People v. Riela

• Decision Date: 21 April 1960
• Citation: 7 N.Y.2d 571,200 N.Y.S.2d 43,166 N.E.2d 840
• Parties: , 166 N.E.2d 840 PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Anthony Peter RIELA, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 43

200 N.Y.S.2d 43

7 N.Y.2d 571, 166 N.E.2d 840

PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Anthony Peter RIELA, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 21, 1960.

Louis Mansdorf, New York City, for appellant.

George Boldman, Dist. Atty., Owego (Eliot H. Lumbard and Joseph Fisch, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

FULD, Judge.

Anthony Peter Riela was one of the 60-odd guests who had gathered at the country estate of Joseph Barbara in Apalachin, New York, on a November day in 1957. This gathering, having attracted considerable attention from law enforcement officials, became the target of investigation by the Grand Jury of Tioga County. Riela, called as a witness, made two appearances before that body. From the beginning, he refused to answer any questions concerning the 'Apalachin meeting', as it has come to be known, on the ground that to do so might tend to incriminate him and, in the course of his two appearances before the Grand Jury, he persisted in the claim of privilege and declined to answer 17 questions about that same subject. Thereupon, at the request of the District Attorney of Tioga County, the Grand Jury, acting pursuant to the authority vested in it by section 2447 of the Penal Law, Consol.Laws, c. 40, 'conferred immunity' upon Riela and ordered him, following the procedure prescribed by the statute, to answer the questions previously put to him. The same 17 questions were again asked and Riela, reiterating his reliance upon the privilege, again refused to answer.

As a consequence of his refusal, the Grand Jury indicted him, charging him, in 17 different counts, with 17 separate crimes of contempt in violation of section 600 of the Penal Law. The defendant waived his right to a jury and went to trial before the County Judge. The latter, finding him guilty on all 17 counts, sentenced him to 60 days in jail upon each, to run concurrently, and imposed a fine of $250 on each count, for a total fine of $4,250.

Before proceeding to an elaboration of the question which prompted the grant of leave to appeal to this court, we consider briefly the only two other points urged by the defendant which warrant discussion: (1) that the immunity provided by section 2447 of the Penal Law had not been properly conferred and (2) that, in any event, such immunity was not broad enough to assure him the protection guaranteed by the Constitution. As to the first, it is necessary only to observe that a reading of section 2447 makes it manifest that the Grand Jury had unquestioned power to confer immunity upon Riela and direct him to answer under pain of prosecution for contempt. And, as to the second point, it is equally clear, under current decisions, that a witness may be compelled to answer in a state proceeding, as long as the immunity granted by the state protects against prosecution under its laws, even though it may not protect against prosecution by the federal government or by other states. See, e. g., Mills v. Louisiana, 360 U.S. 230, 79 S.Ct. 980, 3 L.Ed.2d 1193; Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 78 S.Ct. 1302, 2 L.Ed.2d 1393; Commission of Investigation of State of N. Y. v. Lombardozzi, 5 N.Y.2d 1026, 185 N.Y.S.2d 550, appeal dismissed sub nom. Castellano v. Commission of Investigation, 361 U.S. 7, 80 S.Ct. 51, 4 L.Ed.2d 49.

We come, now, to the real question in the case, namely, whether the defendant is guilty of 17 crimes of contempt or of one. Concerning this, it is our opinion that, while there can be no doubt that Riela's conduct before the Grand Jury constituted criminal contempt under section 600 of the Penal Law, his conviction of 17 separate crimes of contempt, each susceptible to punishment of a year in prison, was totally unjustified.

It is quite true, as the Appellate Division observed (9 A.D.2d 481, 195 N.Y.S.2d 563), that 'the questions (asked of the defendant) were by no means the same question rephrased', but, in a case such as the present where the refusal to answer was grounded, albeit mistakenly on the privilege against self-incrimination, the circumstance that no two questions could have been answered by a single response is beside the point. What is of significance is that it was apparent from the very start of his interrogation that Riela, relying upon the privilege, would decline to answer any question bearing on the 'Apalachin meeting', and that the questions, different though they were from one another, all related to that one subject. This being so, he is guilty of the single contempt of refusing to give testimony concerning the Apalachin gathering, rather than 17 contempts for refusal to answer individual questions about it. See, e. g., Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 73, 78 S.Ct. 128, 2 L.Ed.2d 95; United States v. Costello, 2 Cir., 198 F.2d 200, 204, certiorari denied 344 U.S. 874, 73 S.Ct. 166, 97 L.Ed. 677; United States v. Orman, 3 Cir., 207 F.2d 148, 160; Maxwell v. Rives, 11 Nev. 213, 221; Fawick Airflex Co. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, Ohio App., 92 N.E.2d 431, 436, appeal dismissed 154 Ohio St. 206, 93 N.E.2d 480.

Any other result impresses us as offensive, for, if each separate reassertion of privilege and refusal to answer were to be treated as a distinct contempt, there would be no limit to the number of contempts for which Riela could have been held. The District Attorney could just as well have asked 60 questions about Apalachin for instance, whether Riela knew each of the 60 individuals reputed to have been present as 17, and, if each could become the predicate of a distinct contempt, the limit of punishment would then depend only on the extent of the District Attorney's ingenuity and whim. As the Supreme Court said in the somewhat similar case of Yates v. United...