People v. Reddy
| Decision Date | 18 April 1933 |
| Citation | 185 N.E. 705,261 N.Y. 479 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. REDDY. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Francis Howard Reddy was convicted of murder, and he appeals.
Reversed and new trial ordered.
Appeal from Court of Quarter Sessions, New York County.
Samuel S. Leibowitz, of New York City, and Harry G. Anderson and Joseph H. Stein, both of Brooklyn, for appellant.
Thomas C. T. Crain, Dist. Atty., of New York City (Robert C. Taylor, Asst. Dist. Atty., of New York City, of counsel), for the People.
On the night of August 6, 1931, two robbers held up a cider stube, so called, on West Forty-fourth street in the city of New York. In the course of the robbery, one of the victims was shot and killed. The robber who fired the shots was pursued and captured. His name was Baumann. The other one escaped. Baumann and his companion, designated as John Doe, were indicted for murder in the first degree. Baumann was tried and convicted as charged. The judgment of conviction was affirmed by this court. People v. Baumann, 259 N. Y. 600, 182 N. E. 198. Subsequently the defendant here was arrested and brought to trial as being Baumann's companion and the person named as John Doe in the indictment. His appeal is from a judgment of conviction for murder in the first degree. That conviction was had upon the testimony of Baumann. Unless Baumann be corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime, the conviction must be set aside. Code Cr. Proc. § 399.
Baumann testified that he was twenty-one years of age and had known the defendant Reddy, who was commonly called ‘Howie,’ for five or six years, although he had seen little of him during the year preceding the murder; that on the afternoon of the murder he had driven with Reddy from Keansburg, N. J., where they had both been staying for several days; that after they reached New York, Reddy suggested that they join in a holdup, to which Baumann agreed; that they separated with an understanding that they would meet at Tenth avenue and Forty-ninth street at 7 o'clock in the evening, Reddy in the meantime to get pistols and arrange for the use of a taxicab; that they met at the time and place stated, boarded a taxicab and drove off; that Reddy gave witness a pistol and some extra cartridges; that the taxicab stopped at Forty-fourth street about six doors from Ninth avenue; that Reddy alighted from the taxicab, followed by the witness, the motor being kept running; that the witness took out his pistol, opened the door, and went into the cider stube, followed by Reddy; that they ordered the people in the place to put up their hands and go to the rear of the store; that Reddy did most of the searching while the witness kept the victims covered with his pistol; that when the cash register had been rifled and the pockets of the victims searched, Reddy stepped past the witness saying, ‘Come on, let's go,’ and proceeded rapidly toward the front door; that as witness turned to follow, Munich, one of the victims, grappled with him; that at that time Reddy was close to the front door; that witness shouted out, ‘Wait a minute, Howie, this guy has got me,’ but Reddy proceeded out; that the struggle between witness and Munich ended after a short time with the firing of three shots, after which Munich fell away from the witness, whereupon the witness ran out and saw the taxicab turning into Ninth avenue; that the witness never saw, Reddy again until the trial.
It further appears that when Baumann was searched, following his capture, there was found on him a small photograph of Reddy. He repeatedly denied that that was a photograph of the man who was with him; on the contrary, he asserted that his companion was an ‘Italian fellow.’ Baumann's conviction was affirmed by this court on June 1, 1932, and his execution was set for July 14, 1932. Within a few hours of the time set for execution, Baumann made a statement which for the first time implicated Reddy. A reprieve of twenty-four hours resulted, during which the district attorney took a statement from Baumann. A second reprieve put off execution until the night of August 18th. The statements which Baumann had made were not wholly true, and it was not until almost the moment of execution on the night of August 18th that Baumann sent for the district attorney and made still another statement which apparently satisfied that official. A further reprieve was thereupon granted to cover the time of Reddy's trial. After that trial, Baumann's sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. Baumann on this trial asserted that his testimony on his own trial and all statements made by him relating to the identity of his companion had been intentional and deliberate lies for the purpose of shielding Reddy. He frankly admitted that he finally implicated Reddy and became a witness for the people solely to save his own life, and to that end he would not hesitate to lie. The defendant did not take the stand.
Here, then, is a typical case of conflict between the public need of bringing to justice one against whom suspicion of guilt exists, and the individual right of the suspect to be safeguarded within the law against the effect of tainted evidence. We are to examine the record and say whether or not the testimony of Baumann, the accomplice, was so far corroborated within the rule of law, that the conviction may safely and justly stand.
The law of corroboration under section 399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was concisely but comprehensively stated in People v. Dixon, 231 N. Y. 111, 116, 131 N. E. 752, 754. ‘The corroborative evidence,’ said the opinion, Since the web of proof in every case is unique, corroboration ‘may vary in its nature according to the circumstances of the particular case.’ Id. When the trial judge finds that there is some corroborative evidence, it is his duty to submit it ‘to the jury for them to say first, whether it was worthy of belief, and secondly, whether if true it tended to connect defendant with the commission of the crime.’ Id., 231 N. Y. 117, 131 N. E. 752, 754.
The learned trial judge found the possibility of corroboration in evidence relating to two matters. One was the alleged flight of defendant following the crime; the other was Baumann's stronger motive for implicating as his companion in crime the man actually guilty, rather than one who was innocent. Accordingly, he submitted to the jury the evidence relating to each of these matters, to say whether it was true, and, if so, whether it tended to connect the defendant with the commission of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Morhouse
...353--534, 6 N.E.2d 51, 53; People v. Malizia, 4 N.Y.2d 22, 27, 171 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846, 148 N.E.2d 897, 899; People v. Reddy, 261 N.Y. 479, 484, 185 N.E. 705, 706, 87 A.L.R. 763). The corroboration present here far exceeds this standard. It includes Morhouse's arrangement for his payment by P......
-
People v. Moses
...including flight and analogous conduct, considered indicative of consciousness of guilt and thus of guilt itself. (See People v. Reddy, 261 N.Y. 479, 486, 185 N.E. 705.) Evidence thought to bear on consciousness of guilt has traditionally been considered weak because an innocent person may ......
-
People v. Kohut
...crime. '' (See, also, People v. Leo, 23 N.Y.2d 556, 560--561, 297 N.Y.S.2d 937, 939--940, 245 N.E.2d 705, 706--707; People v. Reddy, 261 N.Y. 479, 484, 185 N.E. 705, 707; People v. Dixon, 231 N.Y. 111, 116, 131 N.E. 752, 753; People v. Bloodgood, 251 App.Div. 593, 598, 298 N.Y.S. 91, 97; Pe......
-
People v. Buchalter
...49 N.Y. 137. Otherwise, it would not constitute corroboration.’ That is not the rule as to corroboration. People v. Reddy, 261 N.Y. 479, 484, 185 N.E. 705, 87 A.L.R. 763;People v. Kress, 284 N.Y. 452, 460, 31 N.Ed.2d 898; People v. Cohen, 223 N.Y. 406, 426, 119 N.E. 886; People v. Elliott, ......