People v. Ranger Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 22 December 1994
• Docket Number: B066363,Nos. B065563,s. B065563
• Citation: 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 807,31 Cal.App.4th 13
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RANGER INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant. The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. NATIONAL AUTOMOBILE & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 807

36 Cal.Rptr.2d 807

31 Cal.App.4th 13

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RANGER INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant.

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. NATIONAL AUTOMOBILE & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant.

Nos. B065563, B066363.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

Dec. 22, 1994.

Gil Garcetti, Dist. Atty. (Los Angeles), Glenn Britton and George G. Size, Deputy Dist. Attys., De Witt W. Clinton, County Counsel, S. Robert Ambrose, Asst. County Counsel, and Gary N. Miller, Deputy County Counsel, for plaintiff and appellant.

Nunez & Bernstein and E. Alan Nunez, Fresno, for defendant and appellant.

INTRODUCTION

CHARLES S. VOGEL, Associate Justice.

These consolidated appeals contest rulings made by the trial court at a hearing to vacate two bail forfeitures. We first reject the contention made by the two sureties (National and Ranger) that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order the bail forfeitures in the first instance. We affirm the trial court's ruling denying National's motion to vacate its forfeiture, finding that the policy provision relied upon by National does not establish that the issued bond was void. Because we agree with the district attorney that the trial court erred in holding that the court could not consider equitable principles in deciding Ranger's motion to vacate, we reverse the order vacating that forfeiture and exonerating the bond and direct the trial court to reconsider the case in light of the views expressed herein.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Jose de Jesus Gonzalez (Gonzalez) was charged with several drug offenses. The court set bail at $150,000. On August 16, 1990, two bail bonds were posted through the same bail agent, Bert Potter Bail Bonds. National Automobile and Casualty Insurance Co. (National) posted a $50,000 bond. The face of that bond stated, in pertinent part: "This bond is void if limits altered or erased or if used singly or with other bonds of this company to furnish bail in excess of $50,000.00." Ranger Insurance Company (Ranger) posted the second bond in the amount of $100,000. The face of that bond stated, in pertinent part: "This bond is void if written for an amount greater than the power of attorney attached hereto...." The attached power of attorney provided: "This Power of Attorney is for use with Bail Bonds only.... This power void ... if used ... in combination with powers from any other surety company, void if used to furnish bail in excess of the stated face amount of this power [of $100,000]...."

On January 9, 1991, ¹ Gonzalez entered into a negotiated disposition with the People. The court ordered Gonzalez to return on March 15 for the probation and sentencing hearing.

On March 6, the court advanced the matter. The record is unclear as to whether Gonzalez was in court on that day. The clerk's minute order contains a check mark next to Gonzalez's name, indicating his presence in court on that day. There are also check marks next to the names for defense counsel and the deputy district attorney. Additionally, the recitations in the minute order that Hector Gutierrez, a Spanish interpreter, was sworn and that "[d]efendant [was] instructed to return" on April 19 are further evidence that Gonzalez was present. However, the reporter's transcript for a brief portion of that day's proceedings states: "The defendant not being present in court with counsel and the People not being represented the following proceedings were held." As the parties have proceeded upon the assumption that Gonzalez was, in fact, not present in court on March 6, we shall indulge them on that point in order to give full consideration to all claims of error.

In any event, the reporter's transcript for March 6 recites, in toto: "The court: Jose Gonzalez. That matter was on calendar for return of property. No motion has been filed. The matter is taken off calendar. [p] (At 8:33 A.M. a recess was taken until 10:50:) [p] The Court: The Jose DeJesus Gonzalez matter that the court earlier took off the calendar, I am restoring it to calendar. Counsel was in on this matter, and made a report to me that the defendant's mother is dying of cancer. I have received a communication from a Doctor Jorge Fumigachi (phonetic), which is written in Spanish, but indicates that the defendant's mother is terminally ill, and there has previously been a stay of execution on this matter. It was continued to March 15th for sentencing. Based on this circumstance, I have indicated to Mr. Janofsky [counsel for Gonzalez] that I would trail the sentencing to April 19, 1991, and that is the order of the court." ² (Emphasis added.)

On April 16, Gonzalez, represented by counsel, appeared as did the prosecutor. (Because of illness in Gonzalez's family, the hearing had been advanced from its originally scheduled date of April 19.) At the hearing, counsel for Gonzalez requested a continuance because Gonzalez's mother had terminal cancer. ³ The court granted the request and reset sentencing for June 14.

On June 14, defendant failed to appear. The court issued a bench warrant for his arrest and ordered the forfeiture of the $150,000 bail. The court sent notices to National and Ranger advising them of its forfeiture order.

The two sureties thereafter moved to vacate the forfeitures. Although each filed a separate motion, each was represented by the same attorney (as they likewise are on this appeal). National contended its policy was void because it was used in conjunction with the Ranger policy to post $150,000 bail, thereby violating the provision that it not be used to furnish bail in excess of $50,000. Ranger contended that its policy was void because its issuance violated the provision that its policy not be used with policies from other companies. Additionally, both Ranger and National argued that the trial court had lost its jurisdiction to forfeit bail because it had failed to order a forfeiture when Gonzalez allegedly did not appear on March 6, the day the court had advanced and vacated the March 15 sentencing hearing.

At the hearing held on the sureties' motions, the People, represented by the Office of the Los Angeles County District Attorney, argued against the motions to vacate. ⁴ Essentially, the People urged that the sureties should be estopped from contending the policies were void because issued in violation of their respective provisions. The People urged that both policies had been issued by a duly authorized agent so that the companies had constructive knowledge of any purported violation for a year-and-a-half but had done nothing until the court ordered the forfeitures. ⁵

The court rejected the sureties' claim that it had no jurisdiction to order the forfeiture. It ruled: "The court finds that the court did not lose jurisdiction on March 6th, 1991. I think a reasonable interpretation of the minute order [see fn. 2, ante ] is that the court was satisfied that there was good cause for the defendant's nonappearance because of the poor health of his mother. I do not have a specific point to draw attention to other than the overview of the minute order, the fact the matter was advanced from a previously scheduled date, thereby lending some note of emergency to this situation. The court acted properly."

The court then ruled: "As to the People asking the court to apply equity principles, equity principles do not apply to bond forfeiture proceedings. These are strictly legal interpretations. The court believes that the authority of the power of attorney was exceeded when the Ranger bond for $100,000 was used in combination with an additional $50,000 bond from National, thereby making the $100,000 bond void. It should not have been accepted by the jail or by the court for release of Mr. Gonzalez. The court is going to grant the motion to exonerate the $100,000 bail. As to the National bond, I'm considering all the arguments made by Mr. Bernstein [counsel for the sureties], that once the $100,000 is void, that the full amount of the bond isn't met because you only have $50,000 being put up. The court still believes the limitations and the wording in the National bond leave that company liable for the $50,000. And the motion to exonerate [the] National bond is denied."

Thereafter, the court entered summary judgment on the forfeiture of the National bail bond. These consolidated appeals by the People and the two sureties followed.

DISCUSSION

The Trial Court Did Not Lack Jurisdiction to Declare the Bail Forfeitures on June 14

Both Ranger and National contend that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to declare the bail forfeitures on June 14 because on March 6, when Gonzalez allegedly did not appear, the court advanced and reset the sentencing hearing rather than order a forfeiture at that time. The sureties' analysis is flawed.

The version of Penal Code section 1305, subdivision (b) ⁶ in effect at the time of the pertinent events ⁷ provided, in pertinent part: "If, without sufficient excuse, the defendant neglects to appear ... upon any ... occasion when his ... presence in court is lawfully required ... but the court has reason to believe that sufficient excuse may exist for his ... neglect to appear ... the court may continue the case for a period as it deems reasonable to enable the defendant to appear without ordering a forfeiture of bail or issuing a bench warrant." It is implicit in this statutory provision that a court may excuse a bailee's appearance in advance of a hearing if it believes sufficient excuse exists to do so. (People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1306, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 464.)

This statutory provision creates a limited exception to the general rule that a failure to appear requires the court to order forfeiture of the bail with prompt notice to the surety. (People v. Surety Ins. Co. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 22, 26, 211 Cal.Rptr. 204.) The theory behind this exception is that "[i]f bail...