People v. Ratliff
| Decision Date | 17 February 1987 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Michael Elvis RATLIFF, Defendant and Appellant. B018433. |
Frank O. Bell, Jr., State Public Defender, and Larry R. Pizarro, Deputy State Public Defender, for defendant and appellant.
John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Steve White, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Gary R. Hahn, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., and Sharon R. Wooden, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.
Following a jury trial the defendant Michael Elvis Ratliff was found guilty of robbery (Pen.Code, § 211). It was further found that a principal in the robbery was armed within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022(a). He was sentenced to state prison for six years.
He appeals contending (1) that evidence that defendant's alibi witnesses had not volunteered their information to the police was irrelevant, highly prejudicial and infringed upon defendant's state constitutional right not to reveal his alibi witnesses to the prosecution, and (2) that he was improperly denied credit for time served after he was sentenced on an unrelated felony conviction from Ventura County.
As Mr. and Mrs. Leroy Jones left a nightclub on the corner of 120th Street and Western Avenue, at approximately 1:45 a.m. on April 6, 1985, they noticed defendant, a light-skinned black man with green or hazel eyes, standing a few feet away. Mrs. Jones remarked that defendant resembled her brother and Mr. Jones agreed.
A few minutes later, they got into their car and a small blue car containing two men pulled up beside them and stopped. Defendant was the driver. The passenger pulled a gun and ordered Mr. Jones out of the car. Defendant then told his partner to take Mr. Jones' wallet and jewelry. Mr. Jones was able to see the license plate of their car: 1KRA215.
When the police arrived, Mr. Jones described the car as a blue Toyota, license number 1CRA215 or 1KRA215 and described defendant as being light in complexion with hazel or green eyes. Both Mr. and Mrs. Jones identified defendant's picture in a photo lineup.
On April 3, defendant's mother rented a blue Renault Encore, license number 1KRA215. The car was returned April 8th. After his arrest, defendant acknowledged that he had control of the car at all times except for one night. On that night he had lent the car to his friend Tony. He did not know the date he lent the car to Tony, nor did he know Tony's last name, address or telephone number.
Testifying for defendant, Felice Williams, defendant's sister, stated that defendant was at a card party at her house on April 5th from 6 p.m. to 3 a.m. Mr. and Mrs. Al Canister also saw defendant at the card party during that time.
Another witness, Mrs. Jonetta Miller, testified that defendant's mother had come to visit her that evening about 8 p.m. and had stayed overnight. Defendant's mother had arrived at her house in a small blue car which remained parked in the driveway overnight behind a locked gate.
Officer Lopez observed Mr. Al Canister as he left the courtroom following his defense testimony when he faced other defense witnesses and said, "Academy Award Winner." Mr. Canister could not recall the incident.
Defendant argues that the prosecutor's cross-examination of the alibi witnesses, concerning their failure to volunteer their exculpatory information to the police prior to trial, was reversible error.
Contrary to defendant's argument, the prosecutor's cross-examination of Al Canister and Felice Williams was proper since it was designed to test their credibility, knowledge and recollection. (See People v. Kearns, 149 Cal.App.2d 113, 123, 307 P.2d 1015; cf. People v. Cartwright, 107 Cal.App.3d 402, 415-416, 166 Cal.Rptr. 37.) There is nothing inherently improper about cross-examining a defense witness as to his failure to come forward at an earlier date. In fact, the information discovered during this type of questioning may well aid the trier of fact in its effort to determine whether the testimony is an accurate reflection of the truth or a recent fabrication.
Although a citizen ordinarily has no legal obligation to offer exculpatory information to law enforcement officials, there are many situations where the natural response of a person would be to come forward in order to avoid a mistaken prosecution of a relative or friend. In that situation a witness' silence may be akin to a "prior inconsistent statement," and therefore, has probative value. (Com. v. Brown 11 Mass.App. 288, 416 N.E.2d 218, 224.)
However, there are situations where it would not be natural for a witness to offer exculpatory evidence to law enforcement officials, i.e. where they believe any disclosure would be futile; where they have been told by the defendant's attorney not to discuss the case; or where they are not aware they possess exculpatory information. Under these circumstances, the witness' failure to speak is consistent with his trial testimony. (Ibid.) However, the fact alternative explanations for a witness' silence may exist, does not provide an adequate ground for adopting a per se rule and excluding this type of questioning entirely. (People v. Dawson, 50 N.Y.2d 311, 428 N.Y.S.2d 914, 921, 406 N.E.2d 771, 778.)
Thus, to ensure that a witness' pretrial silence was a natural consequence the prosecution must lay a foundation for its relevance "by first establishing that the witness knew of the pending charges in sufficient detail to realize that he possessed exculpatory information, that the witness had reason to make the information available, that he was familiar with the means of reporting it to the proper authorities, and that the defendant or his lawyer, or both, did not ask the witness to refrain from doing so." (Com. v. Brown, supra, 416 N.E.2d 218, 224; People v. Dawson, supra, 428 N.Y.S.2d 914, 921, fn. 4, 406 N.E.2d 771, 777, fn. 4.)
Here, the prosecutor laid such a foundation. During his cross-examination of Mr. Canister, he established that not only was Canister a good friend of defendant, he knew he possessed information that could help defendant weeks before the trial. In addition, the prosecutor established that defendant's sister, Felice Williams, had discussed the date of the robbery with defendant and knew she possessed exculpatory information over a month before trial. Thus, there was no error in the prosecutor attempting to impeach defendant's alibi witnesses by showing their failure to come forward before trial and exculpate defendant.
Defendant argues, however, that even if the evidence was relevant it was "so misleading and prejudicial" that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing it to reach the jury.
It is the trial court's function to determine relevancy, admissibility and whether the probative value outweighs the possible prejudicial effect of evidence, and its determination will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear error of law or manifest abuse...
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