People v. Reeves
| Decision Date | 31 January 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 11,No. 98452,98452,11 |
| Citation | 448 Mich. 1,528 N.W.2d 160 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Juma REEVES, Auneray Barber, and Ronald Williams, Defendants-Appellees. Calendar |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Thomas L. Casey, Sol. Gen., John D. O'Hair, Pros. Atty., County of Wayne, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training and Appeals, Karen M. Woodside, Asst. Pros. Atty., Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.
Brian M. Legghio, St. Clair Shores, Joseph M. Xuereb, Tyler, Xuereb & Nelson, P.C., Dearborn, Monsey G. Wilson, Detroit, for defendants-appellees.
This is a statutory construction case involving the interpretation of the word "arson" in the first-degree (felony) murder statute, M.C.L. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548. Defendant Juma Reeves, and codefendants, Ronald Williams and Auneray Barber, were charged, inter alia, with felony murder, with the underlying felony being the burning of other real property, M.C.L. § 750.73; M.S.A. § 28.268. Thirty-sixth District Court Judge Thomas A. Van Tiem, Sr., bound over all three defendants for trial on, inter alia, felony murder and burning other real property charges. Detroit Recorder's Court Judge Daphne Means Curtis reduced the felony murder charge to involuntary manslaughter, M.C.L. § 750.321; M.S.A. § 28.553, finding that the word "arson" in the felony murder statute does not include the burning of property other than a dwelling house. The trial was stayed to allow the prosecutor's interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals construed the word "arson" in accordance with the common-law definition, stating that "at common law, 'arson' referred only to the 'burning of another's house or dwelling house' and appurtenances." 202 Mich.App. 706, 708, 510 N.W.2d 198 (1993). We granted the prosecution's application for leave to appeal 1 to determine whether the word "arson" in the felony murder statute includes the burning of other real property. We conclude that the construction of the word "arson" in the felony murder statute refers to the common-law crime of arson, that is, the malicious and voluntary or wilful burning of a dwelling house of another. 2
During the preliminary examination, the confessions of each of the defendants was read into the record. Each defendant admitted participation in setting the fire at 8340 Kenney, a dilapidated abandoned house in Detroit.
Defendants admitted that they retrieved a mattress from the backyard at 8340 Kenney, carried it inside, doused the mattress and other furnishings located in the house with charcoal lighter fluid, and threw a lighted match on the mattress. The Detroit Fire Department was summoned to extinguish the blaze. Despite the fire department's efforts, the resulting fire consumed the structure.
Before the fire, the old-fashioned brick coat siding had been removed from the foundation to the eaves, exposing the wooden frame. 3 The foundation was weakened by the removal of the bricks. The fire burned through the floor joists and wood structure of the house, eventually causing it to collapse on a fire fighter trainee, killing him.
Although the defendants initially fled from the scene, they returned moments later to watch the flames spread from 8340 Kenney to 8334 Kenney. Both the homes were completely consumed by the fire, but not before spreading to 8328 Kenney, an occupied dwelling. The roof and second floor dormer of the occupied dwelling were charred.
The prosecution argues that the Legislature defined the crime of arson in 1927 PA 38. The 1927 enactment expanded the common-law definition of arson to include any unlawful burning. The Legislature amended the statutory language in 1929, but retained the use of the word "arson." 1929 CL 16935.
The prosecution avers that People v. Clemons, 184 Mich.App. 726, 728, 459 N.W.2d 40 (1990), clarified the modern statutory definition of the crime of arson. The Clemons Court determined that "the Legislature intended that the word 'arson' apply to M.C.L. § 750.73; M.S.A. § 28.268, burning of real property," stating that "[t]his statute was derived from 1929 CL 16935 which was specifically designated as the crime of arson."
Defendants respond that the statutory history of the arson and burning statute does not indicate an expansion of arson beyond the burning of a habitable structure. Defendants contend that a careful review of the statutory history of the arson and burning statute compels the conclusion that the Legislature, when it enacted the Penal Code in 1931, did not intend all types of unlawful burning to constitute arson. Defendants argue that the Legislature was careful to delete the key language on which the prosecution relies. See 1931 PA 328.
The Court of Appeals declined to follow Clemons, stating that People v. Foster, 103 Mich.App. 311, 302 N.W.2d 862 (1981), is indistinguishable from the present case and is better reasoned than Clemons. We agree.
The Court of Appeals has previously considered the issue whether the word "arson" included the burning of other real property in Foster and Clemons, reaching inconsistent conclusions. Both the prosecution and the defendants in the present case attempt to resolve the conflict by arguments based on an analysis of the history of the arson and burning statute.
In Foster, the defendant and a codefendant were charged with felony murder and burning a dwelling house or its contents after setting fire to a vacant house. A rookie fire fighter was killed while inside the building. The defendant was convicted of manslaughter, M.C.L. § 750.321; M.S.A. § 28.553.
The Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction in Foster, 103 Mich.App. at 315-316, 302 N.W.2d 862, noting that the structure was merely a shell of a house and was not a dwelling. The Court concluded that the structure must be habitable to qualify as a dwelling house under the burning dwelling house statute, M.C.L. § 750.72; M.S.A. § 28.267. Before the fire, the radiators, hot water heater, and toilet were removed. The windows were broken, and the door was kicked in. The utilities had been disconnected. Also, the building was infested with rats. Under these conditions, the house was not a dwelling house; therefore, there was no arson to serve as the predicate offense for felony murder. The Court of Appeals panel implicitly determined that the word "arson" in the felony murder statute referred to the burning of a dwelling house and not the burning of other real property.
In Clemons, the defendant was charged with three counts of felony murder and one count of burning real property. He pleaded guilty of three counts of second-degree murder, M.C.L. § 750.317; M.S.A. § 28.549, and one count of burning real property. The defendant claimed that his plea bargain was illusory because the burning of real property cannot serve as the predicate offense for felony murder. Relying exclusively on 1929 CL 16935, 4 and without mentioning subsequent statutory revisions or the Foster decision, the Court of Appeals concluded that the meaning of "arson" within the felony murder statute included the burning of other real property. 5
In the present case, the prosecution argues that in 1927, the Legislature broadened the common-law definition of arson to include the burning of other real property. 6 The defendants respond that when the Legislature enacted the Penal Code in 1931, 7 it did not intend to include in the definition of arson the burning of real property other than a dwelling house. The Penal Code of 1931, defendants argue, did not clearly expand or alter the common-law definition of arson.
In interpreting penal statutes, courts cannot expand the scope of the statutory prohibition. People v. Jones, 142 Mich.App. 819, 822-823, 371 N.W.2d 459 (1985). The courts' construction of the statutory language must further the legislative intent and purpose. Marquis v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity (After Remand), 444 Mich. 638, 644, 513 N.W.2d 799 (1994).
In enacting statutes, the Legislature recognizes that courts will apply common-law rules to resolve matters that are not specifically addressed in the statutory provision. 2B Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction (5th ed), § 50.01, p 90. "[W]ords and phrases that have acquired a unique meaning at common law are interpreted as having the same meaning when used in statutes dealing with the same subject" matter as that with which they were associated at the common law. Pulver v. Dundee Cement Co., 445 Mich. 68, 75, 515 N.W.2d 728 (1994); People v. Young, 418 Mich. 1, 13, 340 N.W.2d 805 (1983). Where the statutory provision describes by name, but does not clearly and explicitly state the definition of a criminal offense, courts will construe the statutory crime by resorting to the common-law definition. People v. Couch, 436 Mich. 414, 419-420, 461 N.W.2d 683 (1990), and 2B Singer, supra, § 50.03, p. 104. The repeal of a statute revives the common-law rule as it was before the statute was enacted. See Marquis, supra 444 Mich. at 653, 513 N.W.2d 799, and Garwols v. Bankers Trust Co., 251 Mich. 420, 424, 232 N.W. 239 (1930).
Previously, we have interpreted other terms within the felony murder statute in Young, supra, and People v. McDonald, 409 Mich. 110, 293 N.W.2d 588 (1980). In those cases, we ascertained the statutory meaning of the terms burglary and rape in the felony murder statute at the time of its enactment. We noted that until the Legislature expressly changed the meaning of those terms in the felony murder statute, its definitions of those terms in other statutory provisions were not controlling. Young, 418 Mich. at 16, 340 N.W.2d 805; McDonald, 409 Mich. at 116, 120-121, 293 N.W.2d 588. In those cases, we concluded that even though the Legislature had amended the breaking and entering statute and had enacted the criminal sexual conduct statute, it had...
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