People v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 13 December 2012
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. George E. ROBINSON, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

101 A.D.3d 1245

956 N.Y.S.2d 239

2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 08575

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.George E. ROBINSON, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Dec. 13, 2012.

Henry C. Meier, Delmar, for appellant.

P. David Soares, District Attorney, Albany (Steven M. Sharp of counsel), for respondent.

Before: PETERS, P.J., ROSE, SPAIN, McCARTHY and GARRY, JJ.

SPAIN, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (McDonough, J.), rendered May 11, 2011 in Albany County, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of kidnapping in the second degree, attempted robbery in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree and grand larceny in the fourth degree.

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of kidnapping in the second degree, attempted robbery in the second degree and other crimes stemming from an incident on August 12, 2010 in which he entered a business in the Town of Colonie, Albany County, confronted an employee (hereinafter the victim) and then brandished what appeared to be a gun. The victim testified that defendant, who she identified at trial, asked if she was alone and she said no; defendant then pulled the gun out of a plastic bag and pointed it at her head, directing her to get her purse and keys, and told her that they were “going to [her] car.” The victim offered defendant her purse, keys and car, telling him he could have them, which defendant declined, repeating that they were going to her car. The victim then proceeded at gunpoint to her car, which was parked in a lot outside the building, and defendant ordered her to unlock it and get inside. The victim threw her purse at defendant, startling him, allowing her to run away and escape to a nearby business, fortunately ending her abduction. Defendant was apprehended shortly thereafter in a nearby hotel parking lot in possession of what proved to be a pellet gun and the victim's purse. Upon his convictions, defendant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms with the maximum aggregate sentence of 15 years with five years of postrelease supervision on the kidnapping conviction. Defendant now appeals.

Supreme Court (Lamont, J.) did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to suppress the physical evidence as the product of an illegal stop and seizure or on the ground that the showup procedure was impermissibly suggestive. Town of Colonie police officers responded to radio dispatches of a black male—wearing a grey T-shirt and blue cap with a weapon—outside the business where the victim fled. Officers observed defendantrunning in close proximity to the crime scene—matching that description in clothing and skin color—providing reasonable suspicion that he had committed these crimes and authorizing the officers to forcibly stop, frisk, search and detain defendant ( see People v. Moore, 6 N.Y.3d 496, 498–499, 814 N.Y.S.2d 567, 847 N.E.2d 1141 [2006];People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 223, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 352 N.E.2d 562 [1976] ). Upon patting down defendant, police discovered the pellet gun in defendant's possession, as well as the victim's purse containing her credit cards, providing probable cause for his arrest ( see People v. Shulman, 6 N.Y.3d 1, 25–26, 809 N.Y.S.2d 485, 843 N.E.2d 125 [2005],cert. denied547 U.S. 1043, 126 S.Ct. 1623, 164 L.Ed.2d 339 [2006] ). Thus, all of the evidence obtained from defendant was the product of a lawful stop and search incident to his arrest ( see People v. Nesbitt, 56 A.D.3d 816, 819, 867 N.Y.S.2d 736 [2008],lv. denied11 N.Y.3d 928, 874 N.Y.S.2d 13, 902 N.E.2d 447 [2009] ).

Moreover, the People demonstrated that the showup was reasonable, given that it was conducted within 15 to 20 minutes and just across the road from the crime scene and, thus, in close temporal and physical proximity ( see People v. Ortiz, 90 N.Y.2d 533, 537, 664 N.Y.S.2d 243, 686 N.E.2d 1337 [1997];see also People v. Gilford, 16 N.Y.3d 864, 868, 924 N.Y.S.2d 314, 948 N.E.2d 920 [2011] ). The victim immediately identified defendant from a distance of 20 to 35 feet, while still in the police car and without prompting, and the facts that defendant was handcuffed and flanked by two officers and the victim had been apprised that police had a suspect in custody did not render the procedure unduly suggestive or create a substantial likelihood of misidentification ( see People v. Mathis, 60 A.D.3d 1144, 1146, 874 N.Y.S.2d 627 [2009],lv. denied12 N.Y.3d 927, 884 N.Y.S.2d 708, 912 N.E.2d 1089 [2009];People v. August, 33 A.D.3d 1046, 1048–1049, 822 N.Y.S.2d 334 [2006],lv. denied8 N.Y.3d 878, 832 N.Y.S.2d 490, 864 N.E.2d 620 [2007] ). Defendant's motion to suppress was in all respects properly denied ( see People v. Ortiz, 90 N.Y.2d at 537, 664 N.Y.S.2d 243, 686 N.E.2d 1337).

Next, defendant's conviction for kidnapping in the second degree did not merge with his attempted robbery conviction, because the acts alleged to support the kidnapping were not inseparable from the attempted robbery. ¹ Under the merger doctrine, a conviction for kidnapping and robbery, or other crimes, is only precluded “if the restraint imposed was simply a minimal intrusion necessary and integral to the other crimes ... and was simultaneous or inseparable from [them]” ( People v. Kruppenbacher, 81 A.D.3d 1169, 1170–1171, 917 N.Y.S.2d 405 [2011],lv. denied17 N.Y.3d 797, 929 N.Y.S.2d 105, 952 N.E.2d 1100 [2011] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see People v. Bussey, 19 N.Y.3d 231, 238, 947 N.Y.S.2d 381, 970 N.E.2d 404 [2012];People v. Perez, 93 A.D.3d 1032, 1033–1034, 942 N.Y.S.2d 227 [2012],lvs. denied19 N.Y.3d 1000, 951 N.Y.S.2d 476, 975 N.E.2d 922 [2012] ). The purpose of the merger doctrine is to preclude kidnapping convictions (and sanctions) for acts of restraint which are “ ‘so much the part of another substantive crime [like robbery] that the substantive crime could not have been committed without such acts and that independent criminal responsibility may not fairly be attributed to [those restraining acts]’ ” ( People v. Gonzalez, 80 N.Y.2d 146, 153, 589 N.Y.S.2d 833, 603 N.E.2d 938 [1992], quoting People v. Cassidy, 40 N.Y.2d 763, 767, 390 N.Y.S.2d 45, 358 N.E.2d 870 [1976];see People v. Woodard, 93 A.D.3d 944, 948, 939 N.Y.S.2d 648 [2012] ).

Under the uncontroverted facts established here, the merger doctrine is inapplicable because the acts constituting kidnapping were separate and distinct from the prior acts constituting attempted robbery, and the kidnapping was not merely incidental to or inseparable from the other crimes ( see People v. Bussey, 19 N.Y.3d at 238, 947 N.Y.S.2d 381, 970 N.E.2d 404;People v. Smith, 47 N.Y.2d 83, 87, 416 N.Y.S.2d 784, 390 N.E.2d 291 [1979] ). Defendant's actions in kidnapping the victim were a separate and additional offense in that the attempted robbery was completed inside the victim's workplace before she was forced at gunpoint out of the building to her car; her confinement was continued outside the building after the robbery, when she was ordered to unlock the car and get in and, thus, the merger doctrine does not bar this kidnapping conviction ( see People v. Bussey, 19 N.Y.3d at 238, 947 N.Y.S.2d 381, 970 N.E.2d 404;People v. Smith, 47 N.Y.2d at 87, 416 N.Y.S.2d 784, 390 N.E.2d 291;People v. Rodena, 170 A.D.2d 418, 418–419, 566 N.Y.S.2d 293 [1991],lv. denied77 N.Y.2d 966, 570 N.Y.S.2d 500, 573 N.E.2d 588 [1991] ). This subsequent, discrete conduct in the asportation of the victim to her car was not a “minimal intrusion necessary and integral” to the robbery attempt but, rather, was a crime in and of itself ( People v. Gonzalez, 80 N.Y.2d at 153, 589 N.Y.S.2d 833, ...