People v. Rodriquez

Citation50 Cal.App.3d 389,123 Cal.Rptr. 185
Decision Date01 August 1975
Docket NumberCr. 7235
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Raul Leandro RODRIQUEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
Gary K. Olsen, Los Angeles, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant
OPINION

KAUFMAN, Associate Justice.

Raul Leandro Rodriquez (hereafter 'defendant') was convicted after a jury trial of violating Penal Code, section 4574 (possession of a deadly weapon, to wit, a razor blade, in county jail). 1 He appeals from the judgment (order granting probation).

On April 19, 1974, defendant was in tank 4 of the Riverside County Jail. He was the sole occupant of his cell, a Danny Carter having moved out two weeks earlier. All of Carter's belongings had been removed with him. The sides and back of defendant's cell are solid walls. The top and front of the rectangular cell are open bars. There are two bunks along the long wall. Defendant occupied the lower bunk.

On the 19th the jail staff made a routine search of the facility. Defendant was in the shower. His shower was interrupted, and he was taken to another part of the jail, along with the other inmates from tank 4. The officers found three brown paper bags on the top bunk of defendant's cell. These bags are used in the jail to hold personal effects. One of the bags was labeled 'Raul.' The bags were standing upright with their tops open.

In one bag, under a stack of envelopes addressed to defendant, was a toothbrush handle. The top of the toothbrush was burned and had a slot in it. In a second bag, under a similar stack of envelopes, was a matchnbox containing, among other things, a portion of a razor blade. The razor blade fits into the slot in the toothbrush and is secured by melting the plastic.

Weapons similar to the razor blade/toothbrush found in defendant's cell are commonly used in jail fights. They can inflict serious injury. Prosecution witnesses testified such items are primarily used, if not solely used, as weapons. These weapons can inflict neck wounds, causing profuse bleeding, which could result in death if not immediately treated.

Moses Duron, a jail trustee on April 19, was a primary witness for the defense. He testified the toothbrush and razor blade were his. He claimed he used them for handicrafts and for sharpening pencils. He explained that he stored the razor blade and toothbrush in defendant's cell without defendant's knowledge. Duron demonstrated, with out permission, how he would use the razor blade to cut cellophane. 2

Defendant testified that the toothbrush and razor blade were not his, and that he did not know they were in his cell. He claimed he would have no use for such items.

Defendant's assertions were rebutted, however, by a crucial discrepancy in the evidence. Duron testified he last hid the matchbox containing the razor blade by reaching through the front bars of the cell and placing it between the mattress and the frame of the top bunk. He also testified the toothbrush was getting too short for effective use (apparently due to repeated assembly and disassembly), and he had put it in a trash-filled paper bag on the floor of defendant's cell. However, both items were found six or seven feet from the front of the cell, hidden among defendant's personal effects. Duron testified he could reach in about two feet into the cell. Therefore he could not have hidden the items in the location where they were found. Defendant offered no explanation of substance to counter the resulting inference that the weapon was under his dominion and control. 3

Defendant was sentenced to prison for the term prescribed by law. Execution of the sentence was suspended and defendant was granted three years probation on various terms and conditions, including a six-month term in Riverside County Jail.

Contentions

Defendant's argument for reversal fall into two basic categories. He cites three errors regarding proof of intended violent use of the razor blade. He also urges Penal Code, section 4574 is unconstitutionally vague.

Discussion and Disposition

1. Defendant makes three related contentions about proof of his intended violent use: (1) intended violent use is an element of the People's prima facie case, (2) the jury was incorrectly instructed in that regard, and (3) the evidence of his intended violent use is insufficient. Noe of these contentions have merit.

The elements of possession of a deadly weapon in county jail may be gleaned from the statute. 4 They are: (1) possession (2) of a deadly weapon, (3) without authorization, (4) by one lawfully committed to county jail. In the context of this case, specific intent could be an element of the prima facie case only if it is subsumed under 'possession' or 'deadly weapon.' 5

In a sense, this a question of first impression--there are no cases directly addressing this aspect of section 4574. However, the question has been decided regarding other, similar, sections of the Penal Code. We find the reasoning of those cases persuasive.

Section 4502 proscribes possession of certain weapons in state prison. 6 Cases interpreting section 4502 conclude intended use of any sort need not be proven. (See, e.g., People v. Steely, 266 Cal.App.2d 591, 594--595, 72 Cal.Rptr. 368; People v. Wells, 261 Cal.App.2d 468, 478--479, 68 Cal.Rptr. 400.) Both 4502 and 4574 proscribe simple possession and not use. The purpose of both sections is the same: to protect inmates and officers from the danger of armed assault. We hold section 4574 is subject to the same rule as section 4502: intended violent use is not an element of proof of possession. (See also, People v. Satchell, 6 Cal.3d 28, 42, 98 Cal.Rptr. 33, 489 P.2d 1361.)

We turn to whether intended use is an element of proof of 'deadly weapon.' A 'deadly weapon' is one ". . . likely to produce death or great bodily injury." (People v. Moran, 33 Cal.App.3d 724, 730, 109 Cal.Rptr. 287, 290; People v. Helms, 242 Cal.App.2d 467, 486, 51 Cal.Rptr. 484.) Certain items are inherently deadly weapons. (People v. Fuqua, 58 Cal. 245, 247; cf. People v. Stinson, 8 Cal.App.3d 497, 501, 87 Cal.Rptr. 537; People v. Deane, 259 Cal.App.2d 82, 89, 66 Cal.Rptr. 177.) Most objects, including a razor blade (People v. Richardson, 176 Cal.App.2d 238, 239--240, 1 Cal.Rptr. 306), may or may not be deadly, depending on the factual context. This is so because they also may be used for legitimate purposes. Whether such an item is a deadly weapon is a question of fact to be determined from surrounding circumstances. (See, e.g., People v. Fuqua, supra, 58 Cal. at p. 247; People v. Moran, supra, 33 Cal.App.3d at p. 730, 109 Cal.Rptr. 287.)

Section 4574 proscribes possession, not use, as noted above. Therefore, the statute is concerned with the potential of the item in question. Reading the statute as a whole, it is evident the Legislature enacted no halfway measure. Effective protection of inmates and officers from armed attack depends upon prohibition of possession of All deadly weapons in jail. (Cf. People v. Satchell, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 42, 98 Cal.Rptr. 33, 489 P.2d 1361.) This valid legislative objective does not except weapons with dangerous capabilities which also have innocent uses. Speaking in regard to section 4502, People v. Wells, supra, 261 Cal.App.2d at pp. 478--479, 68 Cal.Rptr. at p. 406 noted the statute '. . . serves an objective demanding relative inflexibility and relatively strict liability . . .. It is one of the 'stringent statutes governing prison safety.' (People v. Romo, 256 Cal.App.2d 589, 595, 64 Cal.Rptr. 151.)' The same may be said of section 4574. It is plain a razor blade's potential for use as a deadly weapon does not depend on an intended violent use.

Evidence of harmless use by jail inmates, including defendant, may be relevant if it bears on the likelihood that an item will cause death or serious bodily injury. Such evidence is defensive, however. It is not necessary for the People to prove the item has no harmless use. Such a construction of section 4574 would effectively nullify its purpose.

By contending there must be proof of his intended violent use, defendant in effect urges section 4574 creates a specific intent crime. We reject this contention. We hold specific intent is not an element of the prima facie case of the violation of section 4574.

Defendant contends the jury was improperly instructed in regard to his intended use of a razor blade. In fact, however, the jury was instructed, at defendant's request, that the People had to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the intended use of the razor blade was dangerous rather than harmless. 7 This instruction was error. However, the error was vastly in the favor of defendant. It certainly does not justify reversal.

Defendant also contends there is insufficient evidence of his intended violent use. Such proof is not necessary. Further, there is sufficient proof that the razor blade is a deadly weapon. Essentially, the only evidence of the razor blade's harmless use is the testimony of Moses Duron. In regard to defendant, this testimony amounts to testimony about harmless use in the abstract. That is, the testimony establishes that it is possible to use the razor blade in a harmless manner. There is contrary evidence of equal character and quality. The sheriff's officers testified the primary, if not the sole, use of the toothbrush/razor blade is as a weapon in jailhouse fights. The officers also testified to the serious nature of the wounds caused thereby. This is substantial evidence showing the razor blade is a weapon likely to cause death or great bodily injury. 2. Defendant contends the term 'deadly weapon' rend...

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