People v. Rivers, 84CA1192

• Decision Date: 15 May 1986
• Docket Number: No. 84CA1192,84CA1192
• Citation: 727 P.2d 394
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. West Rodrick RIVERS, Defendant-Appellant. . II
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

Page 394

727 P.2d 394

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. West Rodrick RIVERS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 84CA1192.

Colorado Court of Appeals,

Div. II.

May 15, 1986.

Rehearing Denied June 19, 1986.

Certiorari Denied (Rivers) Oct. 14, 1986.

Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., and Maureen Phelan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.

David A. Palmer, Grand Junction, for defendant-appellant.

SMITH, Judge.

Defendant, West Rodrick Rivers, appeals the judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed that were entered upon a jury verdict of guilty of second degree murder and felony theft. We affirm.

Defendant was charged with first degree murder and felony theft stemming from the death of his wife. The evidence at trial and the suppression hearing established that the victim was last seen on a Friday evening outside the trailer which she shared with defendant. The following day defendant was seen outside the trailer, but appeared reluctant to invite others inside. On that Sunday, the defendant drove away in his employer's truck with his two dogs, and did not return to the padlocked trailer.

The next Wednesday the trailer park owners heard complaints about an offensive odor emanating from the Rivers' trailer. One of the owners called the sheriff's office, and an investigator came out. The owner accompanied the deputy sheriff to the trailer and unlocked the padlock with a key that had been given to the owners a few weeks previously by defendant. The deputy entered the trailer and discovered the wife's decomposing body. The deputy left and called an investigating team. The team, including the coroner, came out and took photographs of the body in its original position and then removed it. Later the sheriff's department secured a search warrant, and made a detailed search of the premises.

The defendant was not arrested until almost three years after the victim's death. The arrest occurred in a fishing camp in Texas where defendant had rented a cabin under an alias. A Texas sheriff's deputy, relying solely on the Colorado arrest warrant, knocked on the door of defendant's cabin and asked defendant to step outside. Defendant was placed under arrest after he stepped outside his door. After he was arrested, defendant asked to go inside to get some cigarettes. When the deputy accompanied him inside he saw several items which were later seized and used as evidence at trial.

I. SEARCH OF THE TRAILER

Defendant contends that the initial entry into and search of his trailer were illegal because they were not conducted under a warrant and did not fall under any of the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. We do not agree.

The testimony at the suppression hearing established that defendant and the victim had given the key to the trailer's padlock to the trailer park owners on two occasions when they had left town on business. The owners were instructed to use the key in case of fire or other emergency. On the first occasion the Rivers retrieved the key when they returned, but the second time they did not get it back. The trial court found that, by giving the park owners the key, the defendant had given them authority to consent to a search of his trailer under the circumstances.

Defendant contends that the court's ruling is erroneous. He argues that the defendant's authorization to enter applied only to emergency situations. He cites Condon v. People, 176 Colo. 212, 489 P.2d 1297 (1971) for the proposition that the odor of a dead body is not an exigent circumstance which justifies a warrantless entry. He further argues, citing Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 81 S.Ct. 776, 5 L.Ed.2d 828 (1961), that, absent an emergency justifying a warrantless entry, the park owners lacked the authority to consent to a search on behalf of defendant.

Consent to a search of a dwelling need not be obtained from the owner, if it is obtained from a third party who possesses "common authority" over the property or some other "sufficient relationship" with it. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1973); People v. Berow, 688 P.2d 1123 (Colo.1984). Consent may be explicit, or it may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances. People v. Berow, supra.

Valid consent has been inferred in several cases where the individual giving the consent had been entrusted with a key by the individual seeking to suppress the evidence discovered. United States v. Sellers, 667 F.2d 1123 (4th Cir.1981); United States v. Sor-Lokken, 557 F.2d 755 (10th Cir.1977); People v. Berow, supra.

Here, we need not reach the question of whether the defendant's qualified entrustment of the key to the park owners gave them blanket authority to consent to a search because defendant explicitly granted them the authority to enter in case of an "emergency." The requisite emergency need not be an exigency sufficient by itself to waive the warrant requirement. Any event understood by the park owners to be so unusual as to require investigation suffices. See People v. Berow, supra. Here, an odor that was unpleasant enough to cause complaints from other park residents was adequate to constitute an "emergency" sufficient to allow the park owners to enter the trailer and investigate its source.

II. ARREST

Defendant next contends that his arrest was unlawful because it was effected in the defendant's home not pursuant to a warrant based on probable cause. His contention is without merit.

A warrant for the arrest of defendant was issued by a magistrate in Colorado based upon probable cause. Through a check of defendant's criminal record, the Texas sheriff's deputy became aware of the outstanding Colorado warrant. However, rather than use the Colorado warrant as a basis for the issuance of a Texas warrant, the deputy proceeded to arrest defendant solely on the Colorado warrant.

A warrantless arrest of a suspect in his home, even if that arrest is based on probable cause, is a violation of the individual's Fourth Amendment rights. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). However, a warrantless arrest of an individual in a public place based on probable cause does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even absent exigent circumstances. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976). While a valid warrant issued by a foreign jurisdiction may serve to establish probable cause for a warrantless arrest or the issuance of a warrant, see People v. Gouker, 665 P.2d 113 (Colo.1983), it does not by itself serve as a warrant. See § 16-19-115, C.R.S. (1978 Repl.Vol. 8). Therefore, defendant's arrest in Texas was valid only if he was in a public place at the time it was made.

Generally, if a suspect steps onto his stoop or into his doorway so that he is in public view before being arrested a warrantless premised on probable cause arrest is valid. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976).

Here, the court found, on supporting evidence, that defendant was not enticed to his doorway by improper means. Therefore, the deputy's knowledge of the Colorado warrant served as probable cause on which he effected a valid warrantless arrest in a public place.

III. CONFESSION

Defendant's third contention is that his confession to a co-worker should have been suppressed because it was involuntary as a result of his extreme intoxication. We perceive no error.

The degree of a person's intoxication is relevant to his mental state and, therefore, may be pertinent in determining a statement's voluntariness. See People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722 (Colo.1985). (cert. granted, 474 U.S. 1050, 106 S.Ct. 785, 88 L.Ed 2d 763 (1986)), and People v. Helm, 633 P.2d 1071 (Colo.1981). Here, however, the trial court found that defendant was not intoxicated when he made the statement, and it was "made in the course of coherent conversation between the two parties concerning their mutual family problems." That finding being supported by adequate evidence in the record is binding on us. People v. Fordyce, 200 Colo. 153, 612 P.2d 1131 (1980).

IV. VOIR DIRE

Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to voir dire members of the jury panel individually with respect to their attitude towards alcoholism. While defendant did question prospective jurors with respect to alcoholism, he contends that the fact that the questioning occurred in open court so inhibited the panel members that he was unable to assess accurately their attitudes toward alcoholism. Defendant's contention is without merit.

It is within the discretion of the trial court to limit the scope and conduct of voir dire in the interest of judicial economy. People v. Saiz, 660 P.2d 2 (Colo.App.1982). Here, the defendant was given an opportunity to question prospective jurors on their attitude towards alcoholism, albeit in open court. Under the circumstances, we find no abridgment of defendant's rights or abuse of the trial court's discretion.

V. DISCOVERY MATTERS

Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied him a continuance after interviews with prosecution witnesses divulged felony records which had not been disclosed to defendant prior to trial. We disagree.

Material to be used for impeachment purposes is subject to the discovery provisions of Crim.P. 16, including the provision that the prosecutor perform his obligation as soon as practicable following the filing of charges. Crim.P. 16(I)(b)(1); People v. Thatcher, 638 P.2d 760 (Colo.1981). However, evidence is generally not considered improperly withheld if the defendant has knowledge of it, and mere technical non-compliance does not require the imposition of sanctions by the trial court. People v. Graham, 678 P.2d 1043 (Colo.App.1983).

Here, the trial court ordered disclosure of the criminal records of prosecution witnesses...