People v. Rick, Cr. 4811

Decision Date24 July 1952
Docket NumberCr. 4811
Citation112 Cal.App.2d 410,246 P.2d 691
PartiesPEOPLE v. RICK et al.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Herbert Grossman and Gladys Towles Root, Los Angeles, for appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Dep. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

VALLEE, Justice.

Defendant, having pleaded guilty to burglary which the court found to be of the second degree, made application for probation. The application was denied and he was referred to the Youth Authority. On January 8, 1952, the court committed defendant to the Youth Authority for the term prescribed by law, and remanded him to the sheriff to be held in custody under the jurisdiction of the Youth Authority and subject to any orders it might issue.

On January 18, 1952, the Youth Authority had designated Chino as the place of detention of defendant, but he had not been transferred to that institution and was still in the custody of the sheriff. On that day defendant moved the court for an order staying execution of the commitment and requested that the cause again be referred to the probation officer for consideration of probation. The motions were denied on the sole ground that the signed commitment had been placed in the United States mail on January 9, 1952; that sufficient time had elapsed for the Authority to have received it; and that, therefore, under section 1737 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, the court had lost jurisdiction. 1 Defendant appeals from the order denying the motions.

The People assert that the order is not appealable and that the appeal should be dismissed. Penal Code section 1237 provides that an appeal may be taken by the defendant '[f]rom any order made after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the party.' An order made after judgment is not appealable where the motion merely asked the court to repeat or overrule a former ruling on the same facts. People v. Palmer, 49 Cal.App.2d 579, 580, 122 P.2d 114. There is nothing in the record to show that the case comes within this rule. We think that if the court had jurisdiction to grant the motion to stay execution of the commitment the denial of the motions affected the substantial rights of the defendant and that the order is appealable. People v. Stein, 31 Cal.2d 630, 632-633, 191 P.2d 409.

Defendant contends the court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the motions. We have concluded it did not.

Section 1737 of the Welfare and Institutions Code provides: 'After a court has committed a person to the Authority such court has no power to suspend execution of the commitment. Nothing in this section shall limit or restrict the jurisdiction and powers of the juvenile court under Section 745 of this code.'

The argument is that the word 'committed' in section 1737 refers to a physical turning over, a physical transfer of the person. It is said that because section 745 of the Welfare and Institutions Code provides that a commitment made by the juvenile court 'may at any time be changed, modified, or set aside,' it was not the intention of the Legislature in enacting section 1737 to take away from a trial court the power to consider probation but rather to prevent a trial court from interfering with the Youth Authority after it had physically taken custody of the defendant. The argument is not tenable.

Section 1737 as enacted in 1941 read: 'After a court has committed a person to the Authority such court has no power to suspend execution of the commitment.' In 1945 the last sentence was added as quoted above. Stat.1945, ch. 779, sec. 3. It is apparent that all the Legislature did by the 1945 amendment was to make it clear that the section was not to be construed as denying to a juvenile court the power to change, modify, or set aside a commitment once it had been made. The section as it existed prior to 1945 was not changed insofar as it applies to a commitment to the Youth Authority made by the superior court when it is not acting as the juvenile court.

Section 1732 of the Welfare and Institutions Code provides that 'the court shall commit to the authority' specific classes of persons. Defendant is in one of the classes specified. The order of January 8, 1952, reads: 'The defendant having heretofore been referred to the California Youth Authority and accepted, said defendant is committed to the Youth Authority for the term prescribed by law. Defendant is remanded to the Sheriff of Los Angeles County to be held in custody...

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19 cases
  • Black, In re
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • 16 d5 Junho d5 1967
    ...the defendant to prison and 'the process and authority for carrying the judgment and sentence into effect.' (People v. Rick (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 410, 413, 246 P.2d 691; see also In re Klein (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 58, 61--62, 17 Cal.Rptr. 71.) As previously noted 'no other warrant or authori......
  • People v. Christian M. (In re Christian M.)
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 26 d1 Junho d1 2017
    ...denying rehearing is not appealable], disapproved on other grounds by In re Robert G. (1982) 31 Cal.3d 437, 443-444; People v. Rick (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 410, 412 ["An order made after judgment is not appealable where the motion merely asked the court to repeat or overrule a former ruling o......
  • Ex parte Klein
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 16 d4 Novembro d4 1961
    ...to refer solely to judicial action.' (P. 739, 209 P.2d p. 798.) Following this decision the court in People v. Rick (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 410, p. 413, 246 P.2d 691, p. 693 said: 'A commitment is an order by a court or other authorized agency [citation] sending a person to prison or other pl......
  • People v. Getty
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 23 d3 Julho d3 1975
    ...n. 20, 102 Cal.Rptr. 137, 497 P.2d 481): 'From the moment of commitment, there can be no recall by the superior court. (People v. Rick, 112 Cal.App.2d 410, 246 P.2d 691.)'6 The maximum applicable to defendant in this case, however, is two years or age 23 (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 1770) in view ......
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