People v. Reynolds

• Decision Date: 08 February 2002
• Docket Number: No. 1-00-0747.,1-00-0747.
• Citation: 327 Ill. App.3d 1027,764 N.E.2d 1135,262 Ill.Dec. 18
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ebony REYNOLDS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

764 N.E.2d 1135

327 Ill. App.3d 1027

262 Ill.Dec. 18

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ebony REYNOLDS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-00-0747.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fifth Division.

February 8, 2002.

Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney of Cook County, Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Alan J. Spellberg, Susan M. Caraher, of counsel), for Appellee.

Rita A. Fry, Public Defender of Cook County, Chicago (James H. Reddy, of counsel), for Appellant.

Justice GREIMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

The State charged Ebony Reynolds, the defendant, with first degree murder but did not seek the death penalty. The defendant exercised his right to have his case heard before a jury, which found him guilty. However, the jury was not instructed on and did not find the defendant eligible for the death penalty. Consequently, as no death penalty hearing was held, the defendant never waived his right to a jury as to his eligibility for the death penalty. At defendant's sentencing hearing, the court found that under section 9-1(b)(5) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (the Code) (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(5) (West 1998)), the defendant had contracted to kill an individual for money, which is an aggravated factor for sentencing. The court also found that under section 9-1(b)(11) of the Code (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11) (West 1998)), the defendant committed the murder in a cold, calculated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan to take a life by unlawful means, which is also an aggravated factor for sentencing. Thereafter, the court sentenced the defendant to natural life in prison. For the reasons that follow, we vacate defendant's life sentence and remand for resentencing.

Defendant's only contention on appeal is that sections 9-1(b)(5) and (b)(11) allow a trial judge, at sentencing, to extend a first degree murder sentence from its normal range of 20 to 60 years' imprisonment (pursuant to section 5-8-1(a)(1)(a) of the Unified Code of corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(a) (West 1998))) to natural life imprisonment without submitting the predicate facts to a jury and without finding those facts beyond a reasonable doubt in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). The supreme court in People v. Ford, 198 Ill.2d 68, 260 Ill.Dec. 552, 761 N.E.2d 735 (2001), provided a succinct background of Apprendi:

"In Apprendi the United States Supreme Court invalidated New Jersey's hate crime statute, which allowed the sentencing judge to increase the sentence for a particular offense beyond the statutory maximum if the judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant, in committing the offense, acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals on the basis of, inter alia, race. Apprendi 530 U.S. at 468-69, 120 S.Ct. at 2351, 147 L.Ed.2d at 442. In doing so, the Court held that, under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. XIV), `[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' Apprendi 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-33, 147 L.Ed.2d at 455." Ford, 198 Ill.2d at 73, 260 Ill.Dec. 552, 761 N.E.2d 735.

Initially, we note that under the statutory scheme in effect at the time of the offense, the sentence imposed against the defendant was legal and proper. Under the 1998 version of section 5-8-1(a)(1)(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(b) (West 1998)), in instances where a defendant is convicted of first degree murder:

"[I]f the [trial] court finds that * * * any of the aggravating factors listed in subsection (b) of Section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 [ (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b) (West 1998)) ] are present, the court may sentence the defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment."

In turn, section 9-1 lists a number of aggravating factors that a trial court may use to find a defendant death-eligible if it finds that the crime meets those specific factual circumstances. The first factor used in the present case was under subsection (b)(5), which states that a defendant convicted of first degree murder is death eligible if:

"[T]he defendant committed the murder pursuant to a contract, agreement or understanding by which he was to receive money or anything of value in return for committing the murder or procured another to commit the murder for money or anything of value." 720 ILCS 519-1(b)(5) (West 1998).

The second, alternative factor that the court used was under subsection (b)(11):

"[T]he murder was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or design to take a human life by unlawful means, and the conduct of the defendant created a reasonable expectation that the death of a human being would result therefrom." 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11) (West 1998).

Under this sentencing scheme, all that was required of the trial judge to sentence the defendant to life in prison was a finding that any of the aggravated sentencing factors were present. Here, it is uncontested that the trial court explicitly met that requirement when it stated:

"All right. Under * * * section [9-1] * * *, the aggravated factors, I find that Mr. Reynolds had contracted to kill an individual for money under section [9-1(b)(5)] and also under section [9-1(b)(11)] he qualifies. I will sentence him to natural life."

Accordingly, under the sentencing outlines employed at the time, i.e., pre-Apprendi the defendant was properly sentenced.

Since that time, however, Apprendi verbalized the greater quantum of evidence required to sentence a defendant beyond the normal statutorily prescribed range.¹ By way of example, we note that the majority of this court's decisions have held that Apprendi prohibits a trial court in a noncapital case from imposing a sentence beyond the normal range merely because it finds that the defendant engaged in "exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior" (730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a)(2), 5-5-3.2(b)(2) (West 2000)), if that aggravating factor is not submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, No. 5-99-0637, ___ Ill.App.3d ___, ___ Ill.Dec. ___, ___ N.E.2d ___, 2001 WL 1298211 (October 23, 2001); People v. Bryant, 325 Ill.App.3d 448, 259 Ill. Dec. 307, 758 N.E.2d 430 (2001); People v. Nitz, 319 Ill.App.3d 949, 968, 254 Ill.Dec. 281, 747 N.E.2d 38 (2001); People v. Chanthaloth, 318 Ill.App.3d 806, 816, 252 Ill. Dec. 887, 743 N.E.2d 1043 (2001). We note that in all of these cases, the different panels of this court found that each of the trial court's subsequent findings that the respective crimes were accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty necessarily and improperly increased the defendant's exposure to greater punishment.

We also note that the majority of this court's decisions have applied this reasoning to first degree murder cases where the death penalty was not sought by the State. See, e.g., People v. Armstrong, 318 Ill. App.3d 607, 619, 252 Ill.Dec. 641, 743 N.E.2d 215 (2000); People v. Kaczmarek, 318 Ill.App.3d 340, 350-51, 251 Ill.Dec. 953, 741 N.E.2d 1131 (2000); People v. Albert Lee, 318 Ill.App.3d 417, 423-24, 252 Ill. Dec. 863, 743 N.E.2d 1019 (2000); People v. Michael Lee, 319 Ill.App.3d 289, 307-08, 253 Ill.Dec. 304, 745 N.E.2d 78 (2001). Again, in each of these cases, the different panels of this court found that where an extended term sentence was based solely upon a finding that the crime was "exceptionally brutal and heinous," Apprendi requires that the sentence be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.

As of the date of this opinion, however, at least two different panels of this court have urged a different analysis. In People v. Vida, 323 Ill.App.3d 554, 256 Ill.Dec. 734, 752 N.E.2d 614 (2001), the court found that in reading sections 5-8-1 and 5-8-2 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1,2 (West 1998)) together as part of a single sentencing scheme, a finding of exceptional brutality accompanying a given crime does not increase a punishment's range beyond the maximum penalties already imposed by the legislature. Vida, 323 Ill.App.3d at 570,256 Ill.Dec. 734,752 N.E.2d 614. Rather, the extended-term penalties are just as relevant and integral in sentencing a defendant as the initial sentencing scheme, i.e., section 5-8-1. Accordingly, it found that the maximum sentence in a first degree murder case is natural life in prison. Vida, 323 Ill.App.3d at 569,256 Ill.Dec. 734,752 N.E.2d 614. Given the facts of that case, therefore, the court concluded that because the defendant's 100-year sentence was not beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, it could not be violative of Apprendi Vida, 323 Ill.App.3d at 572-73,256 Ill.Dec. 734,752 N.E.2d 614. See also People v. Rivera, No. 2-98-1662, ___ Ill.App.3d ___, ___ Ill.Dec. ___, ___ N.E.2d ___, 2001 WL 1580919 (December 5, 2001); contra People v. Joyner, 317 Ill.App.3d 93, 250 Ill.Dec. 831, 739 N.E.2d 594 (2000). Rivera agreed with the holding in Vida by concluding:

"A trial court, as the entity vested with the authority to sentence a defendant, should also be vested with the discretion to render upon a defendant a sentence within the range * * * provided by our legislature based upon the offense rather than the extent or nature of the defendant's participation as well as the relevant evidence presented by the parties at trial and at sentencing." Rivera, slip op. at 29.

Because we, like the court in People v. Johnson, No. 5-99-0637, ___ Ill. App.3d at ___, ___ Ill.Dec. ___, ___ N.E.2d ___, slip op. at 6 (October 23, 2001), are not convinced that this approach correctly interprets the constitutional imperative established by Apprendi we decline to follow Vida and Rivera. In short, we simply...