People v. Rotroff

• Decision Date: 22 October 2009
• Docket Number: No. H033527.,H033527.
• Citation: 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 558,178 Cal.App.4th 619
• Parties: THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DENIS KEITH ROTROFF, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

178 Cal.App.4th 619

100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 558

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DENIS KEITH ROTROFF, Defendant and Appellant.

No. H033527.

Court of Appeals of California, Sixth District.

October 22, 2009.

Gordon B. Scott, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Gregg Zywicke and Bridget Billeter, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

ELIA, J. —

Appellant Denis Keith Rotroff appeals from an order of commitment for an indeterminate term that followed appellant's waiver of a jury trial and submission upon documentary reports and the trial court's finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant was a sexually violent predator (SVP) within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 6604.¹ On appeal, appellant challenges the constitutionality of the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) as amended by the passage of Proposition 83 in 2006.²

We affirm.

A. Single Subject Rule

Appellant maintains that Proposition 83³ violated the single subject rule because it "combined too many disparate topics without a common purpose under a broad and amorphous theme of dealing with sex offenders." The single subject rule is expressed in two constitutional provisions, one applicable to statutes and the other applicable to initiative measures. California Constitution, article II, section 8, subdivision (d), which applies to initiatives, provides: "An initiative measure embracing more than one subject may not be submitted to the electors or have any effect."⁴

(1) The single subject rule is "a constitutional safeguard adopted to protect against multifaceted measures of undue scope" and "forbids joining disparate provisions which appear germane only to topics of excessive generality such as `government' or `public welfare.'" (Brosnahan v. Brown (1982) 32 Cal.3d 236, 253 [186 Cal.Rptr. 30, 651 P.2d 274].) "The single subject rule as applied to the initiative has the dual purpose of avoiding logrolling and voter confusion. (Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 231 [149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281].)" (Harbor v. Deukmejian (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1078, 1098 [240 Cal.Rptr. 569, 742 P.2d 1290].) It is intended to avoid passage of a measure that combines "provisions which might not have commanded majority support if considered separately" and to "minimize the risk of voter confusion and deception. [Citation.]" (Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 231.)

(2) The California Supreme Court has "construed our two single subject provisions in an accommodating and lenient manner so as not to unduly restrict the Legislature's or the people's right to package provisions in a single bill or initiative. [Citations.]" (Californians for an Open Primary v. McPherson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 735, 764 [43 Cal.Rptr.3d 315, 134 P.3d 299].) It has "found the single subject rules to have been satisfied so long as challenged provisions meet the test of being reasonably germane to a common theme, purpose, or subject. [Citations.]" (Ibid., fn. omitted.)

In Brosnahan v. Brown, supra, 32 Cal.3d 236, 248, it was argued that Proposition 8, commonly known as "The Victims' Bill of Rights," violated the single subject rule because it contained "disparate provisions covering a variety of `unrelated' matters such as school safety, restitution, bail, diminished capacity, and the like." The California Supreme Court concluded that the proposition met "the `reasonably germane' standard" because "[e]ach of its several facets bears a common concern, `general object' or `general subject,' promoting the rights of actual or potential crime victims." (Id. at p. 247.) The court stated: "As explained in the initiative's preamble, the 10 sections were designed to strengthen procedural and substantive safeguards for victims in our criminal justice system. These changes were aimed at achieving more severe punishment for, and more effective deterrence of, criminal acts, protecting the public from the premature release into society of criminal offenders, providing safety from crime to a particularly vulnerable group of victims, namely school pupils and staff, and assuring restitution for the victims of criminal acts." (Ibid.) The "readily discernible common thread" uniting the initiative's provisions was the goal of protecting and enhancing the rights of crime victims. (Ibid.)

In Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168, 41 P.3d 3], the Supreme Court upheld Proposition 21 against various claims that it violated the single subject rule. (27 Cal.4th at pp. 573-581.) Its provisions related to the "Three Strikes" law, criminal gang activity, and the juvenile justice system. (27 Cal.4th at pp. 574-575.) The court determined that "[t]he general object of the initiative is to address the problem of violent crime committed by juveniles and gangs ...." (Id. at pp. 575-576.) It decided: "[T]he provisions of Proposition 21 that change laws regarding gang-related crime and the juvenile justice system are reasonably germane to each other and to the initiative's common purpose of addressing violent crime committed by juveniles and gangs." (Id. at p. 576.) It further determined that "[r]evising the list of violent and serious felonies to add crimes for which juveniles and gang members can receive increased penalties is reasonably germane to the initiative's general purpose of addressing juvenile and gang-related crime," "[e]ven if some of the crimes added to the list of violent and serious felonies are more likely to be committed by an adult who is not a gang member," because "the offenses nonetheless constitute crimes that commonly are committed by members of street gangs and/or juvenile offenders ..." (id. at p. 578).

(3) In this case, the separate provisions of Proposition 83 are "reasonably germane to a common theme, purpose, or subject" of protecting the public against the commission of sex offenses. Appellant has not identified any provision that falls outside this common purpose. The fact that the measure affected both Welfare and Institutions Code and Penal Code sections is not determinative. (See Manduley v. Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 574-575.) While appellant complains that the proposition reflects a "scattered shotgun approach to diverse topics," he concedes that these topics "relate broadly to sex offenses." (4) The single subject rule does not require that each of the provisions of an initiative measure effectively interlock in a functional relationship. (Id. at p. 575.)

In addition, we must reject appellant's assertion that the public probably misunderstood that "SVP proceedings were civil in nature" since we assume the voters duly considered and comprehended the voter materials. (Manduley v. Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 580.) The proposition's official summary prepared by the Attorney General, which is contained in the Official Voter Information Guide, explicitly stated up front, underneath the official title: "Changes current two-year involuntary civil commitment for a sexually violent predator to an indeterminate commitment, subject to annual review by the Director of Mental Health and subsequent ability of sexually violent predator to petition court for sexually violent predator's conditional release or unconditional discharge." (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 2006) official title and summary of Prop. 83, p. 42, italics added.) One of the proposition's express findings supporting the changes in the SVPA stated in part: "California is the only state, of the number of states that have enacted laws allowing involuntary civil commitments for persons identified as sexually violent predators, which does not provide for indeterminate commitments." (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, text of Prop. 83, § 2, subd. (k), p. 127, italics added.)

(5) Proposition 83 does not violate the single subject requirement of article II, section 8, subdivision (d), of the California Constitution.

B. Due Process

Appellant maintains that the revised SVPA, by providing for an indeterminate term of commitment for persons determined to be SVP's, "creates an unacceptable risk that an SVP detainee who no longer qualifies as a sexually violent predator will have his commitment continued in violation of his right to due process." He insists that due process requires "periodic and mandatory hearings in which the government bears the burden of proof."

(6) There is no dispute that persons committed under the SVPA are entitled to the protection of due process. "[F]or the ordinary citizen, commitment to a mental hospital produces `a massive curtailment of liberty,' [citation], and in consequence `requires due process protection.' [Citations.]" (Vitek v. Jones (1980) 445 U.S. 480, 491-492 [63 L.Ed.2d 552, 100 S.Ct. 1254].) "It is clear that `commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.' Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 [60 L.Ed.2d 323, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1809] (1979)." (Jones v. U.S. (1983) 463 U.S. 354, 361 [77 L.Ed.2d 694, 103 S.Ct. 3043].)

(7) The existence of a recognized liberty interest requiring due process protection, however, does not tell us what procedures are required because "due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." (Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 481 [33 L.Ed.2d 484, 92 S.Ct. 2593].) The United States Supreme Court has generally eschewed "rigid rules and instead ha[s] embraced a framework to evaluate the sufficiency of particular procedures." (Wilkinson v. Austin (2005) 545 U.S. 209, 224 [162 L.Ed.2d 174, 125 S.Ct. 2384].) "To determine what procedural protections ...