People v. Ricketts

• Decision Date: 08 May 1970
• Docket Number: Cr. 16806
• Citation: 7 Cal.App.3d 441,86 Cal.Rptr. 647
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Edward Garfield RICKETTS, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 647

86 Cal.Rptr. 647

7 Cal.App.3d 441

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Edward Garfield RICKETTS, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 16806.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

May 8, 1970.

Rehearing Denied May 19, 1970.

Richard H. Levin, Los Angeles, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Marilyn Mayer Moffett, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

JEFFERSON, Associate Justice.

A jury found defendant guilty of receiving stolen property (Pen.Code § 496) and the court committed him to the California Youth Authority. He was acquitted of a second count charging a violation of Vehicle Code, section 10851. Defendant appeals from the commitment (an appealable judgment under Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1737.5).

On the night of September 8--9, 1968, a 1961 Buick station wagon with the license number NTU 563 was stolen from Eastern Motors used car lot.

On October 26, 1968, at about 10 a.m. Officer Fusan stopped a car for a minor traffic violation on the Hollywood Freeway. Defendant was the driver of the vehicle, a 1961 Buick station wagon with the license number NTU 563. At the request of the officer, defendant produced his driver's license for inspection, but he was unable to produce any registration for the vehicle. The officer noticed that there was not key in the ignition. He ran a routine radio check on the car and the report came back that it was stolen. Whereupon, defendant was arrested. At the time defendant was stopped he had one passenger in the car, a female by the name of Amelia Rodriguez.

After the above evidence was introduced, the People rested. Defendant then made a motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Penal Code, section 1118.1. The motion was denied.

The case for the defense was then presented. Defendant testified that he had borrowed the car from a friend at MacArthur Park. The friend was named Skip Frizzell. He borrowed it to move his belongings and those of Amelia Rodriguez to a new apartment. He was to return the car the next day but when he went back he could not locate Frizzell. He made several attempts after that to locate him but was unsuccessful. When Frizzell had given him the car, he told him that he could start it without a key because the ignition switch was in the on position. Defendant recalled that he asked him at the time, 'Skip, if it's a stolen car, now let me know, I won't use it.' Frizzell assured him that it was not stolen. He said that he was buying it from a friend named Carlo and had made a $10 down payment.

Two additional defense witnesses, Karen Frizzell and Amelia Rodriquez, corroborated defendant's testimony. Miss Frizzell stated that she was the sister of Skip Frizzell and that she was present when her brother loaned defendant the Buick. Her brother had been in and out of trouble in the past and she did not know where he could be found. Miss Rodriguez indicated that she was engaged to defendant. She first saw him with the Buick no more than two weeks before his arrest. During that period she went with defendant several times to MacArthur Park to attempt to return the car to Skip Frizzell.

During the course of the cross-examination of defendant, the district attorney, out of the presence of the jury, requested permission to cross-examine defendant about a similar story he had told on a previous occasion when he was found in possession of a stolen car. The district attorney indicated he had evidence defendant told such a story. The court then conducted an extended hearing outside of the presence of the jury to explore the question of the admissibility of such evidence. At the hearing, the district attorney introduced evidence that, on June 16, 1968, defendant entered a plea of guilty to a charge of violation of Vehicle Code, section 10851. Defendant was then called and he testified, under examination by the district attorney, that he never told the officer who arrested him on March 15, 1968, for taking the vehicle involved in the previous charge, that he had borrowed it from somebody in MacArthur Park; he never told anyone that story. Defendant further stated that he was not advised of his constitutional rights before he talked to the officer. Officer Childress then testified that he arrested defendant on March 15th when he found him in a stolen Camero automobile. He fully advised defendant of his constitutional rights. Thereafter, defendant freely and voluntarily told him that he had borrowed the car from a friend at MacArthur Park. Defendant then resumed the stand and admitted that he had told one of the officers the story attributed to him. He conceded that the story was a lie. The hearing thereafter concluded with the court ruling that the prosecution would be permitted to present evidence to the jury about the prior incident.

Under resumed cross-examination in the presence of the jury, defendant admitted that he was arrested in a stolen car on March 15, 1968, but denied that he had told the officer it was loaned to him by a friend at MacArthur Park.

When the defense rested, Officer Childress was called in rebuttal. He testified that, when he observed defendant in the stolen car on March 15th, defendant told him about having obtained it from a friend in MacArthur Park.

Defendant testified in surrebuttal, admitting that he had stolen the car in which he was arrested on March 15th and that he had told the officer he 'had gotten the car down by MacArthur Park.' He stated that he had lied then but that he was telling the truth regarding the present charge.

After the testimony of Officer Childress, the court admonished the jury, pursuant to the request of the defense, that the officer's rebuttal testimony 'is not to be considered by you as evidencing any criminal disposition on the part of the defendant,' but only, if the jury chooses to accept it, to the extent that it 'tends logically and naturally and by reasonable inference to establish any fact material to the prosecution or to overcome any material matters sought to be proved by the defense.'

In its formal instructions to the jury, the court elaborated on the above admonition as to the limited admissibility of the testimony and concluded the instruction stating, 'The value, if any, of such evidence depends on whether or not it tends to show an absence of an ignorance or mistake of fact, such as would otherwise disprove criminal intent.'

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in permitting the People to introduce evidence concerning the story he told when he was previously arrested in the stolen Camero. The point is without merit. 'Evidence of other crimes is Admissible when it tends logically and by reasonable inference to prove any fact material for the prosecution or to overcome any fact sought to be proved by the defense. (Citations.) It is also admissible where it tends to show presence of a common design, plan or Modus operandi or consciousness of guilt. (Citations.)' (People v. Pell, 258 Cal.App.2d 379, 383, 65 Cal.Rptr. 603, 605). The evidence here in question was highly relevant as tending to establish that the defense testimony about the friend in...