People v. Rigney
| Decision Date | 05 April 1960 |
| Docket Number | Cr. 1428 |
| Citation | 3 Cal.Rptr. 855 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Louis Fredrick RIGNEY, Defendant and Appellant. |
Newberry & Prante and Stafford W. Prante, San Diego, for appellant.
Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Philip C. Griffin, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.
Defendant was charged in an information with three counts of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to commit murder, in violation of section 217 of the Penal Code. Defendant originally entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity, but the latter plea was withdrawn before the trial. After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of the lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon as to Counts I and III and guilty of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to commit murder as charged in Count II of the information. Defendant appeals from the judgment and from an order denying his motion for a new trial.
The evidence discloses that on October 11, 1958, Janet Rigney, defendant's wife, lived in an apartment building in La Mesa, with the 13-month old daughter of Mrs. Rigney and defendant. Previously, on July 18, 1958, Mrs. Rigney had obtained an interlocutory decree of divorce which awarded her the custody of the infant daughter and gave defendant the right of reasonable visitation with the child. At Mrs. Rigney's request, defendant customarily visited with the daughter one afternoon each weekend at a hotel in San Diego where Mrs. Rigney's father resided. On October 11, 1958, a Saturday afternoon, Mrs. Rigney did not appear at the hotel with the child and defendant went to her apartment, arriving there between 4:30 and 5:00 p. m. At that time Gaither Brown, a friend of Mrs. Rigney with whom defendant was not on friendly terms, and Sharon Brown were also at the apartment. Defendant asked Mrs. Rigney why she had not kept the appointment and she reminded him that during the preceding week he had informed her that he was not going to be downtown that Saturday. Defendant requested permission to visit the child on the following day, Sunday, but Mrs. Rigney said she had already made other plans. During this conversation, Gaither Brown asked defendant if he wanted to see him, for he had heard that defendant had been looking for him. Defendant replied, Defendant left and Brown followed him to see whether he had actually left. Defendant testified that as he left Brown called him back and told him to stay away from Mrs. Rigney and her daughter, but Brown denied this.
About 6:00 p. m. that same evening Mrs. Rigney observed the defendant approaching the apartment. At that time, Sharon Brown, Gaither Brown's stepdaughter, was in the dedroom; Gaither Brown was in the bathroom, and Mrs. Rigney was sitting in the living room with her daughter and Lynette, a teenage friend of Sharon Brown. The front door was open but the screen door was closed and locked. Defendant came up to the front door and asked for Mr. Brown who was then summoned by Mrs. Rigney. Mr. Brown came into the living room carrying his coat in one hand and a glass in the other. He tossed his coat to Sharon and Lynette and handed his glass to Sharon who dropped it. As Mr. Brown approached the door, defendant suggested that they go outside and 'finish this thing now.' Mr. Brown said, 'All right,' and reached out to open the screen door, whereupon defendant suddenly produced a pistol and fired at Mr. Brown. Upon seeing the gun, Mr. Brown flattened himself against the wall on the left side of the screen door. Defendant fired four shots through the screen door wounding Mrs. Rigney severely and Sharon Brown slightly. After the fourth shot was fired, Mr. Brown observed that defendant was either reloading or experiencing a malfunction of the weapon. Immediately he unlocked the screen door and grappled with the defendant for control of the pistol. Their struggle carried them into the house, through the living room and into the kitchen where the gun discharged again. At that time no one knew where the bullet went, but it was later discovered at a hospital that this bullet had wounded defendant in the left arm and shoulder. Brown and defendant continued their struggle which carried them outside next to the swimming pool where defendant was disarmed, subdued and held for police officers who arrived at the scene a few minutes after the shooting began.
Subsequently the police recovered the defendant's pistol from the pool. It had one empty brass casing in the cylinder under the hammer and one loaded round in the chamber to the right of the empty casing. Four empty cartridge cases were found immediately outside the screen door. Three bullet holes were found in the walls of the living room and one in the wall of the kitchen. Medical X-rays disclosed that a bullet was lodged in Mrs. Rigney's left lung. Four bullet holes were found in the screen door. Two of these holes had apparently been made by bullets fired straight through the screen and from a gun held a few inches away, and two of the holes appeared to have been made by bullets fired through the screen on an angle toward the position Brown had taken against the wall on the left side of the door.
Defendant testified that after leaving his wife's apartment at about 5:00 p. m. he returned to San Diego and had two or more martinis in a bar. The pistol used in the shooting was in defendant's hotel room, but he did not remember going to his room and getting it. He did not remember driving back to his wife's apartment, except for an interlude when the car was parked near a bridge. During this interlude, defendant remembered discovering the pistol in the waistband of his trousers. The next thing he remembered was walking to the apartment door and saying, 'Tell Chuck I have changed my mind, I would like to see him outside.' Defendant testified that Brown appeared in front of the door, made a grab for his back pocket, and jumped to the side of the door. Defendant did not remember drawing and firing his pistol. The next thing he remembered was hearing a groan inside the apartment and then he remembered fighting with Brown, being hit with the gun and Brown trying to throw him into the swimming pool. Brown had previously told defendant that he was skilled in the art of judo and defendant knew that Brown frequently did target shooting with a pistol. Defendant testified that he did not intend to shoot anyone when he returned to the apartment the second time and that he had taken his pistol along to prevent Brown from harming him. Defendant's purpose in making the second trip was to persuade Brown not to interfere with his visitation rights.
Dr. Robert F. Brandmeyer, a member of the psychiatric staff of the U. S. Naval Hospital in San Diego, testified that he examined the defendant after the shooting and in his opinion the defendant was suffering from retrograde amnesia concerning some of the events surrounding the shooting episode. During interviews the defendant told Dr. Brandmeyer that he was afraid of Brown physically and that he had taken the gun along to defend himself and to show that he 'meant business'; that he intended to see his baby and if he had to make Brown go away at gun point he would do it.
Defendant contends that the court erred in curtailing the voir dire of the jury. Each member of the jury was questioned by the trial judge regarding his occupation; marital status; number of children and their ages; acquaintance with the defendant, victims and counsel; knowledge of the case; whether he had ever been charged with, or been a victim of, a felonious assault; and whether he would be able to fairly and impartially try the case. Then the trial judge permitted both sides to voir dire the jury, after advising counsel that repetition of questions already asked by the court would not be permitted and questions seeking to elicit information useful merely as a basis for peremptory challenges would not be allowed. The district attorney then questioned the panel collectively as to whether the fact that the defendant was in the navy would bias or prejudice them in any way. A negative response was obtained. Then defendant's counsel inquired as to which branch of the military services, if any, the members of the jury had been affiliated with in the past. The trial judge then commented that in view of the fact that defendant was a navy petty officer the question might provide a clue as to how the defendant might desire to exercise his peremptory challenges. But the court ruled that past service in the armed forces would not be evidence of bias or prejudice such as would disqualify a prospective juror and ruled out further inquiries as to the past military affiliations of the jurors.
It is a well-settled rule that a juror may not be examined on voir dire solely to elicit information useful in the exercise of peremptory challenges. People v. Edwards, 163 Cal. 752, 754-755, 127 P. 58; People v. Ferlin, 203 Cal. 587, 598, 265 P. 230; People v. Canales, 12 Cal.App.2d 215, 219, 55 P.2d 289. Inquiry as to membership in organizations whose beliefs or teachings would prejudice a prospective juror against either party to the case is proper. People v. Buyle, 22 Cal.App.2d 143, 146, 70 P.2d 955; People v. Reyes, 5 Cal. 347. However, it does not appear that the attitute of the armed forces toward felonious assaults differs in any regard from the attitudes of the general populace. Therefore, past membership in the armed forces would not have disclosed any bias or prejudice on the part of the jurors. People v. Daily, 157 Cal.App.2d 649, 656, 321 P.2d 469. In his brief, defendant's counsel points out that Gaither Brown is a former marine and contends that...
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PERUSICH v. Commissioner, Docket No. 3381-68 and 611-69 SC.
...to taxable years after December 31, 1966. 6 Stauter v. Carithers, 196 P. 37 (1921); Barker v. Barker, 293 P. 2d 85 (1956); People v. Rigney, 3 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1960); McGaffey v. Sudowitz, 10 Cal. Rptr. 862 ...