People v. Rodas

• Decision Date: 26 April 2016
• Docket Number: XX
• Citation: 2016 NY Slip Op 50733 (U)
• Parties: People of the State of New York, v. Coral Rodas, Defendant.
• Court: New York Justice Court

2016 NY Slip Op 50733(U)

People of the State of New York, v. Coral Rodas, Defendant.

XX

Justice Court of the Town of North Castle, Westchester County

Decided on April 26, 2016

Elyse Lazansky, J.

Defendant was charged by Officer R. Aronson of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority ("MTA") Police Department, with the following violations: a railroad crossing violation pursuant to VTL 1170(b); unlicensed operation of a vehicle pursuant to VTL 509(1); and failure to yield to an emergency vehicle pursuant to VTL 1144(a). These violations allegedly occurred on November 24, 2015 at approximately 10:00 a.m., in the Town of North Castle. On December 21, 2015, the Court received defendant's plea of not guilty and request for a supporting deposition for all tickets. On the same day, a request for such depositions was sent to the MTA officer who issued the summonses. In a departure from his usual efficiency, Officer Aronson failed to fulfill the request.

On February 11, 2016, defendant appeared with counsel, and made an oral application to dismiss the information for facial insufficiency pursuant to CPL 110.40, which divested the Court of jurisdiction and required dismissal of the simplified traffic informations pursuant to CPL 170.35. On February 22, 2016, the Court received the same motion in writing, to which Officer Aronson has not submitted opposition. The Court, having reviewed all papers and filings heretofore submitted herein, all of which are incorporated by reference hereto, now decides as follows.

It is undisputed that defendants charged by simplified traffic informations have a statutory right to request and receive supporting depositions. Defendant's motion adequately sets forth the applicable statutes [CPL §§100.25, 100.40], and the Court does not repeat them here. It is also beyond cavil that failure to supply supporting depositions upon a timely request requires, upon proper application, a dismissal of the traffic ticket(s). People v. Nuccio, 78 NY2d 102 (1991), et seq.

The question here is whether or not the Court's dismissal of the instant simplified traffic informations must be a dismissal with prejudice against the People, thereby prohibiting Officer Aronson from re-filing the violations by way of "long form informations." In his motion, counsel for defendant argues that "[s]imple logic dictates that where the Legislature has enacted specific time requirements and enacted a specific result for failure to meet those requirements, allowance of an extension of time would serve to nullify the law. This the court may not do."

Unfortunately, the Court's actions are not required to be based on only "simple logic." Instead, stare decisis ¹ is a foundational principle of jurisprudence. First and foremost, a court is an institution bound by rules of law, not merely a collection of distinct individuals whose personalities are free to interpret the law; governing rules of law do not change merely because court personnel changes. People v. Taylor, 39 NY3d 129 (2007), People v. Bing, 76 NY2d 331, 338 (1990). Stare decisis promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 US 808, 827(1991). Justice Felix Frankfurter, who was a "stalwart for stability and systemic values in jurisprudence, and no evanescent impulsive innovator"² , eloquently observed that stare decisis is an important social policy "rooted in the psychologic need to satisfy reasonable expectations" of continuity in the law.³ Jurisprudential anarchy would result if judges refuse to accept the humbling notion that no particular court possesses a wisdom which surpasses that of its predecessors. People v. Hobson, 39 NY2d 479, 488 (1976).

Stare decisis is not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, however, if such adherence would involve collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 US 106 (1940). "Odd cases can run roughshod over stare decisis," and so the examination must always be whether the court is overturning well-established doctrine, or justifiably rejecting outlier cases or cases which do not rely justifiably on valid precedent. See, e.g., Hobson, supra, at 488 and cases cited therein.

The Court's examination of the cases on the instant question revealed contradictory precedents. Cited by counsel, People v. Zappula, 41 Misc 3d 226 (Muttontown Vlg.Ct., 2013) held that fax service of a timely request for a supporting deposition sufficiently complies with defendant's statutory obligations, and stated that the result of the People's failure to timely respond divests the court of jurisdiction and mandates dismissal of the information, but without prejudice to the People to re-file the charge. Zappula relies on People v. Nuccio, supra; accord People v. Green, 192 Misc 2d 296 (Muttontown Vlg.Ct., 2002); People v. Rossi, 154 Misc 2d at 624 (Muttontown Vlg.Ct., 1992).

The Court of Appeals decided Nuccio little more than a year after the Appellate Term, Second Department decided People v. Aucello, 146 Misc 2d 417 (App.Term, 9th and 10th Jud.Dists.1990). Aucello had held that absent "special circumstances", a Court's dismissal without prejudice against the People to re-prosecute the violations is an abuse of discretion: "[s]uch actions, in this court's opinion, defeat the very purpose of the CPL, disregard the interests of judicial economy and, often times, render the defense of traffic matters impracticable." This clear and definitive holding is supported by no case, nor any statute.

In direct contrast to Aucello, the Court of Appeals in Nuccio reasoned that the Legislature undoubtedly was aware of prior restraints on re-prosecution when it enacted the Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL"). Dismissals based on legal insufficiency with respect to indictments are specifically addresses in §210.20(4), but the legislature nonetheless failed to include a similar bar for informations dismissed on those same grounds pursuant to CPL §170.30(1)(a). This very clear statutory distinction led the Nuccio Court to hold that neither a dismissal pursuant to CPL §170.30 et seq. (for legal insufficiency) nor double jeopardy bar re-prosecution of non-felony charges, so long as the dismissal does not constitute adjudication on the facts going to guilt or innocence. Nuccio effectively overruled the prejudicial dismissal principle of the Aucello case. See, Nuccio, supra at 105-106, citing People v. Key, 45 NY2d 111, 117 (1978).

Inexplicably, a series of Ninth and Tenth Judicial District Appellate Term cases decided after Nuccio nonetheless have followed Aucello for the invalid principle. Such decisions often cite Nuccio - preceded by "cf.", but without explanation.⁴ See, e.g., People v. Meisels, 31 Misc 3d 143(A) (App.Term, 9th & 10th Jud.Dists.2011); People v. Rathgeber, 23...