People v. Rosario

• Decision Date: 07 November 2012
• Citation: 953 N.Y.S.2d 299,2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 07323,100 A.D.3d 660
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Argelis ROSARIO, appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

100 A.D.3d 660
953 N.Y.S.2d 299
2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 07323

The PEOPLE, etc., respondent,
v.
Argelis ROSARIO, appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Nov. 7, 2012.

[953 N.Y.S.2d 300]

Randall D. Unger, Bayside, N.Y., for appellant.

Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Sharon Y. Brodt, and Roni C. Piplani of counsel), for respondent.

MARK C. DILLON, J.P., RUTH C. BALKIN, LEONARD B. AUSTIN, and JEFFREY A. COHEN, JJ.

[100 A.D.3d 660]Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Hollie, J.), rendered November 13, 2008, convicting him of course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree (two counts), course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree, endangering the welfare of a child, and bail jumping in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant was charged with sexually abusing his cousin, who was eight years younger than the defendant, over the course of approximately six years. The evidence admitted at trial included the defendant's written and videotaped statements, wherein he described five incidents of sexual conduct with the victim. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree (two counts), course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree, endangering the welfare of a child, and bail jumping in the second degree.

[100 A.D.3d 661]Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court, after a Frye hearing ( see Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013), providently exercised its discretion in precluding expert testimony on the issue of false confessions and the use of undue influence in police interrogations because the proposed testimony was not relevant to the specific circumstances of this case ( see People v. Bedessie, 19 N.Y.3d 147, 947 N.Y.S.2d 357, 970 N.E.2d 380;see generally People v. LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449, 452, 835 N.Y.S.2d 523, 867 N.E.2d 374;People v. Lee, 96 N.Y.2d 157, 162, 726 N.Y.S.2d 361, 750 N.E.2d 63;People v. Allen, 53 A.D.3d 582, 584, 861 N.Y.S.2d 775).

Moreover, there is no merit to the defendant's contentions that the testimony of the victim's cousin, to whom the victim first reported the abuse approximately two years after the abuse ended, and the victim's uncle, who then revealed the victim's claims to the victim's immediate family members, including a New York City police officer, constituted improper bolstering. Although these family members had no firsthand knowledge of the events about which the victim would testify, the nonspecific testimony about the child-victim's reports of sexual abuse did not constitute improper bolstering, as it was offered for the relevant, nonhearsay purpose of explaining the investigative process and completing

[953 N.Y.S.2d 301]

the narrative of events leading to the defendant's arrest more than two years after the abuse occurred ( see People v. Terry, 85 A.D.3d 1485, 1488, 926 N.Y.S.2d 216;People v. Manning, 81 A.D.3d 1181, 1183, 917 N.Y.S.2d 721,lv. denie...