People v. Rodriquez

• Decision Date: 13 November 1963
• Docket Number: Cr. 4270
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of California Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ramon RODRIGUEZ, Defendant and Respondent.

Page 907

34 Cal.Rptr. 907

222 Cal.App.2d 221

PEOPLE of the State of California Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ramon RODRIGUEZ, Defendant and Respondent.

Cr. 4270.

District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

Nov. 13, 1963.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., of the State of California, Albert W. Harris, Jr., Michael J. Phelan, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for appellant.

Henry B. Fulton, Salinas, for respondent (Under appointment of the District Court of Appeal).

MOLINARI, Justice.

This is an appeal by the People from an order setting aside Counts I and II of an information charging defendant with violation of Penal Code, section 4501.5, ¹ which at all times pertinent to this appeal provided as follows: 'Every person undergoing a sentence of less than life in a state prison of this State who commits a battery upon the person of any individual who is not himself a prisoner shall be guilty of a felony * * *.' ²

Question Presented

Was defendant 'undergoing a sentence of less than life in a state prison * * *'?

The Facts

Defendant was committed to the Youth Authority after having been declared a ward of the Juvenile Court of Los Angeles County. Pursuant to such commitment defendant was sent to Deuel Vocational Institution and thereafter, on July 26, 1961, was transferred to the Correctional Training Facility at Soledad. While such an inmate of Soledad it is alleged that defendant, on April 27, 1962, struck one guard with his fist and another guard with a guitar handle. These alleged batteries are the basis of the first two counts of the information, which the court below dismissed pursuant to a motion under section 995. For purposes of this appeal, there is no question that at the time the alleged batteries were committed defendant was being lawfully held in custody in a state prison, and that said batteries, if committed, were perpetrated upon persons who were not prisoners. The trial court set aside these two counts on the ground that at the time of the alleged batteries defendant was not serving a sentence. ³

The People's Contentions

The People contend that a person committed to the Youth Authority is a "person undergoing [a] sentence" and that when such a person is transferred to the Correctional Training Facility at Soledad he is punishable for violations of section 4501.5. The People also contend that even if a Youth Authority transferee cannot be deemed a "person undergoing a sentence," such a person should still be amenable to punishment under section 4501.5.

Defendant's Status

Defendant, a person under 21 years of age, was adjudged and declared to be a ward of the Juvenile Court by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County on June 20, 1956, and was ordered committed to the care and custody of the Youth Authority for the time prescribed by section 1769 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. ⁴ While under the custody of the Youth Authority at the Deuel Vocational Institution defendant was transferred by the Authority to the Correctional Training Facility at Soledad pursuant to section 1755.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, which provided, in pertinent part, as follows: '[T]he Youth Authority may transfer to and cause to be confined in * * * the California State Prison at Soledad * * * for general study, diagnosis, and treatment, or any of them, any person over the age of 18 years who is subject to the custody, control, and discipline of the Youth Authority; and the Director of Corrections may receive and keep * * * any person so transferred thereto * * * with the same powers as if the person had been placed therein or transferred thereto pursuant to the provisions of the Penal Code.' Section 1755.5 further provided: 'The provisions of Part 3 of the Penal Code, ⁵ so far as those provisions may be applicable, apply to persons so transferred to and confined * * *, except that, whenever by reason of any law governing the commitment of a person to the Youth Authority or to an institution under the jurisdiction of the Youth Authority the person is deemed not to be a person convicted of a crime, the transfer or placement of the person in * * * the California State Prison at Soledad * * * shall not affect the status or rights of the person and shall not be deemed to constitute a conviction of a crime. * * *' (Emphasis added.)

The People do not contend that defendant is a person convicted of a crime, or that by reason of his transfer to Soledad he is to be deemed a person convicted of a crime. At the time of the Juvenile Court proceedings, section 736 of the Welfare and Institutions Code provided: 'An order adjudging a person to be a ward of the juvenile court shall not be deemed to be a conviction of crime.' ⁶ The People do contend, however, that by virtue of the provisions of section 1755.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code defendant became subject to section 4501.5 and was, accordingly, a "person undergoing [a] sentence." The People rely on In re Herrera, 23 Cal.2d 206, 143 P.2d 345; People v. Temple, 203 Cal.App.2d 654, 21 Cal.Rptr. 633, and People v. White, 177 Cal.App.2d 383, 2 Cal.Rptr. 202. An analysis of each of these cases discloses that they are not applicable to the situation confronting us in the present case.

Herrera is not in point. That case merely involves the right to appeal. There the defendants were committed to the Youth Authority after conviction of the crime of assault with a deadly weapon. On petition for a writ of habeas corpus, they urged that their detention was illegal since they were not 'sentenced' and could not, under the applicable statutes, appeal. The Supreme Court held that 'This commitment is a judicial determination of the fact of defendant's conviction and a pronouncement of the sentence for the offense * * *, and is therefore the court's judgment and sentence of the convict * * *, and is appealable.' (P. 214 of 23 Cal.2d, p. 349 of 143 P.2d; emphasis added.) The important distinction between Herrera and the instant case is that in the former the minors were prosecuted criminally and convicted of a crime, while in our case defendant was not convicted of a crime but made a ward of the Juvenile Court.

Temple involves a situation where a minor, who had been convicted of armed robbery, was sent by the Youth Authority to the Correctional Facility at Soledad. While an inmate there he escaped. The question arose whether the escape was a felony or a misdemeanor. If section 1768.7 of the Welfare and Institutions Code were applicable then the offense would only be a misdemeanor. That section provides that one committed to the Youth Authority and who attempts to or escapes from a facility from which he is confined, is guilty of a misdemeanor. The court held, however, that the provisions of section 1755.5 thereof, insofar as it directs that Part 3 of the Penal Code should apply to Youth Authority transferees at Soledad, was controlling, so that the escape was a felony under section 4530, regardless of the fact that the defendant was under the Youth Authority program. The basis of the holding in Temple was that the defendant was a 'prisoner' within the meaning of section 4530, which provided that: 'Every prisoner confined in a state prison who escapes or attempts to escape therefrom, is punishable by imprisonment in a state prison * * *.'

The Temple case relied upon White. In that case the appellant had been adjudged a psychopathic delinquent pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 7058, and was committed to Mendocino State Hospital. He was later transferred to Atascadero State Hospital, then to the medical facility at Vacaville, and finally, to San Quentin. While incarcerated there he was convicted of violating section 4502, which provided in part as follows: 'Every prisoner committed to a State prison who, while at such State prison * * * possesses or carries upon his person [any deadly weapon], * * * is guilty of a felony * * *.' On appeal it was argued that the appellant was a patient and not a prisoner, and that therefore he could not come under the provisions of section 4502. The reviewing court held that he was 'a prisoner' even though criminal proceedings had been suspended, and the appellant was in prison solely by virtue of section 7058 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, which provided for a 90-day period of commitment for observation. ⁷ The holding of the appellate court was that a person in custody at a state prison as the result of due legal process is a prisoner within the meaning of section 4502, the rationale of the case being that 'the significance of the word 'prisoner' is not the manner of commitment, but rather the fact of a judicial commitment.' (P. 385 of 177 Cal.App.2d, p. 203 of 2 Cal.Rptr.)

The holding of Temple and White is that a person who is legally confined in a state prison is a 'prisoner' whether his confinement results from a criminal conviction or from a commitment stemming from a proceeding of a noncriminal nature. Under the holding of these cases, defendant was a prisoner while an inmate of Soledad. However, the crucial question before us is not whether he was a 'prisoner,' but whether he was a 'person undergoing a sentence * * *.' Temple and White were not called upon to define this phraseology, nor, to our knowledge, are there any other cases directly interpreting this language.

A 'sentence' is the judgment in a criminal action (People v. Perkins, 147 Cal.App.2d 793, 797, 305 P.2d 932; People v. Tokich, 128 Cal.App.2d 515, 519, 275 P.2d 816; People v. Carlson, 177 Cal.App.2d 201, 207, 2 Cal.Rptr. 117); it is the declaration to the defendant of his disposition or punishment once his criminal guilt has been ascertained. (In re Anderson, 34 Cal.App.2d 48, 50, 92 P.2d 1020.) A minor who has been made a ward of the Juvenile Court, as we have pointed out above, is not deemed convicted of a crime. Moreover, a transfer from the custody of the Youth Authority to that of the Director of Corrections...