People v. Redd

• Decision Date: 08 November 1990
• Citation: 561 N.Y.S.2d 439,164 A.D.2d 34
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Vincent REDD, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 439

561 N.Y.S.2d 439

164 A.D.2d 34

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Vincent REDD, Defendant-Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

First Department.

Nov. 8, 1990.

Terrence J. Sweeney, of counsel (Peter D. Coddington, with him, on the brief; Robert T. Johnson, district attorney, attorney), for respondent.

Lawrence A. Vogelman, for defendant-appellant (Lawrence J. Reina, with him, on the brief).

Before MURPHY, P.J., CARRO, ASCH, ELLERIN and SMITH, JJ.

ELLERIN, Justice.

At issue in this case is the extent to which a jury's verdict may be impeached by allegations of improprieties during the jury's deliberations.

Almost one month following the return of the jury's verdict finding defendant guilty, one of the jurors, Eleanor Allen, telephoned the defense counsel and told him that she wished to discuss certain improprieties that occurred during the jury's deliberation. Two weeks later, Ms. Allen and another juror, Jerilynn Harris, came to the attorney's office and detailed their allegations in formal affidavits. Based on these affidavits, defendant moved to set aside the verdict. A hearing was then held at which both disaffected jurors elaborated their complaints.

Both jurors claimed that they had voted "guilty" only because of intimidation and coercion by the foreman and other jurors. They also recounted various alleged improprieties. The jurors asserted that they had been threatened by the foreman, who repeatedly shouted and screamed obscenities at those jurors who were voting not guilty, escalating to a threat to throw Ms. Allen out the window. They further stated that many of the jurors rushed to a verdict on the second day of deliberations, a Friday, because they did not wish to be sequestered over the weekend. In fact, Ms. Harris herself was concerned that she would lose $800 paid for a cruise she was scheduled to take that weekend. They also testified that they and some of the other jurors discussed the case during lunch and other breaks prior to the conclusion of the trial, and that other jurors were predisposed to find the defendant guilty.

Finally, there was testimony by the two jurors that during the course of the trial one of the alternate jurors had visited the crime scene and reported the findings and conclusions of his examination of the area to several of the other jurors, who then discussed these observations during the deliberations.

The hearing court denied the motion to set aside the verdict, without extensive comment, noting that the jurors' complaints could have been made to court officers during the trial, or at the time that the jury was polled.

The basic principle that guides consideration of an application such as this is that, absent special circumstances, a jury verdict should not be impeached by affidavit or testimony of the jurors after the verdict has been returned. See, e.g., People v. De Lucia, 20 N.Y.2d 275, 282 N.Y.S.2d 526, 229 N.E.2d 211 rev'g. 15 N.Y.2d 294, 258 N.Y.S.2d 377, 206 N.E.2d 324; cf. People v. Rukaj, 123 A.D.2d 277, 506 N.Y.S.2d 677.

The longstanding rule that statements by jurors may not be used to impeach a verdict once the jury has been discharged, reflecting the reluctance of courts to inquire into the process of deliberation, can be traced to Lord Mansfield's decision in Vaise v. Delaval, 1 T.R. 11, (1785) where the court refused to consider the affidavits of jurors to prove that the verdict was reached by the drawing of lots on the ground that "a witness shall not be heard to allege his own turpitude". The subsequent incorporation into the jurisprudence of this country of the rule against jurors impeaching their own verdict was based on grounds of public policy. Such proscription was seen as reducing the risk of jury tampering by protecting the jurors from harassment by a defeated party seeking to secure evidence which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict. It was also intended to secure the privacy and secrecy of jury deliberations, to ensure "frankness and freedom of discussion and conference". (McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 268, 35 S.Ct. 783, 59 L.Ed. 1300.) Moreover, the rule served to protect the finality and integrity of a verdict and to maintain the viability of the jury as a decision making body. If all verdicts were assailable, the courts would be caught in a never ending litigation spiral and all notions of finality of judgment would be disregarded. (People v. De Lucia, supra.)

An examination of the various instances of misconduct asserted in the instant case demonstrates the soundness of this approach. Upon careful scrutiny, most of the claims are essentially complaints stemming from escalated tempers and of obscenities shouted by the foreman. In People v. Jacobson, 109 Misc.2d 204, 440 N.Y.S.2d 458 aff'd 89 A.D.2d 826, 452 N.Y.S.2d 473 allegations that jurors threw chairs and shouted obscenities at one another, were found insufficient to upset the jury's verdict. In this case the alleged threats and belligerent exchanges in the course of deliberations would similarly be insufficient to upset the verdict. Such intense feelings and emotional manifestations often accompany the free and unfettered exchange of views that are the hallmark of the heightened atmosphere in which the jury's decision making process takes place. To render that process subject to attack by the subsequent impeachment testimony of its participants would, indeed, "create chaos". (See, People v. De Lucia, supra.)

Nor do the vague and generalized allegations of premature deliberations and predisposed jurors warrant the setting aside of the verdict. No significant details of the alleged premature deliberations were provided and the alleged comments made by other jurors indicating predisposition were isolated remarks which were not shown to have unfairly influenced or prejudiced the deliberative process. Indeed, the two complaining jurors admitted that they were not influenced by these remarks. (See, People v. Horney, 112 A.D.2d 841, 493 N.Y.S.2d 130.)

The jurors were polled at the conclusion of the case and affirmed their decision, in open court, without reservation and with no juror giving any indication that the verdict was not freely his or her own. (Cf., in contrast, People v. Pickett, 61 N.Y.2d 773, 774, 473 N.Y.S.2d 157, 461 N.E.2d 294 affirming 92 A.D.2d 843, 460 N.Y.S.2d 338), where-upon the polling of the jury, one juror when asked whether the verdict was hers, responded "Yes, under duress, I'm saying yes", People v. Rukaj, supra, and People v. Lavender, 117 A.D.2d 253, 502 N.Y.S.2d 439, where alleged coercion and other improprieties were brought to the court's attention during the deliberative process. In each of the foregoing cases, the court's failure to hold an appropriate hearing or inquiry, despite communications of...