then."
The court instructed Ramos to fill out a " Faretta form" (see Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (Faretta )) acknowledging that he intended to waive his right to counsel. The court also informed Ramos that if it granted him "pro per status," the trial would start that day, and he would be expected to adhere to all the rules of court. Ramos then asked for a one-week continuance to prepare for trial. The court explained that was not possible because Ramos had refused to waive his speedy trial rights. Ramos then confirmed that he did not want to waive his speedy trial rights, that he wanted to represent himself in the proceedings and that he was prepared to begin trial that day. After finding that Ramos had made a "voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to have an attorney represent him," the court ordered the clerk to order a "jury panel for the afternoon [session]."
At the afternoon session, the court announced it was going to hold a hearing to determine whether Eimer would still be testifying at trial given the nature of the recorded conversations between her and Ramos. Eimer's counsel informed the court that Eimer intended to assert her Fifth Amendment rights "not to incriminate herself in response to any questions regarding the incident that forms the basis of this case." When questioned by the court, Eimer confirmed that, upon advice of her counsel, she would refuse to answer any questions regarding the case. Although Ramos was provided an opportunity to question Eimer, she continued to exercise her Fifth Amendment rights. The court subsequently declared Eimer "unavailable" to testify, and excused her from the proceedings.
Following Eimer's excusal, Ramos requested a one-week continuance to allow him to "get in contact" with witnesses, and obtain clothing for trial. The court denied the request, explaining that Ramos had refused to waive his right to a speedy trial, thereby requiring that the trial start that day. The court did, however, offer to bring in the jurors, and then order them to return the next day if Ramos would stipulate that the trial had begun that day "for all purposes." Ramos did not agree, and jury selection commenced.
The next morning, private attorney Ernest De La Mora appeared in court with Ramos, and requested that he be substituted in as counsel. The court told De La Mora that in light of Ramos's prior requests in the case, it would only allow De La Mora to substitute in as counsel if he was prepared to begin the trial that day. De La Mora stated that he could not do so because he was currently "engaged" in another trial. De La Mora then requested a continuance, explaining that Ramos's "Sixth Amendment right to have the counsel of his choice" outweighed any harm the State might suffer through the "dismiss[al] of one jury panel." The court denied the substitution, explaining that Ramos had previously insisted on his speedy trial rights, and assured the court he was ready to begin trial immediately.
After a recess, the district attorney asked the court to instruct Ramos not to make any comments in the jury's presence regarding the denial of his request for substitute counsel. The court agreed, admonishing Ramos that his The court further instructed Ramos that he would only be permitted to ask questions that were "legally appropriate," and that he would be "ordered to leave the court room" if he had any "outbursts."
The following morning, the court announced Ramos had absented himself from the proceedings due to abdominal pain. The court also stated that the medical staff had evaluated Ramos, and found nothing abnormal about his vital signs or physical appearance. When Ramos returned to the courtroom the next day, the court told him that, based on conversations with the jail medical staff, it had determined his decision to go to the infirmary was "an attempt to either inject error into the proceeding, get a continuance or get a mistrial." The court instructed Ramos that if he engaged in such conduct again, the trial would move forward in his absence.2
The court then brought out the jury and commenced opening statements. As the district attorney began her opening statement, Ramos stated that he wanted "to address the court." After the court instructed Ramos there would be "time for that later," Ramos stated: The court immediately ordered the jury to exit the room, and made the following statement to Ramos: ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Lubin v. Wackenhut Corp.
... ... site to site: a security officer stationed at the gate of an environmental facility is primarily concerned with controlling the flow of goods, people, and vehicles through the gate; a security officer stationed at a hotel is responsible for remaining visible and regularly patrolling the property; ... ...
-
Commonwealth v. Tejada
...123, 385 P.3d 1151, 1152–53 (2016), review allowed , 361 Or. 350, 393 P.3d 1176 (2017) (emphasis added). Accord People v. Ramos , 210 Cal.Rptr.3d 242 (Ct.App. 2016) (holding that involuntary removal of pro se defendant violates Sixth Amendment); People v. Cohn , 160 P.3d 336, 343 (Colo.App.......
-
State v. Davis
...at 141, 189 Cal.Rptr. 327. The California Court of Appeal has since reaffirmed Carroll’s holding. See People v. Ramos, 5 Cal.App.5th 897, 907 n.5, 210 Cal.Rptr.3d 242 (Ct. App. 2016) (holding when a trial court removes a self-represented defendant, the defendant is necessarily deprived of t......
-
People v. Greer
...that Greer's threats actuallycaused them to be in sustained fear (an element of the criminal threats offenses). (§ 422; People v. Ramos (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 897, 910.) Greer has failed to establish a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's purported failings, the result would have be......
-
Table of Cases null
...Ruiz, 56 Cal. App. 5th 809, 270 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702 (1st Dist. 2020)—Ch. 3-B, §5.4.1; §5.4.1(1); Ch. 5-E, §3.2.1(3)(f) People v. Ramos, 5 Cal. App. 5th 897, 210 Cal. Rptr. 3d 242 (2d Dist. 2016)—Ch. 5-D, §2.1.1 People v. Ramos, 216 Cal. App. 4th 195, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d 824 (3d Dist. 2013)—Ch. ......
-
Chapter 5 - §2. Elements for exclusion
...at critical stages of criminal prosecution is enshrined in both U.S. and California Constitutions); People v. Ramos (2d Dist.2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 897, 909 (noting different definitions of "critical stage"). The denial of counsel during a critical stage of the proceedings requires no showing ......