People v. Veasey

• Decision Date: 02 November 1993
• Docket Number: No. 2-91-0332,2-91-0332
• Citation: 190 Ill.Dec. 929,251 Ill.App.3d 589,622 N.E.2d 1246
• Parties: , 190 Ill.Dec. 929 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Peggy L. VEASEY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1246

622 N.E.2d 1246

251 Ill.App.3d 589, 190 Ill.Dec. 929

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Peggy L. VEASEY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2-91-0332.

Appellate Court of Illinois Second District.

Nov. 2, 1993.

G. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, Ingrid L. Moller, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Elgin, for Peggy L. Veasey.

James E. Ryan, Du Page County State's Atty., William L. Browers, Deputy Director, State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Brian L. Buzard, Mark K. Vincent, Mt. Morris, for plaintiff-appellee.

Justice DOYLE delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Peggy L. Veasey, was convicted of forgery (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 17-3(a)(1) (now 720 ILCS 5/17-3(a)(1) (West 1992))) and theft over $300 by deception (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 16-1(b)(1) (now codified, as amended, at 720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(2)(A) (West 1992)) following a jury trial in the circuit court of Du Page County. Defendant filed a timely appeal from her theft conviction questioning whether there was sufficient evidence to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that she had an intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession of the subject property. Defendant also argues that victims assistance fines were improperly imposed against her by the circuit clerk.

The relevant facts are briefly summarized as follows. On June 12, 1986, Terrance M. Brady, then president of Market Lease, Inc. (Market Lease), received a telephone call from a person purporting to be Dolores Winfield. The caller was interested in a 48-month lease for a Chevy Cavalier. Brady eventually took various credit information from the caller including the caller's name, address, date of birth, driver's license number, social security number, and several credit card numbers. Brady compiled a credit application with this information which he telefaxed to GMAC Corp. (GMAC) for approval. Brady testified that credit information is traced through an individual's social security number. The caller's credit application was ultimately approved by GMAC.

Brady testified that on June 17, 1986, defendant and an unidentified male came into his offices. Defendant identified herself as Dolores Winfield and stated that she was there to pick up her vehicle. Brady testified that he explained the lease agreement and all its terms and conditions to defendant; they went outside and looked at the vehicle; they then finalized the lease agreement, license application, and insurance validation form; they signed the contract; and Brady gave defendant the vehicle's keys and owners manual. Brady stated that defendant signed both the lease agreement and insurance validation form, and she drove the vehicle away after the transaction was completed. The forms were signed "Delores R. Winfield." The lease agreement indicated that the first month's payment ($231.56), a refundable security deposit ($250), and various fees (totaling $50) were due upon signing of the lease. No testimony was presented concerning whether these sums were paid on June 17, or, assuming they were, who paid them or the manner in which they were paid.

Dolores Bell Winfield identified the social security number and two of the credit card numbers appearing on the credit application as her own. Winfield testified that she has never had contact with Market Lease, and she denied ever entering into any lease agreement for a Chevy motor vehicle on or about June 17, 1986. In fact, Winfield testified that she does not drive a car. Winfield stated that she gave no one permission to use her name, social security number, or credit rating. Winfield examined the signature appearing on the lease agreement and stated that it was not her signature.

James Boerema, an officer with the Homewood police department, testified that he executed a traffic stop of the subject vehicle at approximately 8:50 p.m. on June 19, 1986. The vehicle was being driven by a male subject with defendant as a passenger. The jury found defendant guilty of both forgery and theft of over $300 by deception.

Defendant argues on appeal that the evidence introduced at trial failed to show that she did not intend to fully comply with the terms of the lease agreement, including relinquishing possession of the vehicle at the end of the 48-month period, and, therefore, the State failed to prove that she had the requisite intent to permanently deprive the owner of the motor vehicle's use or benefit. The State responds that an intent to permanently deprive may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding defendant's actions. In particular, defendant represented herself to be another person to induce Market Lease to execute a lease for the subject vehicle in reliance on false credit information.

It is well established that the standard for reviewing the sufficiency of evidence supporting a criminal conviction is whether, after considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Smith (1992), 149 Ill.2d 558, 565, 174 Ill.Dec. 804, 599 N.E.2d 888; People v. Hendricks (1990), 137 Ill.2d 31, 62, 148 Ill.Dec. 213, 560 N.E.2d 611; People v. Grengler (1993), 247 Ill.App.3d 1006, 1011-12, 187 Ill.Dec. 278, 617 N.E.2d 486.) This standard is applicable in criminal cases regardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial. (People v. Campbell (1992), 146 Ill.2d 363, 374, 166 Ill.Dec. 932, 586 N.E.2d 1261; People v. Kaminski (1993), 246 Ill.App.3d 77, 82, 186 Ill.Dec. 4, 615 N.E.2d 808.) A reviewing court must consider that the jury heard and saw the witnesses and was, therefore, in the best position to assess their credibility, determine the weight to be accorded their testimony, decide what inferences to draw from the evidence, and resolve any actual disputes arising from conflicting or inconsistent testimony. (Hendricks, 137 Ill.2d at 65, 148 Ill.Dec. 213, 560 N.E.2d 611; People v. Reid (1990), 136 Ill.2d 27, 61, 143 Ill.Dec. 239, 554 N.E.2d 174; Grengler, 247 Ill.App.3d at 1012, 187 Ill.Dec. 278, 617 N.E.2d 486.) A reviewing court must not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on those issues unless the evidence presented at trial is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that no rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Reid, 136 Ill.2d at 61, 143 Ill.Dec. 239, 554 N.E.2d 174; Grengler, 247 Ill.App.3d at 1012, 187 Ill.Dec. 278, 617 N.E.2d 486.

A defendant's intent to permanently deprive the owner of property may be deduced by the trier of fact from the facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged criminal act. (People v. Falkner (1978), 61 Ill.App.3d 84, 87, 18 Ill.Dec. 339, 377 N.E.2d 824; People v. McClinton (1972), 4 Ill.App.3d 253, 256, 280 N.E.2d 795.) "With respect to many criminal acts, the act clearly 'speaks for itself.' The act so clearly broadcasts the intent with which it was performed that the question of intent either becomes inconsequential or the proof of it so directly related to proof of the act that the evidence is regarded as direct even though technically it might be 'circumstantial.' " (People v. Reans (1974), 20 Ill.App.3d 1005, 1009, 313 N.E.2d 184.) For example, it has been generally recognized that an intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property may ordinarily be inferred when a person takes the property of another. (Falkner, 61 Ill.App.3d at 90, 18 Ill.Dec. 339, 377 N.E.2d 824; People v. Steinmann (1978), 57 Ill.App.3d 887, 892, 15 Ill.Dec. 411, 373 N.E.2d 757.) This is particularly true when the owner of the property is a stranger to the accused. (See People v. Jones (1992), 149 Ill.2d 288, 298, 172 Ill.Dec. 401, 595 N.E.2d 1071, quoting People v. Beck (1976), 42 Ill.App.3d 923, 924, 1 Ill.Dec. 566, 356 N.E.2d 848 (" 'It would be contrary to experience and reason to conclude a stranger would * * * take money from another stranger without fully intending to permanently deprive the wronged party of the money' ").) Concealment of property has also been recognized as a circumstance supporting an inference of an intent to permanently deprive. (See McClinton, 4 Ill.App.3d at 256, 280 N.E.2d 795.) Fraudulent or deceptive acts can also give rise to an inference of such intent. See People v. Varellas (1985), 138 Ill.App.3d 820, 826-27, 93 Ill.Dec. 287, 486 N.E.2d 388 (uttering or offering of a forged instrument in...