People v. Redding
| Decision Date | 22 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | NO. 4-19-0252,4-19-0252 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Matthew Q. REDDING, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Jay Scott, State's Attorney, of Decatur (Patrick Delfino, David J. Robinson, and James Ryan Williams, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.
James E. Chadd, Catherine K. Hart, and Jessica L. Harris, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Springfield, for appellee.
¶ 1 In January 2018, defendant, Matthew Q. Redding, was charged with one count of misdemeanor driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). On January 30, 2018, at approximately 10 p.m., officers stopped defendant's truck near the area of Sliderz Bar and Grill (Sliderz) in Decatur after being informed defendant was involved in an altercation inside the bar. Other officers investigating the alleged battery at the bar quickly arrived to speak with defendant. After demonstrating visible signs of intoxication and showing indicators of impairment on standard field sobriety tests, defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol.
¶ 2 In September 2018, defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, claiming sheriff's deputies did not have probable cause to stop his vehicle. In November 2018, the trial court heard and subsequently granted defendant's motion.
¶ 3 On appeal, the State offers three arguments for our consideration: (1) the trial court erred in finding the evidence was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop, (2) defendant did not satisfy his burden by proving or making a preliminary showing that police lacked reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop, and (3) it was error for the trial court to exclude evidence under the facts of this case, based on the good faith of the officers.
¶ 5 In January 2018, Deputy David Lewallen of the Macon County Sheriff's Department received a radio dispatch identifying defendant as a suspect involved in a bar fight at Sliderz. In addition to identifying defendant's involvement in the altercation, the caller provided dispatch the color, make, and model of defendant's truck and informed them he had left the scene. Approximately six minutes after the call, Deputy Lewallen located the truck traveling near the area of Sliderz, confirmed the truck was registered to defendant, and contacted Deputy Patrick Smith, who was investigating the fight. Deputy Smith directed Deputy Lewallen to stop the truck so Smith could speak to defendant about the bar fight. Within minutes of Deputy Lewallen effectuating a traffic stop on defendant's truck, Deputy Smith and Deputy Megan Burgener, a newly hired officer under Deputy Smith's supervision, arrived on scene. Upon interacting with defendant, Deputy Burgener observed several indicators of alcohol intoxication, conducted field sobriety tests, and arrested defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol as a result of her observations and the test results.
¶ 6 In January 2018, the State charged defendant with one count of driving under the influence of alcohol ( 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2018)). In September 2018, defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, arguing the police lacked probable cause to effectuate the traffic stop and defendant's statements should be suppressed because of the deputies' failure to read him Miranda warnings. See Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). In response, the State argued probable cause was not the correct standard to determine whether the traffic stop was permissible, contending the question was whether the deputies had a reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct the stop. The State contended they did. Because the trial court found the officers did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion sufficient to justify the stop, it did not reach the merits of the suppression of defendant's statements.
¶ 8 In November 2018, defendant's motion to suppress was heard. Before the presentation of evidence, defense counsel conceded the proper standard for evaluating the legality of the traffic stop was whether the deputies had a reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct the stop. The defense called Deputy Lewallen and Deputy Burgener to testify during the hearing. The State recalled Deputy Lewallen in support of its response to the motion.
¶ 10 On direct examination, Deputy Lewallen testified he received information from dispatch about an altercation at Sliderz, that defendant was a suspect, and defendant left the bar in a black Chevrolet Silverado. While en route to Sliderz, since Lewallen had already been informed the suspect left in his vehicle, he began looking in the area for a vehicle matching the description given. Other officers were sent to Sliderz to investigate. He testified that, once he got behind defendant's truck (a black Chevrolet Silverado), he verified the license plate with dispatch and confirmed it was registered to defendant. He then called Deputy Smith, who was investigating the bar fight, and asked if Deputy Smith wanted him to make a traffic stop on defendant's truck so Smith could talk to defendant about the fight. When asked what Deputy Lewallen's reasonable suspicion was in making a traffic stop on defendant's truck, he stated, On cross-examination, he stated the investigation of the battery was still ongoing and he pulled defendant's vehicle over pursuant to that ongoing investigation. When recalled by the State, Lewallen testified he informed defendant why he was being stopped and may have asked if he had been in a bar fight at Sliderz before Deputy Burgener arrived on the scene.
¶ 12 At the time of the traffic stop, Deputy Burgener had been with the Macon County Sheriff's Department for approximately four months. She was still working under the supervision of Deputy Smith, who was her field training officer. She testified she was called to back up Deputy Lewallen regarding a traffic stop. She was aware the original call involved a bar fight at Sliderz between the Redding brothers. Upon her arrival at the traffic stop, she approached defendant and "immediately" noticed signs of impairment and began conducting a DUI investigation. On cross-examination, she testified she began focusing on a possible DUI after observing defendant had "slowed movements, slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, indicators of being intoxicated."
¶ 13 Defendant argued the deputies who stopped him did not have a "reasonable suspicion" because "in order for a police officer to stop that person [(a suspect who has left the scene),] they have to have something unfold in front of them that gives them reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime has been committed." Defendant argued because Deputy Lewallen did not have reasonable suspicion that a crime was unfolding in front of him, Deputy Lewallen should have "s[a]t back and watch[ed] [to] see if he could observe a traffic violation" and, without more, there was no basis to stop defendant's vehicle.
¶ 14 The State argued Deputy Lewallen received a call from dispatch that defendant and his brother were in an altercation at Sliderz and the reason Deputy Lewallen made a traffic stop on defendant's truck was to help investigate that report. The stop was based on an ongoing investigation. The State disagreed with counsel's argument that the criminal activity had to reveal itself or unfold in front of the officer in order to have a reasonable suspicion. Regardless of whether Lewallen had probable cause to believe defendant had committed a battery, "he had reasonable suspicion to investigate." The State noted the officers were entitled to rely on the information they were given, even if it proved to be incorrect. After arguments, the trial court took the matter under advisement.
¶ 15 In March 2019, the trial court issued its written order finding "defendant made a prima facie showing that Deputy Lewallen lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to temporarily detain defendant." The court explained Deputy Lewallen did not see defendant violate any traffic laws and the only reason for the stop was due to defendant's alleged involvement in a bar fight with his brother. Furthermore, the court noted that neither of the deputies called to testify identified the complainant of the alleged battery or articulated any facts involving the alleged battery, and neither witness went to investigate the alleged battery. The court found the sole basis for the stop was a dispatch indicating defendant was involved in a bar fight and that neither witness "offered testimony or facts sufficient to establish reasonable and articulable suspicion to make a Terry stop of defendant." See Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). As a result, the court found the State failed to meet its burden. The court further opined that, if the State had called Deputy Smith, who was detailed to investigate defendant's alleged involvement in a bar fight, or the dispatcher who relayed the information concerning the bar fight to Deputy Lewallen, then the State may have provided facts and testimony sufficient to establish a reasonable articulable suspicion to make the stop. Finally, the court stated the complainant was not identified and therefore was "effectively...
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