People v. Randall

• Decision Date: 18 November 1991
• Citation: 576 N.Y.S.2d 362,177 A.D.2d 661
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Larry RANDALL, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 362

576 N.Y.S.2d 362

177 A.D.2d 661

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Larry RANDALL, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

Nov. 18, 1991.

Colarusso, Dellicarri & Napolitano, Valhalla (Anthony R. Dellicarri, of counsel), for appellant.

Carl A. Vergari, Dist. Atty., White Plains (John J. Sergi and Richard E. Weill, of counsel), for respondent.

Before ROSENBLATT, J.P., and MILLER, RITTER and COPERTINO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Rosato, J.), rendered April 12, 1989, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (three counts), and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (three counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant asserts that the admission into evidence of uncharged drug sales denied him a fair trial. We disagree. The trial court did not err in allowing the prosecutor to present evidence of uncharged drug crimes to negate the defense of agency (see, People v. Castaneda, 173 A.D.2d 349, 569 N.Y.S.2d 719 [1st Dept., 1991]; People v. Garriga, 159 A.D.2d 634, 635-636, 553 N.Y.S.2d 31). Further, the trial court's limiting instructions obviated any potential prejudice to the defendant by ensuring that the jury did not employ the challenged evidence for an improper purpose (see, People v. Green, 170 A.D.2d 1024, 565 N.Y.S.2d 946).

We further find that the court acted properly in holding hearings on the admissibility of the evidence of uncharged crimes (see, People v. Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350, 352, 438 N.Y.S.2d 261, 420 N.E.2d 59) during the course of the trial. The hearings were held and the rulings were made outside the presence of the jury. Generally, these determinations should be made at the outset of the trial, but the circumstances of the case supported the trial court's decision to make rulings as the trial progressed (see, People v. Ventimiglia, supra, at 362, 438 N.Y.S.2d 261, 420 N.E.2d 59; People v. Linton, 166 A.D.2d 670, 672, 561 N.Y.S.2d 259).

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the trial court properly denied the defense counsel's belated request for a "missing witness" charge with respect to a confidential informant whom the People chose not to call as a witness at the trial. By waiting until after the close of evidence to alert the court to the "missing witness" issue, the defense counsel failed to act as soon as practicable (see, People v. Gonzalez, 68 N.Y.2d 424, 427-428, 509 N.Y.S.2d 796, 502 N.E.2d 583; People v. Parilla, 158 A.D.2d 556, 557, 551 N.Y.S.2d 326; People v. Pendleton, 156 A.D.2d 725, 726, 549 N.Y.S.2d 478).

Further, the defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial by the court's allegedly unbalanced marshaling of the evidence during its supplemental charge on the agency defense. We find this argument...