People v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 10 July 1997
• Docket Number: No. C020731,C020731
• Citation: 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 406,56 Cal.App.4th 363
• Parties: , 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5507, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8885 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Eric Sean ROBINSON, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 406

65 Cal.Rptr.2d 406

56 Cal.App.4th 363, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5507,

97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8885

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Eric Sean ROBINSON, Defendant and Appellant.

No. C020731.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

July 10, 1997.

Review Denied Oct. 22, 1997.

Tanke & Willemsen and Michael A. Willemsen, Palo Alto, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Edmund D. McMurray, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Doris A. Calandra, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

SPARKS, Associate Justice.

In this case we consider whether the denial of defendant's motion to represent himself under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, is reviewable on appeal after a plea of no contest. We hold that it is.

Defendant entered pleas of no contest to charges of possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf.Code, § 11378), perjury (Pen.Code, § 118), vehicular manslaughter (Pen.Code, § 192, subd. (c)(3)), and assault with a firearm (Pen.Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)). Defendant also admitted various enhancements (Pen.Code, §§ 12022, subd. (c), 12022.1, subd. (b); Health & Saf.Code, § 11370.2, subd. (a)) and the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate unstayed prison term of 14 years.

On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his Faretta motion for self-representation and in denying his motion to withdraw his plea. Defendant's first contention has merit and is dispositive of his appeal. We shall therefore reverse the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The underlying facts surrounding defendant's offenses are irrelevant to the issues raised on appeal. We instead focus our attention on the proceedings involving defendant's request for self-representation.

Defendant's case was set for trial on September 12, 1994. On August 9, James Carroll, the appointed attorney who had represented defendant at the preliminary hearing, asked to be relieved because of trial schedule conflicts. After Carroll was relieved, Frances Huey was assigned from the attorney The court advised that while defendant was entitled to an attorney he was not entitled to specify which attorney should be appointed. Defendant then said he would accept the attorney appointed by the court.

panel to handle defendant's case. Huey informed the court that defendant had asked to represent himself. Defendant clarified that he would like a different attorney, a Mr. Masuda, appointed to his case because Huey had already told him that she would be unable to go to trial on September 12.

Huey explained that she could not go to trial on September 12 and that defendant refused to waive time. The court noted that it had tried to get an attorney who could take the September 12 court date but was unable to find a panel attorney who could do so. The court reiterated that Huey would be appointed to represent defendant and began to indicate that it would find good cause for postponing the trial date. Defendant then stated that he would prefer to represent himself and keep the original trial date.

The court advised defendant that he was entitled to have appointed counsel, a right defendant said he understood. The court asked if defendant understood that it was "generally not a wise choice to represent yourself in a criminal matter," and defendant responded affirmatively. Defendant also said he understood that if found guilty, a sentence of 27 years 4 months might be imposed.

The court further advised, and defendant acknowledged, that defendant would be opposed by a trained prosecutor, would be required to comply with all the rules of criminal procedure and evidence, could not base an appeal on his own lack of competence, and would not be entitled to a delay in proceedings if he subsequently changed his mind and wanted to hire an attorney.

The court then inquired into defendant's background. Defendant said his only legal experience was in his own "previous cases." He said he thought he had represented himself 11 years earlier when he was 18 years old, on a burglary charge and successfully got the case reduced to misdemeanor trespassing, for which probation was ordered. Defendant said he had completed the 11th grade and had attended other classes at the Rio Cosumnes Correctional Center, but had not received any degrees or a GED.

In response to the court's question, defendant stated he had held "various kinds" of employment, primarily manual labor, and had most recently worked as a ranch hand.

The district attorney noted that he was trying to work out a resolution to this case, but concluded, "[defendant's] got a right to represent himself if he wants to do that on a 27-year exposure. I don't know what else we can say."

The court then said to defendant: "... I have to make a determination that you have knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily decided to represent yourself. While I find that you have now made a request to represent yourself, I do not find that you have intelligently made a request to represent yourself. [p] I also find that you voluntarily made a request to represent yourself, but based on your background, your 11th grade education, your absence of any work experience and/or educational experience beyond the 11th grade that result in any type of formal degree, I do not believe that you are--you could effectively represent yourself in these very serious cases."

Defendant interrupted to point out that there was a law library available in the jail, that he was "a determined individual," and that he believed he "could handle [him]self."

The court concluded: "It's my determination to make, ... and I find I cannot determine that you have intelligently decided to represent yourself. I'm denying your pro[.] per[.] status request and appointing Ms. Huey to all three cases."

The court found good cause to postpone trial to September 28, 12 days beyond the 60-day limit. Defendant subsequently entered a negotiated plea of no contest to various offenses and received an aggregate unstayed prison term of 14 years.

Defendant received a certificate of probable cause and this appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I. Raising Faretta Issue After Plea of No Contest

At the court's request, the parties filed supplemental briefs addressing whether defendant's plea of no contest waived any error related to the denial of his Faretta motion. We conclude this issue is not waived by his plea and thus may properly be raised on appeal.

A plea of no contest has the same legal effect as a guilty plea. (Pen.Code, § 1016, subd. 3. [all subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated].) After a plea of guilty or its functional equivalent of no contest [nolo contendere], the appellate rights of the defendant are statutorily restricted. Under section 1237.5, no appeal can be taken by a defendant from a judgment of conviction after a plea of guilty or no contest except where defendant has filed a written statement asserting enumerated grounds "going to the legality of the proceedings" and the court has filed a certificate of probable cause. (See also California Rules of Court, rule 31(d).) But a defendant who receives a certificate of probable cause after a guilty or no contest plea does not have carte blanche to raise any and all issues on appeal. Rather, section 1237.5, subdivision (a), limits these appeals to those that raise "reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings." (See also People v. Hobbs (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948, 955, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 651, 873 P.2d 1246.)

In People v. Turner (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 116, 214 Cal.Rptr. 572, we discussed at length the types of issues that survive a guilty plea and those that are waived by virtue of the plea. For example, we noted: "A guilty plea ... concedes that the prosecution possesses legally admissible evidence sufficient to prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, a plea of guilty waives any right to raise questions regarding the evidence, including its sufficiency or admissibility, and this is true whether or not the subsequent claim of evidentiary error is founded on constitutional violations." (Id. at p. 125, 214 Cal.Rptr. 572.)

We further explained: "A guilty plea also waives any irregularity in the proceedings which would not preclude a conviction. [Citation.] Thus irregularities which could be cured, or which would not preclude subsequent proceedings to establish guilt are waived and may not be asserted on appeal after a guilty plea. [Citation.] In other words, by pleading guilty the defendant admits that he did that which he is accused of doing and he thereby obviates the procedural necessity of establishing that he committed the crime charged. In short, a guilty plea 'admits all matters essential to the conviction.' [Citation.] A defendant thereafter can raise only those questions which go to the power of the state to try him despite his guilt. In other words, in the language of the statute, defendant can only raise 'grounds going to the legality of the proceedings.' " (171 Cal.App.3d at p. 126, 214 Cal.Rptr. 572; see also People v. Jones (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1102, 1109, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 464, 898 P.2d 910.)

After enumerating some of the issues waived by a guilty plea, we turned to those that survive a guilty plea and that may be raised on appeal with a certificate of probable cause. We noted: "Since a factually guilty defendant is entitled to benefit of counsel, the denial of the right to counsel ... is not waived by a plea of guilty." (171 Cal.App.3d at p. 127, 214 Cal.Rptr. 572; see also People v. Holland (1978) 23 Cal.3d 77, 85, 151 Cal.Rptr. 625, 588 P.2d 765.) ¹

The right to self-representation is grounded in the Sixth Amendment's right...