People v. Reans
| Decision Date | 20 June 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 73--270,73--270 |
| Citation | 313 N.E.2d 184,20 Ill.App.3d 1005 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John M. REANS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
James Geis, State Appellate Defender Agency, Ottawa, for defendant-appellant.
David DeDoncker, State's Atty., Rock Island, for plaintiff-appellee.
Defendant John Reans appeals from a conviction (following a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Rock Island County) of the offense of theft by deception in excess of $150 in violation of Chapter 38, §§ 16--1(b) and 16--1(d), Illinois Revised Statutes 1969. He was sentenced to serve 5 years probation. Probation was subsequently revoked and he was sentenced to a prison term of from 1 to 3 years. Defendant has withdrawn a claim of improper revocation of probation and has actually been released on parole. The only remaining issue before the court is whether the appellant's conviction for theft by deception should be reversed.
In argument of his appeal, defendant states that he should have been charged more appropriately with deceptive practices in violation of Chapter 38, § 17--1(d), Illinois Revised Statutes 1969. He argues specifically that the differentiation between the charges is that in the charge of theft for which he was convicted, there is involved the element of intent 'to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 38 § 16--1(d)(1)). He contends that the State his failed to prove such intent.
The record in this case indicates that on January 25, 1971, defendant opened a checking account at a Rock Island bank in the name of a corporation, and that, at that time, he made no deposit but did obtain some checks to use prior to the time the corporation's checks were printed. On January 27, 1971, when a Steve Koehler, to whom Reans owed $10, asked him to pay that money, Reans wrote a check for $300 and instructed Koehler to return the balance in excess of the $10 to him. Defendant Koehler then attempted unsuccessfully to cash the check at two stores. Koehler then went to a bank, where he cashed the check and gave the balance of $290 to Reans. The check was returned unpaid due to insufficient funds, since no money had been deposited in the account by defendant.
During the two-day period following January 25, 1971, Reans tendered ten other bad checks. Although the indictment in the cause before us related only to the eleventh check which was written, the State presented proof of the other ten checks in order to show a prior course of conduct which would support an inference of the requisite felonious intent on the part of defendant.
Defendant Reans contends that at the time he presented the eleventh bad check he was sponsor of a Park District basketball team and was expecting to receive, on January 27, reimbursement in the amount of $900 for some of his disbursements for the team. The money never arrived. Defendant said that, upon learning of the return of the check which he had tendered to Koehler, he called the cashing bank to attempt to make restitution on February 13, but his arrest on February 11 thwarted that endeavor. He also testified that he had asked the drawee bank if he could make a deposit which would enable the bank to honor the returned check. The bank refused. Reans also stated that on February 1, he attempted to arrange a loan in order to pay the bad checks but he was unsuccessful. It is defendant's position that his course of conduct following his tender of the checks, including the fact that he gave the bank his real name and remained in town, was inconsistent with any intent permanently to deprive the drawee bank of the funds with which it had paid the check.
After charges had been filed against him, defendant Reans apparently commenced to make restitution with respect to some of the bad checks. At the trial he attempted to produce some evidence of his subsequent course of conduct for the purpose of countering the State's contention as to his intent at the time he wrote the check to Koehler. The trial judge refused to admit the testimony with respect to any restitution which was attempted after the charges had been filed. Defendant Reans challenges that determination on the ground that such action taken subsequently to the filing of the charges against him, was part of and corroborative of a course of conduct he had commenced prior thereto. He states that while the value as evidence of subsequent acts might have been impaired by the intervening charges, that was a question of weight and not admissibility and the jury was the proper body to decide it.
Defendant Reans contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of a requisite felonious intent. In a trial by jury, where the jury is the finder of fact and has the ability to see and hear the evidence first hand, and, also, to view the witness's demeanor, and generally to decide the weight to be attached to any particular testimony or items of evidence, a court of review hesitates to challenge the finding of the jury. The right to believe or disbelieve the contentions of defendant Reans as to the existence of the requisite felonious intent was the prerogative of the jury. Even though the evidence of the State and defendant Reans was in conflict, that does not in and of itself as a matter of law, raise a reasonable doubt as to guilt. (People v. Hoffman, 326 Ill.App. 514, 62 N.E.2d 24).
We have also noted, from the record, that although Reans supplied the names of his supposed 'backers' who were to have provided the funds which he anticipated but did not receive, Reans failed to either call the backers to testify or to explain his failure to do so. The jury might reasonably have had some reservations about believing the testimony of Reans under such conditions. They obviously could have considered that it would be simple to obtain such testimony and such testimony would be very effective if Reans had attempted to produce it.
On the record, it is clear that Reans tendered a check knowingly without having funds on deposit. This in and of itself would support an inference of the existence of the requisite felonious intent. Likewise, according to provisions of Illinois Revised Statutes 1969, ch....
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...578]¶ 50 The final two cases we mention are People v. Campbell, 28 Ill.App.3d 480, 328 N.E.2d 608 (1975), and People v. Reans, 20 Ill.App.3d 1005, 313 N.E.2d 184 (1974), both decided under the 1961 revision. The defendant in Reans was charged under the former section 16–1(d)(1) ( Ill.Rev.St......
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