People v. Resh

• Decision Date: 03 December 1895
• Citation: 107 Mich. 251,65 N.W. 99
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE v. RESH.

65 N.W. 99

107 Mich. 251

PEOPLE v. RESH.

Supreme Court of Michigan

December 3, 1895

Error to superior court of Grand Rapids; Edwin A. Burlingame Judge.

Frederick Resh was convicted of a crime, and brings error. Affirmed.

Nathan P. Allen, for appellant.

Fred A Maynard, Atty. Gen., and Alfred Wolcott, Pros. Atty., for the People.

GRANT J.

The respondent was convicted of an assault upon one Edward L Wagner, with intent to do great bodily harm, less than murder.

1. The first alleged error is that the court did not require the people to produce a witness whose name was indorsed upon the information. There are two complete answers to this: (1) The witness was in court, and was called as a witness by the respondent, who had the benefit of his testimony. (2) His name was placed upon the information at the request of the respondent. The testimony of the people disclosed that another man was with the respondent at the time of the assault. The contention is that this witness was that man that he was an eyewitness to the transaction; and that it was therefore the duty of the prosecutor to call him, under the following decisions: Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 225; Hurd v. People, 25 Mich. 415; Thomas v. People, 39 Mich. 312; People v. Davis, 52 Mich. 573, 18 N.W. 362; People v. Swetland, 77 Mich. 57, 43 N.W. 779; To view preceding link please click here People v. Deitz, 86 Mich. 422, 49 N.W. 296. The assault was premeditated; was made in the night, with some blunt instrument; and, as soon as the cowardly blow was struck, the respondent and his companion ran away, and escaped in the darkness. The above decisions do not hold, nor is there any reason or common sense in holding, that the people should call as a witness an accomplice in crime.

2. Upon the question of intent, the court instructed the jury as follows: "In this case the intent must be derived from the evidence of the deed committed, in connection with the other evidence in the case; and it is for you to say from the evidence in the case whether or not an intent existed in the mind of the respondent, at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, to commit upon the person of the injured man great bodily harm, less than the crime of murder, or whether he committed a simple assault and battery, or whether he is guilty of any offense at all. The extent of the injury inflicted, no matter how severe or disproportionate to the provocation, if there was any provocation, will not take the case out of that of an assault and battery, unless you find the existence of the intent to do great bodily harm, less than the crime of murder. But the severity and aggravated character of the assault, and extent of the injury received as well as the weapon with which it was committed, may be considered by you, in connection with other evidence in the case, in your endeavor to find from the evidence whether or not such intent stimulated the respondent's action. If, from the evidence, you find that the respondent struck the complainant with a dangerous and offensive weapon, and that the result was serious bodily harm to the complaining witness, less than the crime of murder, you may take all these facts into consideration in determining whether or not the respondent intended to do great bodily harm, less than the crime of murder, at the time he committed the assault, if he committed an assault at all. In this case the intent is the gist of the offense charged in the information, and the law usually presumes that a man intends the natural result of his own acts. And this rule applies in this case, with the usual conditions that if the circumstances and surroundings of the case shown by the evidence establish the fact that there was no intention to do what was done, in the way of inflicting the injury, or leaves in your mind a reasonable doubt of such intent, then your duty is to acquit the respondent of the offense charged in the information." Counsel in his brief says: "We submit that there is no evidence in the case to warrant the language used by the court in his charge as to intent." The blow was struck so suddenly...