People v. Robertson
Decision Date | 23 February 1989 |
Docket Number | No. S004608,C,S004608 |
Citation | 767 P.2d 1109,48 Cal.3d 18,255 Cal.Rptr. 631 |
Court | California Supreme Court |
Parties | , 767 P.2d 1109 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Andrew Edward ROBERTSON, Defendant and Appellant. rim. 23538. |
Timothy J. Foley and Gail R. Weinheimer, San Francisco, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for defendant and appellant.
John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Steve White, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Frederick R. Millar, Jr., Rudolf Corona, Jr., John W. Carney and Maxine P. Cutler, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Diego, for plaintiff and respondent.
This is an automatic appeal from a judgment of death (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11; Pen.Code, § 1239, subd. (b)) imposed under the 1977 death penalty law (former Pen.Code, §§ 190-190.6, Stats.1977, ch. 316, §§ 4-14, pp. 1256-1262, repealed by Prop. 7, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978)) 1 following retrial of the issue of penalty after an initial judgment of death was reversed in People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279 (hereinafter Robertson I ).
After trial a jury found defendant Andrew Edward Robertson guilty of two first degree murders and found true nine charged special circumstances. 2 The jury fixed the penalty at death; the court entered judgment in accordance with the jury's verdicts and findings. On appeal we affirmed the judgment of guilt and the special circumstance findings, but reversed the judgment as to penalty. (Robertson I, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 60, 188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279.)
After retrial to the bench, the court fixed the penalty at death and entered judgment accordingly. This appeal followed.
As will appear, we affirm the judgment.
Pursuant to a waiver of jury trial by the prosecution and the defense, retrial of the penalty phase was before the court as trier of fact. The judge on retrial was not the judge who had presided over the initial trial.
Before the court by stipulation of the parties were transcripts of prior testimony in this action. In the words we used in Robertson I, supra, 33 Cal.3d 21, 188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279, the prior testimony told the following tale.
In its case-in-chief, the prosecution set out to show the penalty of death was appropriate for defendant. At the penalty phase of the initial trial the defense had attempted to demonstrate that defendant's culpability was reduced by mental disease or defect. In evident anticipation of the case it expected the defense to present here, the prosecution called several expert witnesses.
The prosecution experts--four psychiatrists and two psychologists--testified in sum as follows: defendant had a character or personality disorder, variously described as passive-aggressive or mixed character disorder with antisocial features and poor impulse control; he was emotionally immature and was of borderline or low average intelligence; he lacked insight and was concerned only for himself; he was sexually aggressive, received gratification from inflicting pain and had feelings of inadequacy; and as a child he had developed slowly and suffered emotional trauma. The prosecution experts were in conflict as to whether defendant was a mentally disordered sex offender; they were unanimous that defendant did not suffer from any mental disease or defect and was not affected by posttraumatic stress disorder.
As further evidence in aggravation of penalty, the prosecution introduced evidence of defendant's prior crimes. Ernest F. testified that one night in 1973, when he was a 19-year-old enlisted man in the Marine Corps, he went out drinking in Yuma, Arizona; at a bar he met a man who introduced himself as "Tex"; he and "Tex" went bar hopping; in the desert outside of Yuma, "Tex" attacked him, placing a knife to his neck and jabbing him with the weapon; "Tex" forced him to submit to oral copulation as he held the knife at his testicles and groin and jabbed; "Tex" repeatedly threatened to mutilate him and leave him in the desert and also threatened to kill him; he offered no resistance to the attack and soon managed to escape; he reported the incident to the police, but charges were never filed. At trial he stated defendant was the man he had known as "Tex."
Kim P. testified that one night in 1976 she was standing in a parking lot at a truck stop in Ontario, California; a man approached her from behind, put a knife to her throat and forced her into his automobile; a citizen's band radio was on; he drove her to a remote area where he compelled her to disrobe and then cut off her underpants with his knife; he told her he hated women and repeatedly said he was going to kill her; he beat her about the face, head, and breasts; he violated her with a Coca-Cola bottle until her vagina bled; he put lit cigarettes into her vagina and called her a "cry baby" when she complained of pain; he forced her to orally copulate him; he took a pair of underpants from her bag, saying they were for a collection he kept; when the citizen's band radio crackled, he became distracted and she fled; he cruised around the area for five or ten minutes shouting threats that he would kill her, but she made good her escape and reported the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
People v. Fedalizo
... ... (See People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 532, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 96, 115 P.3d 417["[u]nder the federal Constitution, error pertaining to a defendant's presence is evaluated under the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard set forth in Chapman "]; accord, People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 62, 255 Cal.Rptr. 631, 767 P.2d 1109; People v. El (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1050, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 88.) The statutory error under Penal Code section 977"is state law error only, and therefore is reversible only if ' "it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable ... ...
-
People v. Sivongxxay
... ... (See People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 636, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 737, 352 P.3d 318 ; People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1208, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 240, 939 P.2d 354 ( Scott ); People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 570, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353, 834 P.2d 1171 ( Diaz ); People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 37, fn. 5, 255 Cal.Rptr. 631, 767 P.2d 1109 ( Robertson ).) But under the totality of the circumstances standard, the presence or absence of a reference in a colloquy to this particular attribute of a jury trial, or to the 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 280 impartiality requirement, is not ... ...
-
People v. Morelos
... ... ( Ibid. ) A submission occurs when the defendant gives up his or her right to a jury trial, the right to present additional evidence as part of a defense and agrees the court can decide the case on the basis of the transcript of prior proceedings. ( People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 3940, 255 Cal.Rptr. 631, 767 P.2d 1109.) And a submission is defined by the fundamental protections and rights 13 Cal.5th 745 a defendant surrenders, such as the right to a jury, the right to confront witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination. ( Daniels , at ... ...
-
People v. Stanley
... ... (People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1252, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 831 P.2d 1210; People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 43, 255 Cal.Rptr. 631, 767 P.2d 1109; People v. Jennings (1988) 46 Cal.3d 963, 982, 251 Cal.Rptr. 278, 760 P.2d 475.) ... Nor is the penalty phase of trial, as defendant suggests, the equivalent of a criminal prosecution for purposes of due process and speedy ... ...