People v. Rodriguez
| Decision Date | 23 May 2016 |
| Docket Number | D069656 |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ROBERTO GUADALUPE RODRIGUEZ, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Bernard J. Schwartz, Judge. Affirmed.
George L. Schraer for Appellant and Defendant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler and Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorneys General, A. Natasha Cortina, Alastair J. Agcaoili and Allison Hawley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Robert Guadalupe Rodriquez of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) of his wife, Mary Jane Rodriguez, and found he personally used a deadly weapon (a knife) in the commission of the offense. (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b).) The trial court sentenced Rodriguez to a total prison term of 26 years to life: 25 years to life for the first degree murder and one year for the deadly weapon enhancement. Asserting that "provocation in the context of second degree murder has a technical meaning peculiar to the law," Rodriguez contends the court committed federal constitutional error by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on that term's technical and peculiar meaning. We reject the contention, and affirm the judgment.
In the early morning hours of April 11, 2013, Rodriguez stabbed his wife to death with a large butcher knife. About 20 or 30 minutes later, he called 911 and told police to come to his house. In police interviews, Rodriguez stated he had learned two or three years earlier that his wife had been communicating and rendezvousing with other men and had engaged in an affair with a man in Texas in particular. Rodriguez told the investigator he believed his wife expected to take all of their money and wait for him to die so she could be with other men. Though they had engaged in marital counseling, Rodriguez had filed for divorce and began taking steps to protect himself financially.
Rodriguez told the investigator that on the morning of April 11, 2013, he woke up feeling angry and "stupid" that his wife had gone out to entice men the night before. He went to their kitchen and got a knife, returned to their bedroom and stabbed her while she struggled with him, explaining that he "went crazy." When asked what was going through his head before he killed her, Rodriguez told the investigator, "Anger, . . . why you keep doing this to me . . . why you just go away [sic], don't torture—I don't wannasay torcher [sic], but it's painful." Rodriguez agreed that before the murder he was "very angry."
The medical examiner found 25 separate stab wounds on the victim with several potentially or individually fatal. Many of them were located to the left side of her body and on her back. One went through the left side of her chest into her lung and heart. That wound would have left the victim between three and five minutes to live; medical intervention would not have saved her.
Rodriguez, who had worked as a middle school wood shop teacher, presented character witnesses in his defense, who testified they were shocked by the crime. The principal at his school testified Rodriguez was a "calm, very patient, very quiet" teacher who was never violent. Rodriguez's former brother-in-law who knew Rodriguez for 40 years testified that Rodriguez was trustworthy; he never saw him act violently and he was not quick to anger. He testified that Rodriguez was not capable of hurting someone, and such conduct was inconsistent with Rodriguez's character.
The parties stipulated that in August 2012, Rodriguez and his wife had attended marriage counseling sessions individually and together, and that the last social media message between the victim and the Texas man occurred in April 2013. The court admitted into evidence a letter that corroborated the victim had been communicating with another man on the Internet.
The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 520 as to the elements of murder and malice aforethought. It instructed with CALCRIM No. 521 as to murder and first degree murder, respectively, including by telling the jury that a defendant is guilty offirst degree murder if the People have proved he acted "willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation"; that a defendant acts deliberately "if he carefully weighed the considerations for and against his choice, and knowing the consequences, decided to kill" and with premeditation "if he decided to kill before completing the acts that caused the death"; and a "decision to kill made rashly, impulsively, or without careful consideration is not deliberate and premeditated."1 The court then instructed the jury at the defense's request with CALCRIM No. 522, regarding provocation, as follows: Rodriguez's counsel did not request clarification or amplification of that instruction.
The court also read CALCRIM No. 570, which defined the difference between murder and voluntary manslaughter based on a sudden quarrel or the heat of passion, as follows: "A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter if the defendant killed someone because of a sudden quarrel or . . . because of a heat of passion.
Defense counsel sought to modify CALCRIM No. 570 on grounds the instruction shifted the burden to the defense to bring evidence reducing murder to voluntary manslaughter. Rodriguez's counsel also sought a special instruction telling the jury that the absence of heat of passion and provocation was an essential element of murder that the prosecution had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The court rejected these requests.
Rodriguez's sole contention on appeal is that the trial court reversibly erred under federal constitutional standards by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte with the standardused for provocation in the context of second degree murder, which he asserts has a technical or legal meaning relating to the effect that provocation has on the defendant's subjective state of mind. He argues that under this standard, provocation applies even if the conduct that provoked the defendant would not provoke a reasonable person or an ordinary person of average disposition, and that because the term differs from the ordinary definition and has a technical meaning peculiar to the law, the court had a sua sponte duty to give an amplifying or clarifying instruction. According to Rodriguez, this duty was particularly important where the court instructed the jury in detail on provocation for purposes of voluntary manslaughter, giving rise to a danger that the jury would give the term an incorrect meaning and making it unable to return a verdict for second degree murder. In advancing these arguments, Rodriguez acknowledges that his claims may appear to be undermined by People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, overruled on other grounds in People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 390; People v. Hernandez (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1327 (Hernandez) and People v. Jones (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 995, but he seeks to distinguish them on grounds they do not address the specific issue he raises.
The People concede that a trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on familiar words and phrases where the jury...
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