People v. Ramos
| Decision Date | 08 November 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 10CA0035.,10CA0035. |
| Citation | 396 P.3d 21 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Ruben Rosendo RAMOS, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Katherine A. Hansen, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff–Appellee.
Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Adam Mueller, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant–Appellant.
Opinion by Judge TAUBMAN.
¶ 1 Defendant, Ruben Rosendo Ramos, appeals the judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of committing a bias motivated crime and third degree assault. We reverse the judgment of conviction and remand the case to the trial court.
¶ 2 On November 13, 2006, Ramos was riding in the front passenger seat of a car driven by his girlfriend, Mindy Pimperpat. The victim, R.L., was seated immediately behind Ramos in the rear passenger side seat. Pimperpat's three children were seated next to R.L. At trial, R.L. testified that while driving, Pimperpat and Ramos began to argue. Eventually, Ramos turned around in his seat and said to R.L., Ramos then punched R.L. several times in the face and lower neck. When the assault occurred, Ramos's hand was bandaged and bleeding from an unrelated injury. Blood from his bandaged hand ended up on R.L.'s jacket and baseball cap.
¶ 3 The People charged Ramos with committing a bias-motivated crime in violation of section 18–9–121(2)(a), C.R.S.2012, and assault in the third degree in violation of section 18–3–204, C.R.S.2012. A jury found Ramos guilty on both counts.
¶ 4 Ramos asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing a police detective to testify as a lay witness regarding blood spatter and transfer evidence Ramos left on R.L.'s clothing. Specifically, Ramos contends that this testimony improperly bolstered R.L.'s testimony that Ramos had punched her, because the detective's testimony was the only apparently reliable testimony that contradicted Ramos's theory of defense that the blood fell on R.L.'s hat and clothing when he was waving his arm during a verbal argument. We agree.
¶ 5 We review a court's evidentiary ruling regarding lay testimony for an abuse of discretion. People v. Chavez, 190 P.3d 760, 765 (Colo.App.2007). An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court's ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Id.
¶ 6 Ramos timely objected to the detective's testimony, contending that the detective should have been qualified as an expert. The trial court overruled the objection, stating that it would "allow some brief inquiry in this area." Accordingly, Ramos made a proper objection in the trial court. Thus, we apply the harmless error standard for reversal. See People v. Veren, 140 P.3d 131, 139–40 (Colo.App.2005). Under this standard, we may not reverse a conviction if we "can say with fair assurance that, in light of the entire record of the trial, the error did not substantially influence the verdict or impair the fairness of the trial." Id. at 140.
¶ 7 Ramos challenges the testimony of a detective. On direct examination, the detective stated that he had worked on thousands of cases that "involved some degree of blood" during his nineteen years as a police officer. The prosecutor then asked the detective, based on his "training and experience," whether there was a difference "between blood that comes from transfer and blood that is cast off," and what that difference might look like. The detective explained the visual difference between the two types of stains, and provided examples of how they could occur. The prosecutor then asked the detective, "[I]s there a technical term used for [blood] droplets?" to which the detective replied, "[S]patter." The detective then examined photographs of R.L.'s hat and clothes and concluded that the blood on the clothes was "spatter," while the blood on the hat was "transfer" caused by contact with a bloody object. During a relatively brief direct examination, the prosecutor asked the detective four times to respond to his questions based on the detective's "training and experience."
¶ 8 On cross-examination, the detective stated that he had not conducted any blood spatter analysis in relation to the actual investigation of the case and had not examined the physical evidence. Instead, the detective explained that he had been asked by the prosecution to testify regarding the differences between blood spatter and blood transfer. He then stated that based on his examination of the photographs, the transfer stain on the hat was slightly smaller than a dollar bill. On redirect examination, the detective stated that the stain on the hat was about the size of a fist.
¶ 9 Whether the trial court abused its discretion turns on whether the admission of the officer's testimony was proper under CRE 701, because the prosecution did not seek to qualify the officer as an expert under CRE 702. Veren, 140 P.3d at 136.
¶ 10 In People v. Stewart, 55 P.3d 107 (Colo.2002), the supreme court held that police officer testimony may fall under either CRE 701 or CRE 702, but noted the difficulty in making such a classification. Id. at 123. The court recognized that "police officers regularly, and appropriately, offer testimony under [CRE] 701 based on their perceptions and experiences." Id. The court held, however, that "when an officer's opinions require the application of, or reliance on, specialized skills or training, the officer must be qualified as an expert before offering such testimony." Id.
¶ 11 Following Stewart, the supreme court amended CRE 701 to provide:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.
Cf. CRE 702 ().
¶ 12 Accordingly, when determining whether testimony is permissible under CRE 701, Veren, 140 P.3d at 137 (quoting LifeWise Master Funding v. Telebank, 374 F.3d 917, 929 (10th Cir.2004) ).
¶ 13 To determine whether an opinion is based on specialized knowledge, we look to whether ordinary citizens can be expected to have known the information or have had the experiences that form the basis of the opinion. People v. Rincon, 140 P.3d 976, 983 (Colo.App.2005). Thus, "courts should also consider whether the opinion results from ‘a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life,’ or ‘a process of reasoning which can be mastered only by specialists in the field.’ " Veren, 140 P.3d at 137 (quoting Rincon, 140 P.3d at 983 ).
¶ 14 Therefore, a police officer may only offer opinion testimony under CRE 701 when the basis of that opinion arises from experiences or information common to the average lay person. Id. However, where the officer's opinion is based in "experience-based specialized knowledge"—experience unique to the witness's role as a police officer that could be likened to training or education—the officer must be qualified an expert under CRE 702. See Brooks v. People, 975 P.2d 1105, 1115 (Colo.1999) ().
¶ 15 Other jurisdictions have additionally looked to the nature of the question being asked of the officer to determine whether his or her response is lay testimony or expert testimony. In State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 16 A.3d 332 (2011), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a detective's testimony should have been introduced as expert testimony "because it was elicited by a question that referred to the officer's training, education and experience." Id. at 347. Similarly, in United States v. Ochoa–Zarate, 540 F.3d 613 (7th Cir.2008), a prosecutor asked a police officer "whether, based on his training and experience, it was uncommon to find drugs after persons had consented to [a] search." Id. at 614. In analyzing the admissibility of the testimony, the court concluded that by adding the "training and experience" qualifier to the question, the prosecutor created an appearance that any answer was based on information broader than everyday observations and experiences. Id. at 622.
¶ 16 Colorado courts have not addressed whether testimony regarding blood spatter and transfer is permissible under CRE 701. However, a division of this court has held that admitting expert testimony regarding blood spatter and crime scene reconstruction is not an abuse of discretion because it enables a witness "to point out things that a lay person would not normally observe and draw conclusions that a lay person would not normally reach." People v. Miller, 981 P.2d 654, 659 (Colo.App.1998).
¶ 17 Additionally, numerous other jurisdictions have admitted expert testimony regarding blood spatter and transfer. See, e.g., State v. Goode, 341 N.C. 513, 461 S.E.2d 631, 641–42 (1995) (); State v. Halake, 102 S.W.3d 661, 670–71 (Tenn.Crim.App.2001) (expert testimony admissible where officer compared blood spatter on defendant's pants to blood spatter the officer observed from other gunshot wounds
in the past).
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