People v. Rodriguez

• Decision Date: 01 September 2022
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals No. 19CA1354
• Citation: 521 P.3d 678,2022 COA 98
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Matthew F. RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

521 P.3d 678
2022 COA 98

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Matthew F. RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

Court of Appeals No. 19CA1354

Colorado Court of Appeals, Division VII.

Announced September 1, 2022

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Patrick A. Withers, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Mallika L. Magner, Alternate Defense Counsel, Crested Butte, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY

¶ 1 Colorado statutes set forth the steps a court must take when the court, defense counsel, or a prosecutor questions whether a criminal defendant is mentally competent. But those statutes do not address how the

521 P.3d 681

court should proceed in a case where a lawyer asserts that the mental state of a defendant whom the court previously found to be competent has deteriorated to the point where the defendant may no longer be competent. This is such a case.

¶ 2 Matthew F. Rodriguez appeals the judgment of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of sexual assault on a child (pattern of abuse), two counts of sexual assault on a child (position of trust), and aggravated incest. Rodriguez's principal argument challenges the district court's denial of defense counsel's third motion for a competency evaluation (the third motion) and the court's related decision not to grant the defense another continuance, after nearly three years of delays in the proceedings, to allow Rodriguez to undergo further competency testing.

¶ 3 We affirm.

I. Background Facts and Procedural History

¶ 4 Rodriguez engaged in sexual intercourse with his daughter G.L. G.L. gave birth to Rodriguez's child shortly after she turned fourteen. Based on this conduct, in September 2015, Rodriguez was charged with sexual assault on a child (pattern of abuse), two counts of sexual assault on a child (position of trust), and aggravated incest.

¶ 5 Defense counsel filed three motions to determine Rodriguez's competency — in January 2016, in March 2017, and on February 26, 2019. The district court ordered competency evaluations for Rodriguez following the filing of the first two motions. None of the professionals who evaluated Rodriguez concluded that he was not competent to proceed.

¶ 6 After Rodriguez's counsel filed the third motion, the court conducted a hearing at which it reviewed in detail the proceedings following the first and second motions and the results of Rodriguez's previous competency evaluations. The court concluded that Rodriguez was competent to proceed, primarily because no professional had determined that he was not competent over three years of evaluations and neurological testing.

¶ 7 In addition, at the conclusion of the hearing on the third motion, defense counsel requested a " Bergerud hearing" to address an alleged "direct conflict" between Rodriguez and his counsel. See People v. Bergerud , 223 P.3d 686, 694-96 (Colo. 2010) (explaining the circumstances under which a defendant is entitled to the appointment of substitute counsel). Defense counsel asserted that, in light of the purported conflict, Rodriguez was entitled to new counsel.

¶ 8 The court set a Bergerud hearing before a different judge. Following that hearing, at which Rodriguez spoke to the court, the court denied defense counsel's request for appointment of substitute counsel.

¶ 9 The case proceeded to trial. A jury convicted Rodriguez of all the charged counts.

II. Analysis

¶ 10 Rodriguez contends that the district court reversibly erred by (1) denying the third motion, not granting him another continuance to allow for a further competency evaluation, and not suspending the proceedings sua sponte to declare a mistrial; and (2) denying his request for appointment of substitute counsel.

A. Rodriguez's Request for a Third Competency Evaluation

¶ 11 We reject Rodriguez's assertion that the district court abused its discretion by denying the third motion, not granting a continuance for further evaluation, and not declaring a mistrial.

1. Standard of Review

¶ 12 We review a district court's competency determination for an abuse of discretion. People v. Mondragon , 217 P.3d 936, 939 (Colo. App. 2009). A court abuses its discretion where its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or it applies an incorrect legal standard. Id.

2. Applicable Law

¶ 13 Under the United States and Colorado Constitutions, the right to due process

521 P.3d 682

bars the trial of an incompetent defendant. See Cooper v. Oklahoma , 517 U.S. 348, 354, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) ; People v. Zapotocky , 869 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Colo. 1994). In Colorado, a defendant's due process right not to be tried while incompetent is further protected by statute. See §§ 16-8.5-101 to - 123, C.R.S. 2021.

¶ 14 Under the version of the competency statutes in effect when defense counsel filed the third motion on February 26, 2019, a defendant is "[i]ncompetent to proceed" if,

as a result of a mental disability or developmental disability, the defendant does not have sufficient present ability to consult with the defendant's lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding in order to assist in the defense, or ..., as a result of a mental disability or developmental disability, the defendant does not have a rational and factual understanding of the criminal proceedings.

§ 16-8.5-101(11), C.R.S. 2018. (Where indicated, we cite to the version of the competency statutes in effect at the time defense counsel filed the third motion. The General Assembly subsequently amended the statutes. The portions of the statutes most critical to our analysis have not materially changed since 2018, however.) A "[m]ental disability" is a "substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception, or cognitive ability that results in marked functional disability, significantly interfering with adaptive behavior." § 16-8.5-101(12), C.R.S. 2018. Thus, a defendant is competent to proceed if he or she has "both a factual understanding and cognitive ability and perceptions and understandings that are rational and grounded in reality." Mondragon , 217 P.3d at 941.

¶ 15 "A defendant is presumed to be competent to stand trial." People v. Stephenson , 165 P.3d 860, 866 (Colo. App. 2007). The party asserting that the defendant lacks the mental competency to proceed bears the burden to prove incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence. § 16-8.5-103(7), C.R.S. 2018.

¶ 16 The Colorado statutes provide two ways to challenge a criminal defendant's competency to proceed. First, if "either the defense or the prosecution has reason to believe that the defendant is incompetent to proceed, either party may file a motion in advance of the commencement of the particular proceeding." § 16-8.5-102(2)(b), C.R.S. 2018. Second, if the court "has reason to believe that the defendant is incompetent to proceed, it is the [court]’s duty to suspend the proceeding and determine the competency or incompetency of the defendant." § 16-8.5-102(2)(a), C.R.S. 2018. The procedures a court must follow to determine a defendant's competency to proceed are outlined in section 16-8.5-103, C.R.S. 2018.

¶ 17 Under section 16-8.5-103(1), C.R.S. 2018, if a defendant's competency is called into question, "the court may make a preliminary finding of competency or incompetency, which shall be a final determination unless a party to the case objects within fourteen days after the court's preliminary finding." If a party objects to the court's preliminary finding, or if the court determines it has insufficient information to make a preliminary finding, the court "shall order that the defendant be evaluated for competency" by the department of human services and that the department "prepare a court-ordered report." § 16-8.5-103(2), C.R.S. 2018.

¶ 18 "Within fourteen days after receipt of the court-ordered report, either party may request a hearing or a second evaluation." § 16-8.5-103(3), C.R.S. 2018. "If a party requests a second evaluation, any pending requests for a hearing shall be continued until the receipt of the second evaluation report." § 16-8.5-103(4), C.R.S. 2018. However, "[i]f neither party requests a hearing or a second evaluation within the applicable time frame, the court shall enter a final determination, based on the information then available to the court, whether the defendant is or is not competent to proceed." § 16-8.5-103(5), C.R.S. 2018.

3. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying the Third Motion

¶ 19 We disagree with Rodriguez's contention that the district court erred by denying the third motion and not suspending the court proceedings further to allow for another competency evaluation.

521 P.3d 683

¶ 20 As explained below, after a court makes a final determination of competency, as the district court had already done twice here before defense counsel filed the third motion, the court need not order an additional competency evaluation where the new motion raises the same issues as did the previous competency motions. Under these circumstances, sections 16-8.5-102 and 16-8.5-103 do not require the district court to address the defendant's competency again.

a. The Three Competency Motions

¶ 21 We begin our review of the court's ruling on the third motion by examining the allegations in the first and second competency motions and...